KIM JONG-IL ILL HEALTH RUMORS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001795 E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2018 TAGS: KS KN PGOV PREL SUBJECT: KIM JONG-IL ILL HEALTH RUMORS Classified By: Ambassador Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Rumors that Kim Jong-il (KJI) may be gravely ill or worse are circulating in Seoul, fueled by various leaked intel and his failure to appear at the September 9 Pyongyang parade celebrating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK. The ROKG initial reaction is cautious, seeking factual information on his condition. President Lee Myung-bak held an emergency cabinet-level meeting about the issue on September 10. South Koreans are of the view that if KJI is indeed incapacitated or dead, the situation would be quite different from that of Kim Il-sung's death in 1994, when his successor, KJI, had been clearly designated and the military power balance was more favorable to the North than now. ROKG officials have also conveyed to us informally that that even if the rumors of KJI's ill-health turn out to be exaggerated on this occasion, Seoul and Washington should begin discussions on North Korean contingencies. END SUMMARY. -------------- KJI OUT OF SIGHT -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Koreans noted in early September that Kim Jong-il had not been seen publicly since August 14, when the DPRK's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that he had visited Korean People's Army Unit 1319, a report that could not be independently verified. The buzz increased after a September 6 media report cited an unnamed ROKG official to the effect that five Chinese doctors had recently visited Pyongyang during late August/early September to treat KJI. Subsequent articles speculated that he had suffered a stroke or heart attack, noting his reputed diabetes and heavy drinking. ¶3. (SBU) On September 10, ROK media reported widely the fact that KJI did not appear at the September 9 parade commemorating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK. The articles noted that KJI had regularly appeared at the September 9 event, the DPRK's equivalent of July 4, and that 60th anniversaries were especially important in Korea. Subsequent media reports on September 10 cited North Korean officials, including head of state Kim Yong-nam, denying that there was anything wrong with KJI, but not explaining his absence. The tone of ROK media reports has been cautious, noting past episodes, such as mid-2006, when KJI was out of sight for months and subsequently reappeared. By the evening of September 10, TV and radio news broadcasts were dominated by speculation over KJI's whereabouts and welfare; media speculation also extended to possible successors, KJI's past illnesses, regime stability, and the future of inter-Korean relations. -------------- ROKG REACTION -- MUTED SO FAR -------------- ¶4. (C) ROKG reaction has also been cautious, focusing on getting the facts. President Lee Myung-bak held an emergency meeting on the issue on September 10, which a contact described as focusing on the ROKG impression that KJI is chronically ill, even if his current condition is not known. Minister of Unification Kim Ha-joong told the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee during previously scheduled September 10 hearings that, "Nothing has been confirmed but that (Kim) was absent from the September 9 event." Meanwhile, MOFAT's Six-Party Talks Representative told a contact that he believed KJI was now recuperating from a stroke. ¶5. (C) Contacts in MOFAT's Office of Inter-Korean affairs told us that they felt certain that KJI had suffered a stroke and that MOFAT officers had been recalled from leave to work the issue. In a previously scheduled meeting with POL M/C, MOFAT Director-General Chang Ho-Jin said that he was quite worried that there was no "real planning or discussion" on North Korea "contingency" issues. He said that he had been thinking about these issues for some time and that he had been asked recently to begin inormal consultations with his USG counterparts. Perhaps, PDAS Arvizu's visit later this month could kick off such discussions, DG Chang said. ¶6. (C) Also in a previously scheduled meeting, GNP National Assemblyman Lee Sang-deuk, who is the elder brother of President Lee, told POL M/C that he believed Washington and Seoul should have a process in place to discuss North Korean issues. Rep. Lee assessed that the "political mood" within the ROKG had changed substantially since the Roh Moo-hyun days; he was quite certain the Blue House would welcome such discussions, which should focus on broad political strategies, such as how to assess the possible reactions of regional powers, especially China, Russia and Japan, and how to deal with a likely flood of refugees. -------------- UNCERTAINTY COMPARED TO 1994 -------------- ¶7. (C) If KJI is incapacitated or worse, Korean analysts have pointed out, the situation would be much more uncertain than in 1994, when KJI had clearly been groomed to succeed Kim Il-sung. ROK media in recent days have renewed speculation about which, if any, of KJI's sons might succeed him, but virtually all DPRK watchers here agree that all the sons are too weak to have any chance at the top slot. Another difference from 1994 is that the DPRK is much weaker now, after the mid-1990s famine and subsequent continuing decline in agricultural output and GDP. The corollary is that South Korea is substantially stronger, economically and militarily, than in 1994. In addition, the fact that the DPRK tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006 and may have several nuclear weapons on hand would bear on any succession crisis. Taken together, several analysts believe, these factors could mean that the ROKG, with the conservative Lee Administration in charge, would be interested in affecting outcomes in the DPRK if KJI leaves the scene, which is in contrast to 1994 when the ROK was interested in stability above all else. -------------- COMMENT: CONSULTATIONS NEEDED -------------- ¶8. (C) In all high-level meetings, the U.S. and South Korea always agree to consult closely on North Korea issues. This was easier said than done, however, during the past ten years, mostly because Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung were committed to a broad engagement policy centered on providing stability and predictability for North Korea. Fearing a provoked North Korea, Roh and Kim essentially forbade discussions of North Korean contingencies within the ROKG, let alone with us. Given DG Chang's overture -- and Rep Lee's views -- we assess that this topic is no longer taboo. Even if the current rumors about KJI's ill health turn out to be exaggerated, we believe this episode points to the need to begin regular consultations with the ROKG about contingencies in the North, and soon. VERSHBOW