AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH NEW NATIONAL SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001292 SIPDIS TOKYO ALSO FOR A/S HILL E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINR KS KN SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH NEW NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR KIM SUNG-HWAN Classified By: AMB. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4(b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a June 26 meeting with the Ambassador, National Security Advisor Kim Sung-hwan, in office less than a week, said that it was a shame that, because of the protests over American beef, President Bush's July 9-11 visit had to be postponed. President Lee looked forward to rescheduling the visit as soon as possible -- preferably in early August, before President Bush's visit to Beijing. NSA Kim expressed appreciation for U.S. efforts to find a solution on beef. He predicted that the beef protests could reach their peak this Saturday night, the anniversary of the June 29, 1987 democracy proclamation. The numbers were getting smaller, but protestors were becoming more violent. President Lee now needed to get the protests behind him so that he could focus on the economy and other domestic and foreign policy issues. Kim strongly emphasized the need for both Korean and U.S. legislatures to ratify the FTA. He also put a high priority on resolving key alliance issues, such as base returns and the SMA negotiations. END SUMMARY. -------------- Beef Protests -------------- ¶2. (C) New National Security Advisor Kim Sung-hwan opened his June 26 meeting with the Ambassador by expressing President Lee's appreciation for the help given by President Bush which made it possible for the beef agreement to enter into force. NSA Kim said that it was regrettable that President Bush had to postpone the visit because of the protests over beef. President Lee would very much like to reschedule the visit at the earliest possible date; otherwise, South Koreans would read it as a negative sign in the U.S.-ROK relationship. Kim urged the Ambassador to explore an early August visit, before or after President Bush's visit to Beijing. The Ambassador said that he knew that President Bush would want to show support for President Lee ¶3. (C) Commenting on the on-going beef protests, Kim assessed that the numbers were getting quite small, much less than 10,000. However, they were the core groups; many were extremists. Therefore, the protests were getting rougher and more violent. Kim predicted that the coming weekend -- June 28-29 -- could see a spike in the protests, because these were memorable dates for the protestors: the commemoration of June 29, 1987 democracy proclamation, which ushered in the end of military dictatorship of Chun Doo-hwan and the beginning of free elections. -------------- VIP Meetings -------------- ¶4. (C) NSA Kim said that the Blue House was still very interested in coming up with a joint vision statement or declaration on the future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance for the possible summit in August. The Ambassador said that current drafts showed some gap between the two capitals, especially in how each saw the role of the alliance outside the Peninsula. The Ambassador suggested that the two NSCs get together to thoroughly discuss the drafts. ¶5. (C) Turning to the Secretary's visit this weekend, June 28-29, the Ambassador said that Dr. Rice may review with President Lee the progress in the Six Party Talks and her desire to consult closely with the ROKG as we move into phase ¶3. The Secretary would also be interested in the Lee Administration's views on a permanent peace regime to replace the 1953 Armistice and the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism, as these were subjects that would be addressed at some point in phase 3. ¶6. (C) NSA Kim said that President Lee was looking forward to getting the beef issue behind him. All activities during this week surrounding North Korea's denuclearization moves were an opportunity to highlight cooperation with the United States. President Lee had already told Foreign Minister Yu to issue a welcoming statement in response to North Korea's nuclear declaration. Seoul's main concern regarding the declaration, Kim said, was that it did not include nuclear weapons. This was a big issue among the Korean conservatives. Kim hoped that the 6PT would soon deal with North Korean's nuclear weapons. While the ROKG looked forward to phase 3, we all must realize the magnitude of the challenge in getting rid of the North's nuclear programs and weapons. Pyongyang's demand for light water reactors would present tremendous difficulties for all of us, Kim observed. -------------- Blue House Priorities -------------- ¶7. (C) The most urgent issue for the Blue House was to normalize the domestic political scene by convening the National Assembly. Although the Blue House was pressing all the parties, the opposition UDP seemed to be adopting a harder position. Soon after the National Assembly is opened, the Blue House will work toward the early ratification of the KORUS FTA. The United States must also ratify the FTA soon, Kim stressed; otherwise, President Lee's political sacrifice in opening the beef market will have been for nothing. The Ambassador said he knew President Bush was committed to the KORUS FTA and that the Administration would do its best to successfully complete its trade agenda this year. We also understood President Lee's political situation. ¶8. (C) NSA Kim said that U.S.-ROK Alliance issues, such as the SMA and base-return negotiations, must also make progress. These issued had become very sensitive among the Korean public over the past decade or so; they required sensitive handling. The Ambassador said that Washington was well aware of these sensitivities, and the need for caution until the beef crisis subsided. Perhaps, both sides should be looking at solutions which did not break new ground, such as a simple inflation-adjusted extension of the previous SMA agreement and a base-return arrangement similar to that of last year. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Kim Sung-hwan is an experienced diplomat very comfortable in all things American. He has done several tours in the United States and with the North America Bureau in the Foreign Ministry. (He is also the most senior Russian speaker at MOFAT, having done Soviet studies at the University of London and serving previously as ROK Ambassador to Uzbekistan.) Relaxed and affable, one of his staff told us after the meeting that the atmosphere in the NSC had changed substantially; it was much more calm than under Kim Byung-kook. Kim's deputy, Kim Tae-hyo, however wondered whether the new NSA was sufficiently tough to get all the ministries in line. Certainly, our impression is that the NSC is now under a capable diplomat who knows the system well, although more ideological critics might question whether a bureaucrat like Kim Sung-hwan truly understands and will advance Lee Myung-bak's political agenda. VERSHBOW