SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 8 VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000001 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 8 VISIT TO SEOUL Classified By: Ambassador Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4(b/d) For the Secretary from Ambassador Stephens ¶1. (C) Madam Secretary, We at Embassy Seoul are delighted that you are able to make this visit. Foreign Minister Yu is eager to see you, especially as he had to cancel his visit to Washington last month due to key National Assembly hearings. President Lee Myung-bak wants to thank you and the President for strengthening trust between our two countries during the first year of the Lee Administration, and for receiving him so warmly in Camp David last year. FM Yu and President Lee will be keen to hear your advice on how to manage U.S.-ROK relations through the transition period. They will also want your counsel on other issues, especially the KORUS FTA ratification in the U.S., the global financial downturn, the Six-Party Talks and the Kim Jong-il regime, and how Seoul and Washington can maintain our close Alliance relationship. This is your sixth visit to Korea as Secretary of State. As before, your visit will demonstrate to the Koreans the importance we attach to this relationship, and our appreciation for their support around the world, most recently in Iraq. -------------- ROKG Domestic Context -------------- ¶2. (C) This has been a year of enormous domestic political changes in South Korea, with the conservative Grand National Party (GNP) winning the executive and legislative branches of the government. The transition has been very noisy. Unhappiness with Lee Myung-bak's style of leadership was almost immediate, beginning in the streets when tens of thousands of Koreans gathered in May and June to protest the government's decision to reopen imports of U.S. beef. In July and August the struggle was among the political parties as the GNP engaged in contentious negotiations with the opposition Democratic Party (DP) about the structure of the National Assembly's committees. This upheaval is still playing out in the National Assembly, where the GNP's recent decision to exercise its majority has both parties resorting to physical force. The GNP is committed to pushing through more than 70 mostly economic-related bills before the end of the current legislative session on January 8. Among these is the Korea-U.S. FTA, which DP lawmakers are trying to block by occupying the Assembly hall, despite the fact that former President Roh Moo-hyun, himself a DP member, concluded the agreement. ¶3. (C) Fairly or unfairly, South Koreans have blamed Lee for everything, ranging from poor cabinet selections to the financial crisis to deteriorating relations with the North. President Lee's approval rating has hovered around 25 percent for the past six months, a steep descent from a year ago when he was elected with an unprecedented 5.3 million vote margin of victory over his nearest rival. ¶4. (C) In the past month or so, President Lee has clearly decided that he must regain authority over the domestic political process. Among the first steps he has taken is to force through a package of bills that, even if they do not spur the economy, will help remake it. With a comfortable GNP majority in the National Assembly and disgust with the opposition mounting each day as the DP lawmakers remain camped out on mattresses on the Assembly floor, Lee has a chance to capitalize on his legislative strength. Another step will be a Cabinet reshuffle, which is likely in February, when Lee will have been in the Blue House for one year. If he succeeds, President Lee will emerge in firm control, empowering his administration to implement a far-reaching conservative agenda, including reforming taxation, labor and education laws. If he fails, President Lee will continue to struggle and could even become irrelevant, because the Korean constitution allows for only a single term in office. -------------- Economy: Bad News -------------- ¶5. (C) Disappointing economic performance is a key factor behind President Lee's lack of popular support. Korea has been severely affected by the global financial crisis and economic slowdown. The Korean won has fallen by about 29 percent over the last five months, although it was down by approximately 50 percent at one stage in late November. Export markets are slowing (November exports fell 18 percent from last year). Korea's stock markets have fallen by roughly the same percentage as U.S. indices since mid-summer, recovering somewhat in December from a steeper October decline. While President Lee Myung-bak has recently warned of negative GDP numbers for the first and possibly second quarter of 2009, most economists still predict positive GDP growth for Korea next year. These numbers are a far cry, however, from the seven percent growth Lee promised in his election campaign. ¶6. (C) Unlike some other countries, in Korea the image of the U.S. economy and financial system has actually emerged reasonably unscathed thus far. The actions of the Administration, especially the Fed's October 29 announcement of a USD 30 billion currency swap line with Korea and President Bush's strong support for including Korea in the November 15 financial summit, were seen as a big vote of confidence for the Korean economy, loudly applauded by the Korean public. -------------- KORUS FTA -------------- ¶7. (C) President Lee has been the biggest advocate of the KORUS FTA, submitting it to the National Assembly for ratification on October 8. The opposition DP does not fundamentally oppose the FTA, but wants additional trade adjustment measures for affected sectors of the Korean economy to be put in place before ratification. It also argues that Korea should not ratify before the prospects for U.S. Congressional action are clearer. In the current polarized political environment, the FTA legislation, like other government-sponsored bills, are now waiting for the "showdown," which could mean that the FTA could be ratified with only GNP legislators participating. We have refrained from inserting ourselves into what is largely a domestic debate. -------------- North Korea -------------- ¶8. (C) South-North cooperation and dialogue have deteriorated sharply since President Lee's inauguration in February. South Korean officials will justify their stance toward the North as consistent and reasonable: offering dialogue and continued economic engagement