Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SEOUL1434
2008-07-18 06:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:
MOFAT SAYS ROK PLANNING MORE ASSISTANCE TO
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001434
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/K
STATE FOR EUR/RPM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2018
TAGS: MARR MASS PREL PTER KS AF
SUBJECT: MOFAT SAYS ROK PLANNING MORE ASSISTANCE TO
AFGHANISTAN
Classified By: Acting POL M/C Brian McFeeters, Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001434
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/K
STATE FOR EUR/RPM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2018
TAGS: MARR MASS PREL PTER KS AF
SUBJECT: MOFAT SAYS ROK PLANNING MORE ASSISTANCE TO
AFGHANISTAN
Classified By: Acting POL M/C Brian McFeeters, Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) POL-MIL Chief met on July 17 with Director Kim
Yong-hyon of the ROK-U.S. Security Policy Division at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) to receive new
information on ROKG internal decisions regarding additional
South Korean contributions in Afghanistan. Director Kim
stated that the ROKG is dedicated to continuing their policy
of contributing to the stabilization of Afghanistan. Towards
that end, the ROKG pledged $30 million at the Paris donors
conference and is also planning to expand its current Korean
Medical and Vocational Training Team (KMVTT) at Bagram air
base. The medical clinic at the KMVTT re-opened on June 30
and two additional vocational trainers are due to be sent to
the KMVTT in the future.
2. (C) Director Kim went on to identify three new areas he
said the ROKG is looking at in regards to increasing its
participation in the stabilization and reconstruction of
Afghanistan. The first is expansion of the existing
vocational training mission and eventual construction of a
vocational training center at the Bagram KMVTT site. To
begin with the Korean trainers plan to operate out of the
cafeteria previously used by the ROK troops stationed at
Bagram last year. Once local training needs have been
identified, a "significant expansion" of the vocational
training program and facility is likely, Kim said.
3. (C) The second new contribution being considered is the
provision of equipment to the Afghan National Police. He
requested U.S. assistance in identifying a list of the
equipment that is most needed.
4. (C) Finally, Director Kim informed us that the ROKG had
made an interagency decision to train Afghan National Police
in Seoul, rather than attempting to do so in Afghanistan due
to the fear of casualties and the lack of adequate security
for ROK personnel operating in Afghanistan. Kim cited the
high potential for significant domestic political fallout if
Koreans were to be put in harm's way in Afghanistan as the
reason for ROKG reticence. Pressed on the idea of sending
police trainers to Afghanistan Kim replied that the ROKG had
not entirely ruled out the idea, but had chosen to begin with
a Seoul-based training program.
5. (C) Throughout the course of the meeting Director Kim
conveyed the ROK's strong desire for close consultations with
the USG and GOA to identify the kind of vocational training,
police training and police equipment that would be most
useful on the ground. Questioned as to whether or not the
ROKG still planned to send a survey team to Afghanistan,
Director Kim stated they had no current plan in place to do
so. POL-MIL Chief pointed out that while the USG would
always be happy to provide advice in answer to the ROKG's
questions, the best way for the ROKG to secure that
information would be to conduct an on-site survey by
appropriate South Koran personnel who could engage directly
with the Afghan National Police and other relevant officials
in Afghanistan.
VERSHBOW
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/K
STATE FOR EUR/RPM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2018
TAGS: MARR MASS PREL PTER KS AF
SUBJECT: MOFAT SAYS ROK PLANNING MORE ASSISTANCE TO
AFGHANISTAN
Classified By: Acting POL M/C Brian McFeeters, Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
1. (C) POL-MIL Chief met on July 17 with Director Kim
Yong-hyon of the ROK-U.S. Security Policy Division at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) to receive new
information on ROKG internal decisions regarding additional
South Korean contributions in Afghanistan. Director Kim
stated that the ROKG is dedicated to continuing their policy
of contributing to the stabilization of Afghanistan. Towards
that end, the ROKG pledged $30 million at the Paris donors
conference and is also planning to expand its current Korean
Medical and Vocational Training Team (KMVTT) at Bagram air
base. The medical clinic at the KMVTT re-opened on June 30
and two additional vocational trainers are due to be sent to
the KMVTT in the future.
2. (C) Director Kim went on to identify three new areas he
said the ROKG is looking at in regards to increasing its
participation in the stabilization and reconstruction of
Afghanistan. The first is expansion of the existing
vocational training mission and eventual construction of a
vocational training center at the Bagram KMVTT site. To
begin with the Korean trainers plan to operate out of the
cafeteria previously used by the ROK troops stationed at
Bagram last year. Once local training needs have been
identified, a "significant expansion" of the vocational
training program and facility is likely, Kim said.
3. (C) The second new contribution being considered is the
provision of equipment to the Afghan National Police. He
requested U.S. assistance in identifying a list of the
equipment that is most needed.
4. (C) Finally, Director Kim informed us that the ROKG had
made an interagency decision to train Afghan National Police
in Seoul, rather than attempting to do so in Afghanistan due
to the fear of casualties and the lack of adequate security
for ROK personnel operating in Afghanistan. Kim cited the
high potential for significant domestic political fallout if
Koreans were to be put in harm's way in Afghanistan as the
reason for ROKG reticence. Pressed on the idea of sending
police trainers to Afghanistan Kim replied that the ROKG had
not entirely ruled out the idea, but had chosen to begin with
a Seoul-based training program.
5. (C) Throughout the course of the meeting Director Kim
conveyed the ROK's strong desire for close consultations with
the USG and GOA to identify the kind of vocational training,
police training and police equipment that would be most
useful on the ground. Questioned as to whether or not the
ROKG still planned to send a survey team to Afghanistan,
Director Kim stated they had no current plan in place to do
so. POL-MIL Chief pointed out that while the USG would
always be happy to provide advice in answer to the ROKG's
questions, the best way for the ROKG to secure that
information would be to conduct an on-site survey by
appropriate South Koran personnel who could engage directly
with the Afghan National Police and other relevant officials
in Afghanistan.
VERSHBOW