Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SARAJEVO532
2008-03-21 17:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - DODIK FORCED TO WITHDRAW PROPOSAL TO

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR PHUM KDEM SOCI ECON BK 
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VZCZCXRO1624
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #0532/01 0811744
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211744Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8091
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO BK PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000532 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB); NSC FOR
BRAUN; OSD FOR BEIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM KDEM SOCI ECON BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - DODIK FORCED TO WITHDRAW PROPOSAL TO
REVERSE MUNICIPAL REFORMS

REF: A. SARAJEVO 90

B. 07 SARAJEVO 615

Classified By: DCM JUDITH CEFKIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000532 SIPDIS SIPDIS EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB); NSC FOR BRAUN; OSD FOR BEIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM KDEM SOCI ECON BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - DODIK FORCED TO WITHDRAW PROPOSAL TO REVERSE MUNICIPAL REFORMS REF: A. SARAJEVO 90 ¶B. 07 SARAJEVO 615 Classified By: DCM JUDITH CEFKIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The international community and civil society groups scored a victory this week in blocking a move that would have walked back a key democratic gain in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This came on March 19, when Republika Srpska (RS) PM Milorad Dodik withdrew a proposal to eliminate the direct election of mayors in the RS. Dodik did so in the face of private and public pressure from the Embassy, other international representatives, civil society groups, and RS politicians from his own party. The proposal, if adopted, would have reversed a reform implemented in 2003 with the strong support of the U.S., Dodik, and his party, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD). It would also have constituted a major setback to our democracy and governance agenda in Bosnia to which we have devoted tremendous political energy and millions of dollars in assistance over the years. The RS Government had announced plans to make the dramatic change on March 13, and the Ambassador raised U.S. concerns directly with Dodik on March ¶14. Dodik failed to honor a private commitment to the Ambassador that he would withdraw the proposal from the Republika Srpska National Assembly (RSNA). He only relented in the face of a strong public statement by the U.S., Sweden, and The Netherlands critical of the proposal, as well as statements by the OSCE Head of Mission and visiting Secretary-General, and a concerted public campaign against it SIPDIS led by the non-governmental organization and USAID grantee, the Center for Civic Initiatives (CCI). This support provided SNSD mayors opposed to the measure with the political cover they required to do so publicly. END SUMMARY The RS Drops a Bombshell -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On March 13, the RS Government announced plans that would eliminate the direct election of mayors and that it had asked the RSNA to consider the proposal under "urgent procedure" at its March 19 session. "Urgent procedure" effectively allowed the RS Government to bypass the traditional public comment and consultation on the proposal and prohibi
t amendments in the RSNA. The RS Government claimed that the dramatic and unexpected proposal was necessary to a) prevent gridlock in municipalities where one party controlled the assembly and another the mayoralty, b) address the cost of holding recall elections, and c) prevent the concentration of power in the hands of one individual. Politicians from the opposition Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and civil society groups were quick to denounce the RS Government proposal as anti-democratic and an attempt by RS PM Dodik to further centralize power in his hands and the hands of his political party (Ref A). (Note: There is widespread concern among civil society and the international community about Dodik's increasing tendency to centralize power in his hands and to silence critics. This was reflected in our recently released annual human rights report. End Note) Promoting Democracy and Combating Nationalism -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The U.S., along with OHR, led efforts in 2003 to institute the direct election of mayors in each of Bosnia's 142 municipalities. The aim was to increase the democratic accountability of local officials, improve municipal governance, and undercut nationalist forces that were impeding reconciliation. At the time, the initiative had the full backing of Dodik and SNSD, and it resulted in progressive changes in the RS. The most prominent was the election in 2004 of a moderate, reformist mayor in Foca, whose subsequent policies directly led to a U.S. decision to lift Lautenberg sanctions on the municipality. Our effort to strengthen municipal governance also involved creating the Indirect Taxation Authority (ITA) and working to improve