NO DECISION TO EXTEND ROK DEPLOYMENT IN IRAQ; NO

S E C R E T SEOUL 001253 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP, PM, AND NEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2018 TAGS: PARM MASS PREL KS IZ SUBJECT: NO DECISION TO EXTEND ROK DEPLOYMENT IN IRAQ; NO TIMELINE FOR POST-UNSCR LEGAL REQUIREMENTS REF: A. STATE 60836 ¶B. SEOUL 504 ¶C. SEOUL 150 ¶D. SEOUL 1243 Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun, Reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. In response to reftel A, Kim Hyon-du, Deputy, ROK-U.S. Security Cooperation Division, told poloff that the ROKG has not yet determined the type of post-UNSCR 1790 legal structure that would be required for ROK participation in Iraq beyond 2008 because it has not yet decided whether to extend the ROK Zaytun Division's deployment. As previous Post reporting indicated (reftel B and C),the current ROK deployment of 650 troops in Irbil is set to expire in December 2008. When the last extension was approved amid political opposition in December 2007 and halved the number of ROK troops, it was widely speculated that no further extensions would be made. ROKG interlocutors continue to indicate that an extension for 2009 is unlikely, especially given ROK domestic political sensitivities surrounding the recent beef protests (reftel D) and the ROKG intention to reevaluate the U.S. policy vis-a-vis Iraq after the November elections. Should the ROKG pursue an extension and the National Assembly approves it, the ROK would likely seek a ROK-Iraq SOFA based on the U.S.-Iraq SOFA, or consider signing onto the U.S.-Iraq SOFA. However, ROKG officials have yet to seriously consider what the legal structure would look like because there remains significant uncertainty about extending the ROK presence in Iraq. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) Poloff explored ROKG intentions regarding its post-UNSCR involvement in Iraq during recent meetings with Kim Hyon-du, Deputy, ROK-U.S. Security Cooperation Division, and Hong So-youn, Deputy, SOFA Affairs Division, ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT). Both officials indicated that the ROKG was currently consumed with addressing the ongoing candlelight vigils protesting the Lee Myung-bak Administration's handling of U.S. beef import resumption. The decision whether to extend the Zaytun deployment in Iraq, let alone the type of legal structure that would be needed to protect ROK servicemembers operating in Iraq in a post-UNSCR environment, had not been determined. ¶3. (C) Kim noted that gaining the necessary support for an extension among the ROK public and National Assembly would prove challenging, particularly until the domestic political situation stabilized. In the interim, the ROKG had placed on hold the decision whether to request the Zaytun extension from the National Assembly, along with ROKG decisions on its Afghanistan contributions and a number of other problematic Alliance issues on the Korean Peninsula, he said. (NOTE: In recent weeks, the ROKG postponed our annual Security Consultations on Allied Partnership (SCAP) talks, as well as bilateral negotiations on our alliance burdensharing agreement and camp returns. A ROKG survey team slated to visit Kabul in mid-June to prepare for a possible despatch of ROK police trainers was also postponed indefinitely pending a complete internal review of ROK contributions to Afghanistan. See reftel D. END NOTE.) ¶4. (C) Kim explained that the ROKG was committed to continue contributing to reconstruction efforts in Iraq, but it was questioning whether an extended ROK military deployment was the best way to maximize the benefits its contribution could have, both in support of the Iraqi people and the U.S.-ROK Alliance. Kim also noted that even before the beef issue, the ROKG had intended to base its deployment decisions, at least in part, on how U.S. policy vis-a-vis Iraq is affected by the U.S. elections in November. Therefore, Kim did not expect that an interagency decision whether to pursue an extension would be made until late in the year. He explained that the procedure for an extension would require the interagency ROKG to submit a request to the National Assembly for approval before the end of December. (NOTE: In each of the previous five years, the National Assembly has delayed its vote on extending the Zaytun deployment until the final days of December. END NOTE.) -------------- SOFA LEAST OF THEIR CONCERNS -------------- ¶5. (S) In the event that the ROKG decided to request an extension of the deployment and the National Assembly approved it, both Hong and Kim agreed that the ROK would either look to the U.S.-Iraq SOFA as a model for negotiating a separate ROK-Iraq SOFA arrangement, or consider the possibility of signing onto the U.S.-Iraq SOFA. Hong, resident Korean expert on the U.S.-ROK SOFA, said that given the relatively small numbers (less than 650) and expected short time-frame for ROK military deployment (no more than a couple years, if that),it would be "a waste of time" to negotiate a ROK-Iraq SOFA from scratch when the U.S.-Iraq SOFA was likely to meet ROK needs. At this point, the exact procedures, timeline, or legal requirements necessary to complete the process under either option are "pure conjecture," according to Kim. He emphasized that at this stage, the question was not how to secure legal protections for its servicemembers operating in Iraq and Kuwait, but whether ROK servicemembers would continue to be deployed there at all. Both officials agreed that if the political decision to maintain ROK military presence in Iraq were reached, the legal procedural aspects could be quickly resolved. VERSHBOW