Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SEOUL1826
2008-09-16 04:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON FORMER PRSIDENT ROH

Tags:  PREL PGOV GG RU KS 
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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1630
INFO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4859
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4733
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001826 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RU KS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON FORMER PRSIDENT ROH
MOO-HYUN

Classified By: AMB Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001826

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RU KS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON FORMER PRSIDENT ROH
MOO-HYUN

Classified By: AMB Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a September 9 meeting with former
President Roh Moo-Hyun at his home in Bongha village, South
Gyeongsang Province, Ambassador Vershbow and Roh discussed
the accomplishments that took place in the U.S.-ROK bilateral
relationship during the last two years of Mr. Roh's term,
including the signing of the KORUS FTA. Roh was reluctant to
engage on current issues, and offered familiar opinions on
how to deal with North Korea, Japan's insensitivity to its
neighbors, and the asymmetrical nature of the ROK-U.S.
military alliance. Roh said that while his former political
party was now in opposition, that did not alter the
progressive trend in Korean politics over the long term. END
SUMMARY


2. (C) The Ambassador opened the discussion by expressing
appreciation for some of the tough decisions Roh had taken
during the Ambassador's tenure to strengthen U.S.-Korean
relations, especially the conclusion of the KORUS Free Trade
Agreement. He expressed the hope that the legislatures of
both countries would ratify the FTA, and pledged to do his
best to persuade Congress when he returned to Washington.
Roh responded only by expressing his hope that the FTA would
become a reality, but did not evince much pride in his own
achievement (which remains controversial among some
progressives).


3. (C) Asked for his views on the latest problems in
relations with North Korea, Roh expressed the opinion that
integration of the DPRK and ROK is not likely even if the
North collapses. In his view, the best way forward was to
work to relieve the North of its fear that the United States
intended to attack the DPRK or undermine its regime. That
was the best way to encourage North Korea to move toward a
more open society. It is a case of crisis management rather
than a policy choice, the former President noted, and the
only solution is to alleviate North Korea's insecurity. The
Ambassador said we had made numerous efforts to assure the
North that we had no intention to attack it, but we couldn't
guarantee the regime's survival -- that was in the hands of
the North Korean leaders themselves, who needed to face up to
the need for political and economic reforms.


4. (C) Ambassador Vershbow noted key decisions made during
Mr. Roh's last two years that had advanced the transformation
of the ROK-U.S. military alliance. Mr. Roh complained that
the expectations of the two sides during the negotiations
were quite different. Progressives in Korea expected that
the ROK and the U.S. would have equal rights and that fair
compromises would be possible, whereas the U.S. took
advantage of its superior status. He ruefully recalled the
solution to the question of the environmental clean-up of
U.S. bases being returned to Korea. In that case, the U.S.
had rebuffed the progressives' demands that the bases be
restored to their natural state, insisting on applying the
same standard that it applied in other countries. Roh said
that, on this and other issues, he felt caught between the
two sides' positions, and in the end had to accept the
position of the Ministry of Defense, which was closer to that
of the U.S.


5. (SBU) The former President commented that one of his
accomplishments was in finding a suitable site for a new U.S.
Embassy. The Ambassador indicated that this was still a
delicate and ongoing issue, since it could be years before
the new Camp Coiner site was cleared by the Cultural Heritage
Administration.


6. (SBU) The discussion of cultural heritage led to comments
on Japanese attempts during the colonial period to erase
Korea's cultural identity and the need for Japan to confront
its own history. Roh said that Japan had never experienced
foreign occupation or fighting on its own soil, with the
exception of the A-bomb, so it did not understand the
emotions of neighbors who had lived under Japanese
occupation.


7. (SBU) Asked if he was giving advice to the ROK's
opposition Democratic Party, the successor to Roh's Uri
Party, Roh replied that he was just an observer. He offered
the view that the shift of power to the conservatives was not
in harmony with the long-term progressive direction of Korean
democracy. The former president predicted that, under the
new conservative administration, the opposition would succeed
in forcing changes to legislation being considered in the
National Assembly if public opinion demanded it. If the
changes appeared regressive, the Democratic Party would have

to oppose them.


8. (C) COMMENT: Roh seemed uncomfortable throughout the
meeting -- his wife, who was also present, was far more
welcoming and good-humored, and seemed to be enjoying life in
Roh's beautiful retirement home. Roh gave the appearance of
being detached from current political debates, and seemed
most interested in meeting with the crowds of fans and
tourists that gather twice each afternoon outside the house
for an audience with the former President. However, most
observers expect that, sooner or later, Roh will try to
assume a more active role in progressive politics from behind
the scenes. END COMMENT
VERSHBOW

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