municipal services through our highly successful, multimillion dollar Government Accountability Project (GAP). (Note: The Swedish and Dutch governments have partnered with us for our 30 million dollar GAP II program. End Note) Direct SARAJEVO 00000532 002 OF 003 election of mayors was the crucial foundation for both. All these initiatives and programs strengthened responsible local government at the expense of cantons and entities, which are bastions of nationalist politics. Dodik's Empty Promise -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador raised our concerns directly with Dodik at a March 14 lunch. He cited our strong political and financial support for municipal reform and reminded Dodik that his party had previously supported direct election of mayors. The Ambassador also noted that we found it odd SNSD was justifying, in part, the change based on the cost of recall elections given that SNSD had initiated five of seven recalls in the RS since October 2006 (Ref B). Dodik bluntly replied that his aim was to secure additional SNSD mayoralties in the 2008 municipal elections, but he promised to "make it go away" if the U.S. would refrain from publicly criticizing the initiative. After it became clear that Dodik did not plan to honor his commitment and the RSNA was continuing preparations for adoption of the proposal, the Ambassador called Dodik on March 18 to reiterate USG concern and inform him that we would make our concerns public. Dissension Within SNSD's Ranks -------------- ¶5. (C) In the meantime, we provided behind-the-scenes support to public campaigns against the RS government proposal led by the NGO Center for Civil Initiative (CCI),a USAID grantee, and to increase the private pressure on Dodik from other members of the international community. (Note: The French, Turkish, and Japanese Ambassadors all expressed concern about the measure at the March 14 Steering Board Ambassadors. End Note) There was almost universal opposition to the change from mayors participating in our GAP project, including mayors from Dodik's party. However, SNSD mayors also told us that they feared crossing Dodik, and were reluctant to criticize the proposal publicly. With this in mind, we agreed with our GAP partner countries to issue a joint statement on March 18 just before the Association of Mayors of Republika Srpska met to discuss and vote on the issue. CCI also shared with the mayors a poll it had conducted indicating that 90 percent of RS citizens opposed Dodik's measure. These efforts provided the Association with the political cover it required to formally ask the government to postpone RSNA discussion on the initiative. Dodik Relents -------------- ¶6. (U) The joint U.S.-Swedish-Dutch statement received wide press coverage and was hailed by the independent media as a sign that the U.S. and other members of the international community were "standing up to Dodik." Dodik responded cautiously to our statement, but attacked the NGOs for commenting on "political issues," implying that they were merely tools of opposition political parties. The RS government spokesman took a tougher stance, accusing the U.S. of interfering in Bosnia's internal affairs. Despite the bluster, by the morning of March 19, the RS government decided to pull back its proposal to eliminate the direct election of mayors. Dodik stated publicly that he supported the move because "my mayors said that in the long run this is bad for their communities, for them as mayors, and for their political parties." Dodik and other RS government officials also explained the about face by claiming they were concerned about a "negative evaluation" of the RS from the OSCE (Note: OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut was in Bosnia on March 18-19 and raised the issue in a meeting with Dodik in Banja Luka. OSCE Head of Mission Douglas Davidson had also been vocal in the press over the preceeding weekend in criticizing the proposed election change. End Note) Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The push by Dodik and the SNSD to reinstitute the indirect election of mayors was the latest example of their attempts to roll back reforms and Dodik's increasingly SARAJEVO 00000532 003 OF 003 autocratic behavior in the RS. We increasingly hear concerns from RS civil society, journalists, and politicians about the latter, including from within SNSD. It appears that this time Dodik overreached. This allowed us, working cooperatively with NGOs, the media, other international representatives, and RS politicians willing to criticize Dodik publicly (particularly Foca Mayor Krsmanovic),to drive a wedge between him and some of his party rank and file. The result was that we blocked a proposal that, if passed, would have been a major setback for our democracy and governance agenda in Bosnia. It was also encouraging to see the impact civil society groups had on public debate and perceptions of Dodik's proposal. It helped that it was possible to frame the issue as "democracy vs. autocracy" rather than as "Serb vs. Bosniak" or "entity vs. state." This made it more difficult for Dodik to paint the issue in the hues of Bosnian Serb nationalism as he so often does when criticized. ENGLISH

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