UK AMBASSADOR TO DPRK: NORTH KOREA IS CHANGING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001020

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI KNNP EAID KS KN
SUBJECT: UK AMBASSADOR TO DPRK: NORTH KOREA IS CHANGING

Classified By: DCM Bill Stanton. Reasons 1.4(b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: UK Ambassador to Pyongyang, John Everard,
told the DCM and Poloffs on May 16 that the there has been
slow but noticeable change in North Korea during the two
years that he has been serving there. North Korean elites
were more openly flaunting their wealth in Pyongyang where it
was not uncommon to see young women in high-heeled shoes
carrying bags of expensive goods to their cars. Commenting
on the continuing availability of luxury goods in Pyongyang,
Everard said "It is like UN Resolution 1718 had no effect."
Information continued to flow into the North via South Korean
DVDs and other sources and spread via word of mouth
throughout the country "like wildfire." Although it is too
difficult to determine the true extent of the current food
shortage, Everard said that he believed there was indeed a
shortage that ranged somewhere between some NGOs' radical
estimates of imminent starvation and others who believed the
shortage was a complete myth. Everard said that despite Kim
Jong-il's reported statements to the contrary, he believed it
was still possible that Kim would be willing to give up his
nuclear weapons although that decision had likely not yet
been made. END SUMMARY.

OUT AND ABOUT IN PYONGYANG
--------------


2. (C) In his two years in Pyongyang, UK Ambassador to
Pyongyang John Everard said that he had seen slow but
constant change. The number of, and people's reliance on,
markets in Pyongyang was steadily increasing. As private
business ventures increased, people were finding new ways to
make a living. Everard said that two of his local employees
had left their good positions in the Public Service Bureau
(the government office that supplies all local staff for
foreign embassies) to take on unspecified private business
ventures that were likely to provide better income. One sign
of increasing personal wealth was that more people had pet
dogs in Pyongyang and as a result even dog walkers were
emerging as a new form of employment.


3. (C) Everard said he also sensed a decline in North
Korean's deference to authority figures, both foreigners and
government officials. As examples, he noted that when he
recently visited local primary schools where UK citizens were
teaching English, the students and school administrators paid
him less attention than in the past. Also, in meetings with
North Korean officials, Everard said he noticed that the
staff seemed to act more casually around Deputy Foreign
Ministers where as in the past they were treated with much
more respect and attention.


4. (C) The supply of electric power was fairly good lately,
Everard noted. The outages were less frequent and lasted for
shorter periods of time. In contrast to the past, now it was
not uncommon to walk down the street at 9 P.M. and still see
lights on in apartment buildings around town.


5. (C) The unstable nature of the power supply, however,
remained the reason why many North Koreans were hesitant to
use the subway system, Everard said, since passengers feared
being stranded in total darkness underground. Even though
foreigners were technically forbidden from riding the subway,
Everard noted that he frequently did and had only been
questioned once by a ticket attendant.

LUXURY GOODS CONTINUE TO FLOW
--------------


6. (C) Commenting on the continuing availability of luxury
goods in Pyongyang, Everard said "It is like UN Resolution
1718 had no effect." Scotch whiskey was readily available in
Pyongyang and cost a fraction of the price for the same
product in London. People were driving and being driven
around in new Mercedes and some 300 Volkswagen cars that Kim
Jong-il supposedly purchased as gifts for loyal friends were
commonly seen around town.


7. (C) Unlike two years ago when he first arrived in
Pyongyang, Everard said that wealthy elites were more visibly
spending their money in public. It was not uncommon to see
young women tottering around in high-heeled shoes and
carrying bags loaded with expensive clothing and goods to
their cars. A friend recently told Everard of an experience
in an expensive shoe store where a couple came in, picked a
pair of shoes off the shelf, left two 100 Euro notes on the
counter, and then walked out without trying on the shoes or
waiting for their change. This type of visible flaunting of
wealth by the elites was contributing to the less privileged
losing faith in the five-year economic plan that the North
had launched in 2007, according to Everard. Similarly, when
the North Korean regime publicly blasted Lee Myung-bak's
economic stimulus plan for North Korea, Everard said that
many of his North Korean contacts "salivated" at the prospect
of earning USD 3000 per year. As the North recognized they
had opened Pandor
a's Box in discussing the plan, they attempted to discredit
Lee and say that he never really intended to help the North
Koreans but the damage had already been done. According to
Everard, the elites in North Korea cared less about who was
their next leader but more about maintaining their status and
wealth.

INFORMATION FLOWS IN THE DPRK
--------------


8. (C) Everard said that the North Korean people he met all
had access to South Korean DVDs and therefore they also
presumably had DVD players as well. Through these DVDs,
Everard said that North Koreans have a better understanding
of the economic disparity between North and South. As a sign
that the DPRK officials recognize the potential harm that the
DVDs can cause, Everard said that officials recently arrested
a friend's daughter who was allegedly caught watching a South
Korean program on a DVD. Despite tough enforcement measures,
Everard said that he planned to take back South Korean DVDs
for his friends and contacts in the North as they were in
high demand. He also said that several of his DPRK contacts
would ask to borrow South Korean books from his personal
library and even enjoyed discussing the books with him
afterward.


9. (C) More than any other method, word of mouth was still
the most prevalent form of communication in North Korea,
according to Everard. Most people did not read the newspaper
or watch television to learn about what was going on in North
Korea, an indication that the regime was losing its ability
to communicate with the people on an official level. As
information filtered in through the Kaesong Industrial
Complex or Mt. Kumgang, it would spread "like wildfire"
throughout the country. North Koreans love to talk, Everard
said, and therefore it was common for people in Pyongyang to
call their relatives out in the countryside and tell them
what was happening in the capital.

NY PHILHARMONIC RESPONSE
--------------


10. (C) According to Everard, many North Koreans saw the live
televised performance of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra
in February, and a subsequent re-broadcast. Despite his
belief that North Koreans are generally unfamiliar with and
do not appreciate Western classical music, he said that the
North Koreans who attended the performance were visibly moved
during the performance of Arirang. More than the music, the
North Koreans were interested in the spectacle of having a
U.S. orchestra playing in Pyongyang.

FOOD SITUATION DIFFICULT TO JUDGE
--------------


11. (C) Everard was interested in the imminent USG
announcement of food aid for North Korea but noted that it
was very difficult to determine the true extent of the food
shortage. According to Everard, estimates from the NGO Good
Friends were wildly exaggerated while others said the
shortage was a complete myth. Most observers fell somewhere
in the middle, believing that there was a serious problem, he
said. He cited a recent survey conducted by the World Food
Program in the southeast regions of North Korea that
estimated there were ample food supplies to last through the
end of May but then they would have to turn to other goods,
especially the potato harvest, for nourishment. Everard said
that he had heard that DPRK officials recently told a
delegation of German businessmen visiting Pyongyang that an
appropriate gift to bring would be a shipping container of
flour. The German delegation ignored the suggestion.

KIM JONG-IL'S THINKING
--------------


12. (C) Everard discounted those who believed that Kim
Jong-il would never give up his nuclear weapons. Although
Kim had to tell most of his followers that he would never
give them up, it was still possible that he could make a
"quick decision" to surrender the nuclear weapons. Everard
said that he thought Kim Jong-il had not made up his mind on
the matter and would likely wait until the last minute before
making a "surprise announcement." It was also not clear
whether the DPRK military would allow Kim to move forward
with a decision to disarm.
VERSHBOW