Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SARAJEVO414
2008-03-04 14:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA - SENIOR MILITARY COMMANDERS CONCERNED

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR MARR BK 
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VZCZCXYZ0751
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVJ #0414/01 0641445
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041445Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7971
INFO RUZEJAA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0223
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSNAVEUR NAPLES IT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 000414 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, SILBERSTEIN, FOOKS,
STINCHCOMB),EUR/RPM
DEFENSE FOR FATA, BEIN
NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA - SENIOR MILITARY COMMANDERS CONCERNED
ABOUT POLITICAL CRISIS IMPACT ON ARMED FORCES

REF: A. 07 SARAJEVO 1999

B. 07 SARAJEVO 2295

C. 07 SARAJEVO 2296

Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SARAJEVO 000414 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR (DICARLO),EUR/SCE (HOH, SILBERSTEIN, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB),EUR/RPM DEFENSE FOR FATA, BEIN NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MARR BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - SENIOR MILITARY COMMANDERS CONCERNED ABOUT POLITICAL CRISIS IMPACT ON ARMED FORCES REF: A. 07 SARAJEVO 1999 ¶B. 07 SARAJEVO 2295 ¶C. 07 SARAJEVO 2296 Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In separate discussions, Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) Generals Mirsad Gutic and Dragan Vukovic, a Bosniak and Bosnian Serb respectively, expressed concern about the impact the long-running series of political crises were having on the armed forces. They warned that the AFBiH would "break" if called upon to assist civilian authorities with an internal security challenge. Both Gutic nd Vukovic said that loyalty to the state and defnse institutions within the AFBiH had not develope sufficiently to trump ethnic loyalties if the to were pitted against one another. The Generals said that this was particularly the case within the mono-ethnic infantry battalions. Neither General predicted a near-term deterioration in the security situation, but the mere fact that they raised the issue with us suggests a growing anxiety within the Armed Force's senior leadership about the direction in which Bosnia is headed. Their comments also raise concerns that the political tumult in the country has begun to infect, if not weaken, Bosnia's defense institutions. END SUMMARY "9 TO 5" SOLDIERS -------------- ¶2. (C) During a frank discussion in his headquarters in Tuzla on February 26, Commander of the AFBiH 5th Infantry Brigade Brigadier General Mirsad Gutic told us that the continued deterioration of the political environment in Bosnia could exacerbate existing tensions in the Armed Forces. Gutic, stressing he is not a "pessimist," said the primary loyalty of soldiers under his command was to their ethnic group, not to state structures or the Armed Forces. Gutic, a Bosniak, noted that he could only control the 5th Brigade from "9 to 5 every day," but after hours his soldiers were Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats first, and Bosnians second. Gutic said that the Armed Forces required a calm political environment in order to develop into a truly multi-ethnic, apolitical organization, something Bosnia has lacked for almost two years. MONO-ETHNIC UNITS A CONCERN &
#x000A; -------------- ¶3. (C) In this context, Gutic told us that he believed the Armed Forces would break apart along ethnic lines if the political dynamics here led to a deterioration in the security situation. Gutic expressed strong doubts about the ability of the three mono-ethnic battalions that make up his brigade to contain even a minor security challenge. Gutic said some Bosnian Serb elements under his command had already challenged his authority, explaining that the Bosnian Serb infantry battalion stationed in Bijelina had continuously refused to transfer even one truck across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) for use by other elements under his command. Gutic also complained that none of his units provided him with intelligence within their areas of operation. He scoffed at the idea that the Minister of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Staff in Sarajevo would have anything close to real-time information about developing security threats. (Note. Both Defense Minister Cikotic and CHOD LTG Podzic have maintained that they would have actionable information from military units if any security issues were to develop. End Note.) CONTINGENCY IS NATO? -------------- ¶4. (C) Gutic outlined a couple of scenarios under which he felt the military would "break." Gutic said that if the security situation deteriorated, Bosniak returnees in the Eastern RS might go to the Bosniak battalion in Zenica and demand weapons to defend themselves. Despite the fact that the guard forces on the armories are multi-ethnic, Gutic said he had little doubt that the sympathies of the majority of soldiers in the battalion were such that equipment would be readily turned over. Gutic predicted that he would be attacked by his own soldiers if he tried to restore order and discipline. Gutic also said that in the event that the Armed Forces were called upon to restore order in parts of the RS, whatever the circumstances, he had no confidence that the Bosnian Serb battalion based in Bijelina would follow orders to deploy. Gutic, noting that EUFOR was nothing more than a paper tiger, said that "NATO and the US" would have to prevent the security situation from spiraling out of control. TOP SERB GENERAL SHARES ASSESSMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) The Bosnian Serb Commander of the AFBiH Support Command in Banja Luka, Major General Dragan Vukovic expressed similar concerns in a discussion on February 28. Vukovic said that he doubted the multi-ethnic units under his command would present any challenges, but he had strong reservations about the loyalty of the mono-ethnic battalions in a serious crisis. Vukovic, echoing Gutic, told us that the Armed Forces needed more time to develop a professional loyalty to the state that superseded the ethnic loyalties of its component parts. Vukovic said that the current politically charged environment had set back efforts to insulate the Armed Forces from ethnic politics. Vukovic added that he was worried military discipline was being systematically undermined by the nationalist rhetoric and policies of the country's political leadership. At this point, he said, the AFBiH was incapable of fulfilling its primary mission-- maintaining the territorial integrity of Bosnia. Vukovic said that the clear lesson from the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) experience in 1990-1992 was that all Bosnian military units should be confined to their barracks in the event of a breakdown of security and order. COMMENT: AFBiH WEAK, DIVIDED -------------- ¶6. (C) Our discussions with Generals Gutic and Vukovic were sobering. Neither man is a nationalist, and we believe they are genuinely committed to the success of defense reform and the development of the AFBiH. Both men served as junior JNA commanders during the break-up of that force in the early 1990s, and they told us that they see parallels between that time and the current political climate in Bosnia. As Vukovic pointed out, the AFBiH is much less cohesive than the old JNA, implying it would take much less to pull the institution apart. The concerns expressed by Gutic and Vukovic suggest that they believe the AFBiH is, or is in danger of, becoming a politicized force. ¶7. (C) As we pointed out in September 2007, insulating the MOD and Armed Forces from politics has been crucial to the success of both as well as to defense reform in general (Ref A). Since the October 2007 political crisis, we have witnessed a progressive weakening of their immunity from political developments. Two examples: 1) Bosnian Serb Deputy DefMin Crnadak and Bosnian Serb general officers met with RS Prime Minister Dodik in the midst of the October crisis (Ref B); 2) Minister Cikotic told us that he regularly provides security updates to his political party chairman (Ref C). We do not believe that defense institutions are on the verge of breaking apart, but Gutic's and Vukovic's comments raise concerns that the fragmentation driving Bosnian politics may be spreading to defense institutions. ENGLISH

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