DPRK FOOD AID VISIT: GOOD BEGINNING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001528 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2018 TAGS: KN KS EAID PGOV SUBJECT: DPRK FOOD AID VISIT: GOOD BEGINNING Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) During a June 30-July 5 visit to the DPRK to observe the beginning of the U.S. food aid program, USAID and Embassy Seoul officers met with World Food Program (WFP) and U.S. NGO representatives who said cooperation with DPRK authorities on launching the program was good. The WFP and NGOs had been granted access to most (but not all) counties during a just-completed food-security assessment, and arrangements for the offloading, bagging and storing of wheat from the Baltimore, a U.S. vessel that had arrived at Nampo harbor on June 28, were favorable. WFP stressed the importance of continuing USG attention to proper implementation of the Letter of Understanding (LOU) outlining the program. END SUMMARY. -------------- WFP AND NGOS SEE SERIOUS FOOD SITUATION -------------- ¶2. (C) WFP and NGO representatives -- the latter from World Vision International, Mercy Corps, Samaritan's Purse, Global Resource Services, and, with no representative in Pyongyang as of our visit, Christian Friends of Korea -- completed field visits to most counties in North Korea in late June. Without going into detail on the assessments, which were pending approval from headquarters, they said the food situation in many counties, particularly in North Hamgyong Province (northeast corner of the DPRK),was serious. ¶3. (C) WFP Chief Representative Jean-Pierre de Margerie said that he saw the DPRK as facing "chronic food insecurity" ever since the famine conditions of the mid-1990s, but now his assessment was that food insecurity had deteriorated further and was "very high," though "nowhere near the situation of the mid-1990s." He added that there were some questions about the value of the assessments because DPRK authorities had selected those the WFP was able to interview, but WFP's 15 years of experience in country allowed it to produce a balanced assessment. He asked for coordination on the commodities to be supplied under the program, asking about corn-soybean combinations and other potential sources of protein. ¶4. (C) Separately, a WFP official who had worked in the DPRK from 2003 to 2006 and had joined the assessment team to North Hamgyong, said that some people there were relying on grasses and wild vegetables for food, meaning they would have to consume two kg per day to get sufficient calories. She added that two groups that normally get enough food, farmers and officials, were having trouble there, the former because the government was taking over half of their production (usually only 25 percent) and the latter because they were not used to having rations cut so had developed few coping strategies. She described cooperation during the assessment as good, citing an instance where the team had asked to see a different household than planned and was granted access on five minutes notice. ¶5. (C) U.S. NGO Team Leader Jim Hinton said that PDS distributions were down to 150 grams per person every two weeks, instead of 650 grams, and that farmers were being asked to lend extra food to the government and feared that they would not be paid back. Deputy U.S. NGO team leader Jan Morrow said that there were also signs of food insecurity in the 18 North Pyongan Province counties and in particular in the 7 Chagang Province counties that his teams had assessed. Among the signs of lack of food were high school and work absentee rates, and reduction in livestock numbers as animals were consumed or sold. ¶6. (C) Swedish Embassy official Ingrid Johannsen, completing four years in Pyongyang including extensive travel within the DPRK, said that food insecurity is not often visible to the naked eye, but that most children in the DPRK appeared several years younger than their actual age because of stunting. She added that local DPRK officials have started targeting the most vulnerable families in their counties, providing extra food and assistance to them, a sign that they see the need to prevent starvation. A WFP official mentioned this response too, adding that DPRK trading companies are being asked for monetary contributions to support the assistance. -------------- DISTRIBUTION PLANS UNDERWAY -------------- ¶7. (C) As they developed initial distribution plans during the first week of July, WFP and NGO officials were also ramping up their staff, with 59 and 14 monitors expected, respectively. The WFP is interacting with the National Coordination Commission, as before. WFP's de Margerie said that the LOU agreement to allow inspections of any PDCs on 24 hours of notice, compared to the two weeks that WFP was used to, would help keep the program on track. Diversion should be minimized because the bagging companies would provide a tally of bags of wheat offloaded and monitors would be allowed to take physical stock of food bags in warehouses for the first time. WFP monitoring teams will be based in Chongchin, Hungnam, Haeju, and Pyongyang. While saying that initial cooperation with DPRK authorities had been good, de Margerie stressed that Washington's backing would be needed throughout to ensure that the LOU was implemented properly. ¶8. (C) U.S. NGOs will interact with the Korean American Private Exchange Service (KAPES),a Ministry of Foreign Affairs offshoot that replace the Flood Damage Response Commission in 2005, but still appears to be getting organized. Throughout our delegation's visit, our main handler from KAPES, 48-year-old MFA official Kim Yong-suk, stressed the need to get U.S. food distributed as fast as possible, hinting that U.S. NGOs were moving too slowly, even though wheat was still being offloaded from the Baltimore. He asked that our delegation rent vehicles and drivers, since KAPES "only has four vehicles." Other handlers, such as 35-year old Shin Song-ho, had recently been seconded from the Ministry of Environment based on English-language ability, so the sense was that the DPRK side was also ramping up to staff the food distribution program. U.S. NGOs were preparing to place monitoring teams in Huichon and Sinuiju. ¶9. (C) Two WFP officials cited concerns about transportation, which the DPRK is supposed to provide under the LOU. China is apparently demanding that the DPRK return all of the Chinese railroad cars still in the DPRK during July, and will in turn provide 1,400 railroad cars for DPRK use, but the officials worried that there could be problems with this exchange. ¶10. (C) In an attempt to gain a broader understanding of the food situation, we asked to see informal markets in Huichon or other areas, but KAPES refused on the grounds that markets were unrelated to U.S. food distribution. A WFP official said that DPRK officials had long refused to even discuss markets with the WFP, claiming that they did not exist, but that lately they were willing to show WFP monitors rural food markets. The official said her sense was that the authorities were still trying to suppress market activity, by restricting the age of sellers, the opening times, and the commodities that could be sold. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) During our visit to Pyongyang and other areas, we saw the WFP and U.S. NGOs carefully preparing to distribute U.S. food assistance, and we repeatedly heard from KAPES and local officials that the DPRK government is eager to receive and distribute the food. Hence, the program appears to have the potential to work very well. The increasing presence of U.S. and other international personnel in different parts of the DPRK will mean increased contacts with DPRK officialdom and possibly ordinary North Koreans; the increased presence could also lead to frictions given the DPRK's penchant to control everyone's movements. Another cautionary note came from Swedish Ambassador Mats Foyer, who noted that DPRK officials regard non-government organizations suspiciously as "anti" government organizations. VERSHBOW