UPDATE FOR THE SECRETARY'S JUNE 26-27 VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001280

SIPDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KS KN
SUBJECT: UPDATE FOR THE SECRETARY'S JUNE 26-27 VISIT TO
SEOUL

REF: SEOUL 01244

Classified By: AMB Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Developments on beef and North Korea issues
create an opportunity to get the Koreans -- up until now
completely paralyzed by the beef crisis -- to reengage on our
bilateral and international agenda. This cable provides an
update to our earlier scenesetter, and suggests some priority
issues to raise at Saturday's meetings with President Lee and
Foreign Minister Yu. END SUMMARY

--------------
BEEF UPDATE
--------------


2. (C) On June 26, South Korea publicly issued the new
import rules for U.S. beef, implementing our bilateral beef
agreement reached on April 18 and legally reopening the
Korean market to all cuts of U.S. beef for the first time
since 2003. The voluntary agreement that U.S. exporters will
not send meat from cattle older than 30 months to South Korea
"until consumer confidence improves" seems to have generally
allayed public concerns, and most mainstream media have
supported the government's efforts this week to put the beef
issue behind it.


3. (C) The biggest challenge for the Lee Administration is
how to get back on its feet. The opposition United
Democratic Party (UDP) is certainly not helping: it is still
calling for renegotiation of the beef agreement and refusing
to end its boycott of the National Assembly, further
stymieing governance. Although the number of demonstrators
has generally decreased, the participants are becoming much
more radicalized and sometimes violent. The coalition of
anti-beef civic groups has called for a major demonstration
when you are here on Saturday (the largest demonstrations
have tended to be on weekends). The government hopes this
will be the final crescendo of protests and that the public
will be ready to move on.


4. (C) The beef protests have generally been aimed at the
Lee Government, not at the United States -- and indeed Korean
officials acknowledge that no other trading partner would
have done what the U.S. did to help Korea find a way through
this unanticipated crisis. Some Koreans you meet may propose
additional steps on beef, to further assuage public concerns
and calm the political waters. But at this point, the best
approach is probably to let the Korean people refamiliarize
themselves with U.S. beef as it starts flowing back into the
market (which probably won't begin in earnest for another
month or so). Both the ROKG and U.S. industry have committed
to major outreach efforts to promote the safety of U.S. beef,
which should also help increase consumer confidence.


5. (C) The Korean leadership is now concerned that after
taking a huge hit over the beef agreement and working to get
the new National Assembly session to ratify the KORUS FTA in
the next few months (likely September),President Lee will be
left hanging if Congress fails to approve the KORUS FTA later
this year. President Lee and FM Yu will want to hear that
their politically damaging work to salvage the beef deal was
not in vain -- that the Administration remains committed to
KORUS ratification this year, and will do everything possible
to include KORUS with the Colombia FTA in any package deal
with the Congress. Lee may also update you on his thoughts
regarding the timing of ratification in Korea. Our position
has been that it makes sense for both sides to ratify the
agreement as soon as their political processes will permit.
But given our inability to control the timing of
Congressional ratification, we have refrained from pushing
the ROKG too hard for immediate ratification (which is Lee's
inclination anyway).

--------------
NORTH KOREA
--------------


6. (C) The beef issue has diverted a lot of public and media

attention away from the Six Party Talks. Lee Myung-bak's
harder line against the North generally resonates with the
public, which seems largely apathetic to North Korean
rhetorical attacks and insults. Friday's explosion of the
cooling tower at Yongbyon is likely to turn some heads, but
it will largely be seen as a Six-Party Talks' success, not a
result of Lee Administration policy. North Korea objects to
President Lee's emphasis on reciprocity in North-South Korea
relations and his Administration's refusal to endorse the
2000 and 2007 Summit Declaration. Bilateral engagement has
all but ceased outside of the context of the Six Party Talks,
but so far the government and public remain patient.


7. (C) As we begin to transition from phase 2 to phase 3 of
the Six Party Talks, Seoul can help us in pressing for a
robust verification regime of the declaration. As Chair of
the Energy and Economy Working Group, South Korea may request
that you press Japan to begin contributing its share of Six
Party energy assistance. South Korea will also be interested
in our thinking on how to sequence denuclearization steps in
phase 3, and when we envisage launching parallel talks on a
permanent peace regime to replace the 1953 Armistice and the
Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism.

--------------
SUGGESTED PRIORITIES FOR YOUR MEETINGS
--------------


8. (C) As noted, the beef issue has paralyzed top-level
decision-making on other issues for nearly two months, so
your visit is an opportunity to get the Koreans to focus once
again on the broader agenda:

-- On NORTH KOREA, with North-South relations largely
frozen, it is especially important for the South Koreans to
be seen as fully engaged with us in planning next steps in
the Six Party process. Moreover, as we seek to move forward
on verification of the Declaration and a roadmap for Phase 3,
South Korean support can be helpful in countering passivity
on the part of our other partners. Therefore, we suggest
offering to intensify bilateral consultations with Seoul over
the next few weeks aimed at shaping an agreed roadmap for
phase 3 and forging a unified position for the first round of
four-way talks on a permanent peace regime to replace the
1953 Armistice.

-- On TRADE ISSUES, you should express our appreciation
that President Lee opened the beef market this past week,
standing firm in the face of massive demonstrations and
finally resolving the beef situation that had been bequeathed
him by former President Roh. You should moreover express
satisfaction that our two sides were able to find a way to
address most public concerns without formally renegotiating
the beef agreement -- something that would have served
neither Korean nor U.S. interests. Finally, you let your
Korean interlocutors know that while the climate for trade is
difficult in Washington, KORUS remains in the running, and
that President Bush remains firmly committed to his trade
agenda and intends to do everything possible to include KORUS
with the Colombia FTA in any package deal with the Congress.

-- On SUMMIT PREPARATIONS, in addition to updating the
Koreans on White House efforts to reschedule the President's
visit, you should urge FM Yu and National Security Advisor
Kim Sung-hwan to lean on their bureaucracy to take a more
forward-looking and global approach to the proposed "vision
statement" for the summit. The Koreans continue to take a
narrow, peninsular approach that is not in sync with
President Lee's own emphasis on "Global Korea." Since
controversial alliance issues (burden-sharing, camp returns)
are being deferred until the fall, we will not have many
concrete deliverables beyond the "vision statement."

-- On CLIMATE CHANGE, we should thank Korea for hosting
the June 20-22 Fourth Major Economies Meeting (MEM4),which
succeeded in securing agreement on a draft MEM leaders'
declaration, albeit limited in its ambition. Korea signaled
a willingness to make a binding pledge to slow its emissions.
Its interventions at MEM4 were helpful, but infrequent and



muted, perhaps a consequence of its self-image as a "bridge"
between the developed and the developing. You should
encourage a more active Korean role at Toyako. We hear that
President Lee plans to announce at the G8 summit the outlines
of a domestic climate change program that is somewhat more
aggressive than Korea's existing program. Details will only
be announced after Lee returns.


9. (C) In sum, your visit is an opportunity to buck up a
beleaguered, but still important, ally and enlist Korean
support where we need it most. We look forward to seeing you
on Saturday.
VERSHBOW