in exchange for progress on denuclearization. Indeed, the ROKG has continued to call for dialogue even after North Korean security personnel shot and killed a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang in July. The DPRK, however, has refused dialogue and demanded an ROK commitment to honor the October 2007 agreement between outgoing President Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Jong-il, which promised billions of dollars of aid to North Korea, as a pre-condition for talks. To pressure South Korea, the North is trying to create a crisis atmosphere, most recently by shutting down or restricting all inter-Korean land borders, which resulted in cancellation of once-popular Kaesong city tours and severe limits on the number of South Koreans who can go to the Kaesong Industrial Complex. ¶9. (C) Of deep concern to the South Koreans is the North Korean tendency to ignore Seoul while improving ties with Washington. FM Yu and President Lee will want to hear from you that Pyongyang cannot drive a wedge between Washington and Seoul, neither now nor under the Obama Administration. They want us to continue to reinforce to the North Koreans that inter-Korean relations should be improved and Pyongyang should tone down its rhetoric; FM Yu has even suggested informally to me that we might consider doing this in writing so that the message is delivered undiluted to KJI. The ROK will also be interested in your read on the incoming Administration's intentions for the Six Party Talks, which the ROK favors continuing, even though it shares our frustrations. -------------- Strategic Alliance -------------- ¶10. (C) In the Camp David summit meeting last year, Presidents Bush and Lee committed to transform the U.S.-ROK Alliance into a value-based strategic global alliance. We should encourage President Lee and FM Lee to move forward in several areas: -- Afghanistan: The ROKG is considering various aid options, including deploying a military unit, which will be politically difficult, requiring National Assembly consent. To date, the ROK has pledged USD 30 million at the June 2008 Paris donors conference and USD 5 million in transportation aid on December 12. -- Iraq: The ROK,s Zaytun Division, which contributed to the stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, returned to Seoul on December 19. On November 12, President Bush wrote to President Lee thanking the ROK for its contribution. The Korean Development Agency intends to remain in the Erbil region for one year with a $10 million budget to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance. -- Anti-piracy: After announcing its intention to deploy a naval warship to the Horn of Africa to participate in counter-piracy operations, the ROKG decided to delay the deployment for budgetary reasons; the estimated cost is around USD 30 million. Our contacts now predict that it will be February or March before a ROK ship deploys. In the meantime, the ROKG supported the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1851 on December 16 and is planning to participate in the inaugural meeting of the Contact Group on Somali Piracy proposed for January 13-14, 2009 in New York City. -- China and Japan: Much more than his predecessor, President Lee wants to work with Japan. Although tensions flare up now and then over history and disputed sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks, Lee has been quite warm in engaging his Japanese counterparts, establishing good relations with Fukuda. We understand that PM Aso will make his first official visit to Korea in January, thus continuing the so-called "shuttle" summits. With more diligence and enthusiasm, Lee has courted the Chinese, because he would like to see all aspects of ROK-PRC relations expand. While such closer ties are natural and welcome, Seoul needs to be more aware of China's non-transparent policies on issues ranging from economic assistance to trade to human rights to its dealings in Iran, Burma and Sudan. -- New Embassy: Under President Lee and Foreign Minister Yu, we have made progress toward agreement on a New Embassy Compound. It would be helpful for you to encourage your ROKG interlocutors to complete the process expeditiously so that we can move to new facilities which are more representative of the caliber of the U.S.-ROK relationship. -------------- Long List of Accomplishments -------------- ¶11. (C) Your list should not be confined to homework, because FM Yu and President Lee will see your visit as an opportunity to say farewell and to thank you and President Bush for standing firmly behind Korea for eight years. It has indeed been eight years of strong ties between our two countries. During this time, our two countries have deployed soldiers in support of the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan; concluded negotiation of a far-reaching free trade agreement; laid the groundwork for repositioning U.S. forces on the Peninsula; and worked together on the Visa Waiver and Work, English Study, Travel (WEST) programs to bring our two peoples closer. These are enormous achievements, ensuring that the United States has a key strategic presence on the Peninsula, which is very much wanted and welcomed by the Koreans. ¶12. (C) You should also take this opportunity to highlight the Administrations achievements on North Korea. Thanks to the Six-Party Talks, this part of the world now has a genuine multilateral initiative that can deliver a denuclearized North Korea and much more. Our two government have also worked together to improve North Korean human rights. In 2008, the ROKG under President Lee broke precedent by co-sponsoring a UN resolution -- long a USG priority -- deploring the human rights situation in the DPRK and calling for improvements. The ROK also resettled close to 2,500 DPRK defectors in 2008, more than ever before, and our two governments cooperated so that additional defectors could be resettled in the U.S. With ROKG facilitation, the Voice of America now has a new agreement to begin for the first time in January 2009 broadcasting Korean-language programs into the DPRK from South Korea, increasing the chances that North Korean citizens will hear about the outside world. This values-based cooperation between our two governments and peoples sends the strong message that the United States is committed to working with the ROK and like-minded partners to address and improve the situation of vulnerable North Koreans both in and out of the DPRK. STEPHENS