FORMER FM SONG: PHASED APPROACH FOR BEEF IS THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001058 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN SUBJECT: FORMER FM SONG: PHASED APPROACH FOR BEEF IS THE BEST SOLUTION Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a May 22 luncheon meeting with the Ambassador, National Assembly member-elect (and former Foreign Minister) Song Min-soon said that it was up to the U.S. to find a way out of the current beef situation and recommended a phased opening of the beef market (as the Roh administration had proposed late last year) as the only way to assuage the liberal United Democratic Party's (UDP) concerns. Song said that Koreans were caught off guard at the abrupt announcement of the reopening of the Korean market to U.S. beef and were concerned that the necessary safety measures were not included in the agreement. If their concerns about beef were not addressed, Song said that the UDP would be forced to oppose ratification of the KORUS FTA, despite many members' support for the agreement. Turning to North Korea, Song said that the DPRK might be willing to make a deal with the U.S. while President Bush was in office to move forward on phase three of the denuclearization agreement if the terms were "very good," but they were more likely to wait for a new U.S. administration. On South Korea's relations with the North, Song said that he perceived a discrepancy between President Lee's approach to the North and the harder-line views of the Blue House staff -- a difference that Kim Jong-il would try to exploit to the fullest. END SUMMARY. -------------- BEEF SOLUTION SHOULD INCLUDE PHASED APPROACH -------------- ¶2. (C) In a luncheon meeting with the Ambassador on May 22, National Assembly member-elect (and former Foreign Minister) Song Min-soon said that he was tactfully working to prevent the current beef issue from becoming an anti-U.S. issue. According to Song, Koreans felt that the beef agreement appeared to be a hastily concluded deal designed to pave the way for a positive summit between the two Presidents. Song quoted Gordon Hewitt, a British judge, who said "justice should not only be done, but also clearly be seen as being done," to illustrate how Koreans felt ignored in the run-up to the final beef agreement. Most Koreans were caught off guard because they expected a phased approach that would first open the Korean market to U.S. beef less than 30 months of age, with beef over 30 months of age being approved at a later date. This, Song said, would allow time for broader safety concerns to subside. The Ambassador explained that there was no scientific basis for a two-stage approach; while such an approach might have worked last year, we needed a full market opening to ensure FTA ratification this year in the U.S. Congress. ¶3. (C) Song said that he had tried to lay the groundwork for a successful beef agreement during his tenure as Foreign Minister. When he talked with members of Lee Myung-bak's transition team and suggested that they hold a special meeting with ROKG officials to discuss the handling of the beef issue, Song said his suggestions fell on deaf ears. Instead, the new administration just "punched their way into office" and were unwilling to heed outside advice, Song lamented. Song recounted President Roh's phone conversation with President Bush March 29, 2007, when the two discussed the way forward on beef on the eve of the conclusion of the KORUS FTA negotiations on April 2. According to Song, President Roh told President Bush that after the OIE made its ruling, U.S. beef would not be treated unfairly in the Korean market. He pointed out that the uproar over the April 18 agreement was due in part to the agreement going further than Roh had pledged without sufficient explanation. Song said that President Roh had planned to resolve the issue by the end of 2007 in a manner that would not appear as though the U.S. had "strong-armed" Korea into the deal, but he was unable to do so. (COMMENT: This seriously downgrades what Roh actually promised in March 2007, which was to "respect" the OIG's scientific guidelines. END COMMENT) -------------- BEEF LINKAGE TO KORUS FTA -------------- ¶4. (C) Song said that although the beef deal may have helped the KORUS FTA's prospects in the U.S., it was having the opposite effect in Korea. Song said that beef and the FTA should not be linked and that they had been dealt with separately up until now. The Ambassador said that the U.S. had agreed not to include beef market opening in the FTA, but to treat it as a matter of food safety, on the understanding that it would be resolved on the basis of science and fact. If the U.S. were to now change the agreement based on other factors, U.S. industry representatives were likely to reject the deal, and businesses across the board would lose trust in the reliability of doing business with Korea. ¶5. (C) Without changing the beef deal to include a phased approach that would allow the UDP to get behind the deal and save face, Song said that the UDP was not likely to support the FTA. "A vote for the FTA has been turned into a vote for the beef agreement," which UDP members could not support, even those who had long favored the FTA. Song inquired if Korea's ratification of the FTA was a requisite for U.S. passage. The Ambassador responded that it was not a necessary condition but it would force the U.S. Congress to take a more serious look at the agreement and preempt calls to renegotiate the automobile chapter. -------------- PROSPECTS OF NORTH KOREA DENUCLEARIZING -------------- ¶6. (C) Song said that the DPRK wanted to get de-listed from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism and was therefore willing to move forward and provide a complete declaration of its nuclear materials and programs. Momentum created by this declaration would likely slow as talks began on denuclearization issues in phase three, as the level of DPRK commitment becomes "much steeper" at that point. Despite this challenge, Song said that the DPRK might accept a deal with the current U.S. administration to move forward with phase three of the February 2007 agreement if the terms of the deal were "very good." This said, Song thought that Kim Jong-il was nervous to step into uncharted waters of giving up his plutonium or allowing a U.S. Embassy to be opened in Pyongyang, and he was likely to continue negotiating while waiting to see who would become the next U.S. president. -------------- ROK POLICY TOWARD THE NORTH -------------- ¶7. (C) Song characterized President Lee's lack of willingness to listen to members of the previous administration by saying, "there is no one more blind than those who do not want to see." Song said that he advised members of President Lee's transition team "not to step too far out on a limb with regard to North Korea policy." Despite his advice, Song judged the Lee team had gone too far and was having a hard time "getting back to the trunk of the tree." Song said that in his discussions with the transition team he perceived a discrepancy between President Lee's approach to the North and the harder-line views of the Blue House staff -- a difference that Kim Jong-il would try to exploit to the fullest. For now, Korea should focus on denuclearization and let the dust settle on North-South relations. Once the dust settled, the way forward would be clearer, Song said. ¶8. (C) According to Song, Koreans wanted to see quick progress in relations with the North and each Korean president also should have the goal of advancing dramatically the relations between the Koreas or, "he should not be president." President Lee's Administration was already "under attack" by the people to do more in support of North Korea, especially in light of the U.S. announcement that it would provide food aid to the North. South Korea felt that it should be the "master" of the North and when another country gets ahead of the South, the Korean people get concerned. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Song is a savvy politician despite his protestations that he did not know Yeoido or how to navigate in the political world. He proved this as he rose through the ranks in the Roh administration despite being a "U.S. hand." He has already done much to earn his spurs in the UDP by engineering the political attack on the Ambassador, and thus the U.S., over a May 21 phone call between UDP Chair Sohn Hak-kyu and the Ambassador. A longtime U.S. expert known for his aggressive negotiating style, Song is likely to be a formidable opponent of the ROKG and at times the U.S. as he works his way up the political ladder. Assembly sources tell us he will likely be on the Defense Committee. VERSHBOW