UK AMBASSADOR TO DPRK: NORTH KOREA IS CHANGING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001020 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI KNNP EAID KS KN SUBJECT: UK AMBASSADOR TO DPRK: NORTH KOREA IS CHANGING Classified By: DCM Bill Stanton. Reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: UK Ambassador to Pyongyang, John Everard, told the DCM and Poloffs on May 16 that the there has been slow but noticeable change in North Korea during the two years that he has been serving there. North Korean elites were more openly flaunting their wealth in Pyongyang where it was not uncommon to see young women in high-heeled shoes carrying bags of expensive goods to their cars. Commenting on the continuing availability of luxury goods in Pyongyang, Everard said "It is like UN Resolution 1718 had no effect." Information continued to flow into the North via South Korean DVDs and other sources and spread via word of mouth throughout the country "like wildfire." Although it is too difficult to determine the true extent of the current food shortage, Everard said that he believed there was indeed a shortage that ranged somewhere between some NGOs' radical estimates of imminent starvation and others who believed the shortage was a complete myth. Everard said that despite Kim Jong-il's reported statements to the contrary, he believed it was still possible that Kim would be willing to give up his nuclear weapons although that decision had likely not yet been made. END SUMMARY. OUT AND ABOUT IN PYONGYANG -------------- ¶2. (C) In his two years in Pyongyang, UK Ambassador to Pyongyang John Everard said that he had seen slow but constant change. The number of, and people's reliance on, markets in Pyongyang was steadily increasing. As private business ventures increased, people were finding new ways to make a living. Everard said that two of his local employees had left their good positions in the Public Service Bureau (the government office that supplies all local staff for foreign embassies) to take on unspecified private business ventures that were likely to provide better income. One sign of increasing personal wealth was that more people had pet dogs in Pyongyang and as a result even dog walkers were emerging as a new form of employment. ¶3. (C) Everard said he also sensed a decline in North Korean's deference to authority figures, both foreigners and government officials. As examples, he noted that when he recently visited local primary schools where UK citizens were teaching English, the students and school administrators paid him less attention than in the past. Also, in meetings with North Korean officials, Everard said he noticed that the staff seemed to act more casually around Deputy Foreign Ministers where as in the past they were treated with much more respect and attention. ¶4. (C) The supply of electric power was fairly good lately, Everard noted. The outages were less frequent and lasted for shorter periods of time. In contrast to the past, now it was not uncommon to walk down the street at 9 P.M. and still see lights on in apartment buildings around town. ¶5. (C) The unstable nature of the power supply, however, remained the reason why many North Koreans were hesitant to use the subway system, Everard said, since passengers feared being stranded in total darkness underground. Even though foreigners were technically forbidden from riding the subway, Everard noted that he frequently did and had only been questioned once by a ticket attendant. LUXURY GOODS CONTINUE TO FLOW -------------- ¶6. (C) Commenting on the continuing availability of luxury goods in Pyongyang, Everard said "It is like UN Resolution 1718 had no effect." Scotch whiskey was readily available in Pyongyang and cost a fraction of the price for the same product in London. People were driving and being driven around in new Mercedes and some 300 Volkswagen cars that Kim Jong-il supposedly purchased as gifts for loyal friends were commonly seen around town. ¶7. (C) Unlike two years ago when he first arrived in Pyongyang, Everard said that wealthy elites were more visibly spending their money in public. It was not uncommon to see young women tottering around in high-heeled shoes and carrying bags loaded with expensive clothing and goods to their cars. A friend recently told Everard of an experience in an expensive shoe store where a couple came in, picked a pair of shoes off the shelf, left two 100 Euro notes on the counter, and then walked out without trying on the shoes or waiting for their change. This type of visible flaunting of wealth by the elites was contributing to the less privileged losing faith in the five-year economic plan that the North had launched in 2007, according to Everard. Similarly, when the North Korean regime publicly blasted Lee Myung-bak's economic stimulus plan for North Korea, Everard said that many of his North Korean contacts "salivated" at the prospect of earning USD 3000 per year. As the North recognized they had opened Pandor a's Box in discussing the plan, they attempted to discredit Lee and say that he never really intended to help the North Koreans but the damage had already been done. According to Everard, the elites in North Korea cared less about who was their next leader but more about maintaining their status and wealth. INFORMATION FLOWS IN THE DPRK -------------- ¶8. (C) Everard said that the North Korean people he met all had access to South Korean DVDs and therefore they also presumably had DVD players as well. Through these DVDs, Everard said that North Koreans have a better understanding of the economic disparity between North and South. As a sign that the DPRK officials recognize the potential harm that the DVDs can cause, Everard said that officials recently arrested a friend's daughter who was allegedly caught watching a South Korean program on a DVD. Despite tough enforcement measures, Everard said that he planned to take back South Korean DVDs for his friends and contacts in the North as they were in high demand. He also said that several of his DPRK contacts would ask to borrow South Korean books from his personal library and even enjoyed discussing the books with him afterward. ¶9. (C) More than any other method, word of mouth was still the most prevalent form of communication in North Korea, according to Everard. Most people did not read the newspaper or watch television to learn about what was going on in North Korea, an indication that the regime was losing its ability to communicate with the people on an official level. As information filtered in through the Kaesong Industrial Complex or Mt. Kumgang, it would spread "like wildfire" throughout the country. North Koreans love to talk, Everard said, and therefore it was common for people in Pyongyang to call their relatives out in the countryside and tell them what was happening in the capital. NY PHILHARMONIC RESPONSE -------------- ¶10. (C) According to Everard, many North Koreans saw the live televised performance of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra in February, and a subsequent re-broadcast. Despite his belief that North Koreans are generally unfamiliar with and do not appreciate Western classical music, he said that the North Koreans who attended the performance were visibly moved during the performance of Arirang. More than the music, the North Koreans were interested in the spectacle of having a U.S. orchestra playing in Pyongyang. FOOD SITUATION DIFFICULT TO JUDGE -------------- ¶11. (C) Everard was interested in the imminent USG announcement of food aid for North Korea but noted that it was very difficult to determine the true extent of the food shortage. According to Everard, estimates from the NGO Good Friends were wildly exaggerated while others said the shortage was a complete myth. Most observers fell somewhere in the middle, believing that there was a serious problem, he said. He cited a recent survey conducted by the World Food Program in the southeast regions of North Korea that estimated there were ample food supplies to last through the end of May but then they would have to turn to other goods, especially the potato harvest, for nourishment. Everard said that he had heard that DPRK officials recently told a delegation of German businessmen visiting Pyongyang that an appropriate gift to bring would be a shipping container of flour. The German delegation ignored the suggestion. KIM JONG-IL'S THINKING -------------- ¶12. (C) Everard discounted those who believed that Kim Jong-il would never give up his nuclear weapons. Although Kim had to tell most of his followers that he would never give them up, it was still possible that he could make a "quick decision" to surrender the nuclear weapons. Everard said that he thought Kim Jong-il had not made up his mind on the matter and would likely wait until the last minute before making a "surprise announcement." It was also not clear whether the DPRK military would allow Kim to move forward with a decision to disarm. VERSHBOW