DASD SEDNEY MEETING WITH ROK DEFENSE MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001841 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018 TAGS: PBTS PGOV PHSA PINS MARR KS KN SUBJECT: DASD SEDNEY MEETING WITH ROK DEFENSE MINISTER REF: SECSTATE 96122 (IRAQ COALITION DEMARCHE) Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun REASONS 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Following the end of SPI-19 (septel),DASD David Sedney and Ambassador Vershbow met with ROK Minister of National Defense Lee Sang-hee. The Ambassador delivered reftel points on the pending announcement by the Government of Iraq regarding reductions in Coalition forces that would include withdrawal of ROK troops by the end of the year. The Minister responded with a series of questions, but otherwise accepted the news with neither complaint nor apparent pleasure. He said he shared DASD Sedney's largely positive assessment of SPI-19, but also agreed that difficult issues remained to be resolved in the lead up to his October 17 Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) with Secretary Gates. Lee cited the environmental issues relating to camp returns and public rollout of the cost and timeline for the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) as the most sensitive matters on the agenda. He compared observations with the Ambassador and DASD Sedney on reports that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il had taken ill, and pledged close U.S.-ROK information sharing in the days ahead. Lee advised that it would be important for the SCM to publicly demonstrate the strength and readiness of the U.S.-ROK Alliance to deal with what may come. END SUMMARY CONCLUDING THE ZAYTUN MISSION -------------- ¶2. (C) Following the end of Security Policy Initiative talks in Seoul (SPI-19),David Sedney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, met with ROK Minister of National Defense Lee Sang-hee to coordinate on Iraq, Afghanistan and other U.S.-ROK Alliance concerns. He was accompanied to the meeting by Ambassador Vershbow. The Ambassador delivered reftel talking points on the pending announcement by the Government of Iraq about reductions in Coalition forces that would include complete withdrawal of the ROK's aytun Unit by the end of the year. The Ambassador stated that the Zaytun troops had completed their mission with honor and had earned the gratitude of the Iraqi and American people. He added that much work still needed to be done in Iraq and that non-military contributions by the ROKG would be welcomed. Sedney added that the ROK military had earned the respect and admiration of the U.S. for their performance. ¶3. (C) The Minister of National Defense responded with a series of questions concerning the Government of Iraq's decision: -- Are reduction plans for U.S. Forces in place already? -- Are further reductions in U.S. Forces planned? -- What will be the command relationship for U.S. Forces after the UN mandate expires? -- What were the criteria for asking some countries to remain in the Coalition in 2009? -- What did the Ambassador mean by non-military assistance? A PRT? ¶4. (C) DASD Sedney answered that the President had announced a reduction of 8,000 U.S. troops in his September 9 National Defense University speech, but that further reductions in U.S. Forces were dependent upon on-going discussions with the Government of Iraq. Sedney also explained that the U.S.-Iraq General Agreement and Status of Forces Agreement were still being negotiated and that the Government of Iraq had decided which countries it would ask to stay on based on Iraqi judgment of Iraq's security requirements. The Ambassador defined non-military assistance as technical, humanitarian and financial contributions, including investment guarantees aimed at economic development assistance. ¶5. (C) The Minister thanked them for answering his questions. He said that if the ROK was to be asked to redeploy to somewhere else his government would need full details and would require close consultations on the matter. POSITIVE SPI-19, BUT DIFFICULT ISSUES REMAIN FOR SCM -------------- -------------- \ ¶6. (C) DASD Sedney gave a positive assessment of the just-concluded SPI-19 talks, but noted that it had taken late night and early morning senior-level meetings to achieve progress toward resolving environmental issues relating to camp returns and reaching a compromise solution on the Combined Defense Improvements Project (CDIP) funding issue. He predicted to the Minister that Secretary Gates would want to discuss Afghanistan at their upcoming October 17 Security Consultative Meeting in Washington. He praised the success of the August 2008 Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) military exercise (at which ROK commanders took the lead for the first time),and expressed our appreciation to Minister Lee and President Lee Myung-bak for their personal participation in the exercise. ROKG SENSITIVITY ON CAMP RETURNS -------------- ¶7. (C) Referring to the evolving deal on CDIP, DASD Sedney said he hoped that U.S. and ROK Alliance managers could do a similarly good job of handling the sensitive environmental issue relating to the return of Camp Hialeah and eight other former U.S. Forces Korea facilities to Korea by the end of this year. The Ambassador added that he had been in Busan the previous day and that Busan Mayor Huh had said he was eagerly awaiting the return of the Hialeah property, which the city plans to turn into a public park. ¶8. (C) Defense Minister Lee replied that he thought SPI had once again proven to be a very valuable tool for effective Alliance management. He agreed that UFG had been a very good exercise, with many lessons learned. He cautioned, however, that several sensitive Alliance issues remained to be resolved and that the LMB Administration would prefer to move cautiously, for fear that mismanagement of those issues could result in renewed anti-government or anti-U.S. protests. He cited base returns as particularly worrisome, stating that the City of Busan wanted Hialeah returned quickly, but that the central government could be heavily criticized by the public depending on how it addressed the environmental concerns prior to handover. He and DASD Sedney agreed that it was positive that the SOFA Special Joint Committee on Camp Returns is scheduled to meet on September 30. They pledged that both sides would work in the lead up to that meeting to design an appropriate joint environmental assessment process with which to resolve the issue. YRP COST/TIMELINE ALSO VERY SENSITIVE -------------- ¶9. (C) MND Lee warned that the cost and timeline for completion of the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP),as well as when and how the cost and timeline would be disclosed to the Korean public, was also a highly sensitive subject in ROK domestic political arena. He urged that we be "wise and not too hasty" in the way we handle the issue. INFORMATION SHARING ON KJI'S HEALTH -------------- ¶10. (C) MND Lee turned the discussion to intelligence, media reports and rumors indicating that Kim Jong-il had been stricken by illness -- possibly a stroke. Lee said there were many mysteries relating to KJI and that we should devote serious thought to what it all meant. He assured that MND was devoting a lot of effort to how the North Korean leadership situation could develop, and pledged that he would work with USFK on that. He said the ROKG would not hesitate to ask the USG if/when it needs anything from us in that regard. ¶11. (C) EAP/K Director Kurt Tong stated that it was our working assumption that KJI was in fact seriously ill, but could recover. He advised calm and suggested it would be unwise to fuel speculation being circulated by the media since that could provoke the wrong reaction from the North. Lee agreed, noting that no one outside of North Korea had known that KJI's father, Kim Il-sung, had passed away until the DPRK made the announcement some twelve hours after his death. The Ambassador asked that the Minister share any new information the ROK may acquire on the developing leadership situation. DASD Sedney assured the Minister that the U.S. wished to work closely with the ROK and that we stood ready to be the ROKG's partner in every sense of that word. PREPARING FOR THE OCT 17 DEFENSE MINISTERIAL -------------- ¶12. (C) Looking ahead to his October 17 SCM meeting with Secretary Gates, MND Lee advised that it was most important that the meeting display the strength of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. He also said it should demonstrate to the public how we will address our security concerns. DASD Sedney noted and the Minister of National Defense agreed that since it would be the last SCM under the Bush Administration and the first for the LMB Administration it was important to make the meeting as productive as possible. ¶13. (U) DASD Sedney has cleared this message. VERSHBOW