CANADIAN READOUT ON MAY 7-9 PYONGYANG MEETINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001113 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2017 TAGS: KN KS PGOV CN SUBJECT: CANADIAN READOUT ON MAY 7-9 PYONGYANG MEETINGS Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: DPRK Foreign Minister Pak Ui-chun told a Canadian delegation on May 8 that the DPRK was expecting to move forward on denuclearization if the USG took appropriate actions and that relations with South Korea were "alarmingly strained," according to an official at the Canadian Embassy in Seoul who accompanied the Canadian Foreign Ministry's Director General for East Asia Gordon Houlden on his trip to Pyongyang. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Director General Houlden, the most senior Canadian official to visit Pyongyang, requested a meeting with the appropriate vice foreign minister, but was pleased to be offered a 40-minute meeting Foreign Minister Pak Ui-chun on May 8 instead; Pak was accompanied by Vice Foreign Minister of the Sixth Department Kim Hyong-joon but not Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan, with whom the Canadians had also requested a meeting. A Canadian Embassy Seoul officer provided a readout, using his notes from the meeting. -------------- DENUCLEARIZATION -------------- ¶3. (C) On denuclearization, Pak asked that Houlden tell ROKG interlocutors that its nuclear weapons program was not directed at the ROK but was instead a deterrent, and that he tell USG interlocutors that the USG should "fully implement" agreements with the DPRK in order for the denuclearization process to move forward. Pak also said (in answer to a question) that allegations of DPRK involvement with Syria were "ridiculous"; that the DPRK was ready to submit the nuclear declaration to the Chinese Government "today" if the USG would take appropriate actions; stressed that full denuclearization would require adequate compensation; and complained that only one-fourth of promised energy and energy-related assistance for Phase II had been provided so far. ¶4. (C) Pak said the April meeting between A/S Hill and VFM Kim Gye-gwan in Singapore had resulted in an agreement under which the DPRK would submit its declaration, and the USG "would lift its two sanctions." On USG denuclearization policy, Pak said that the earlier USG insistence that the DPRK move first had been changed, replaced by the current action-for-action approach, and that President Bush's support for humanitarian aid to the DPRK was a significant step. As part of a question, Houlden asked for Pak's views on the Northeast Peace and Security Mechanism but got no reply on that issue. -------------- NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS -------------- ¶5. (C) Pak said that relations between the DPRK and ROK were "alarmingly strained" because (President) Lee Myung-bak had reversed the last 10 years of inter-Korean relations by "rejecting" the June 2000 and October 2007 Summit statements; he said the ROK should respect these internationally recognized declarations. As a result of the strained relations, discussions about sending a joint cheering squad to the Beijing Olympics had ceased. Pak said that Lee's approach was comparable to President Bush's overturning of the nuclear negotiations that preceded him. Pak also criticized Lee's decision to allow imports of U.S. beef, which had raised a "hue and cry" among the people. ¶6. (C) Returning to the subject of inter-Korean relations later, Pak said that the DPRK remained committed to the goal of reunification of the two Koreas, but that this had to be done in a way that respected different ideologies and did not impose one system or another. "Great strides" in this area had been made in the last 10 years, but now the effort faced "real challenges." Pak said his expectation was that the ROK would not continue on its current path, but that if it did, the DPRK would have to revise its view of North-South relations. -------------- HUMAN RIGHTS -------------- ¶7. (C) Pak rejected Houlden's criticism of the DPRK's human rights policy, saying that Canada and the U.S. had a double standard; for example, U.S. human rights abuses during the war in Iraq are not mentioned. Pak also said that the UN Special Rapporteur on DPRK Human Rights (Vitit Muntarbhorn) was a "running dog of the U.S." and that he and others sought to overthrow the DPRK government by raising human rights. That was why the DPRK refused to allow him to visit. -------------- OTHER MEETINGS -------------- ¶8. (C) Foreign Ministry Director General Ho Yong-bok told Houlden that the nuclear issue could be resolved in one to two years, depending the USG's willingness to "terminate its hostile policy" toward the DPRK. The DPRK sought conditions under which the DPRK and U.S. could "coexist." ¶9. (C) Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK Liu Xiaoming told Houlden that the DPRK leadership was still arriving at a decision about complete denuclearization, and that the DPRK would increase its cooperation on denuclearization if it were removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. The DPRK government had deliberately decided to show restraint and remain engaged after the public allegations of its involvement with Syria's nuclear program were made, showing resolve not to walk away from the negotiating table. He said that North Korea was upset at only receiving a limited amount of the energy and non-energy assistance promised under Phase II. The Chinese government was trying to work quietly to persuade the DPRK to accept international standards. The Ambassador said that he was the first foreign diplomat to hold a press conference in Pyongyang. DPRK press personnel had attended and watched while foreign reporters asked questions. ¶10. (C) World Food Programme Country Director for North Korea Jean-Pierre DeMargerie told Houlden that his organization saw signs of food insecurity and even food crisis in some areas, with particular concern about inequalities in food distribution. People in some areas were eating only two meals a day, and the average household was spending 70 percent of its income on food. There had been three consecutive years of bad harvests, so the food situation was likely to get worse. But DeMargerie cautioned that no international organization had direct access to data about food and nutrition status across the DPRK. VERSHBOW