BOSNIA - PIC MEETS AMID BREWING POLITICAL CRISES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000348 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO),EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS/STINCHCOMB); NSC FOR BRAUN; OSD FOR BEIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL PNIR BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - PIC MEETS AMID BREWING POLITICAL CRISES IN BOSNIA AND FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGES TO DAYTON Classified By: Ambassador Charles English. Reason 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Political Directors will meet in Brussels on February 26-27 as Bosnia enters yet another in a long series of political crises, which stretch back to May 2006. Bosnia's continued political deterioration has shaped an emerging consensus among PIC members (excluding Russia) that OHR must remain open beyond June 2008. There is also broader support among the Quint for the HighRep's "objectives-based" approach to OHR's closure, but we will need to defend this position against Russian demands for a clear end date and/or a watered down set of benchmarks. OHR's future is the main topic on the PIC agenda, but Republika Srpska's (RS) response to Kosovo independence, particularly assertions by RS PM Milorad Dodik and other senior RS officials that the RS enjoys the right to self-determination, is the more pressing issue confronting the PIC. These claims, coupled with rhetoric and actions from the RS over the last 20 months, appear to be elements of a calculated strategy to eventually achieve an independent RS. We must use the PIC to begin a serious discussion about steps we and the Europeans could take after the PIC to counter it. At the same time, we should anticipate trouble after the PIC from Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic. Silajdzic, who assumes the Chairmanship of the Tri-Presidency on March 6, has already signaled his intention to revive controversy over Srebrenica and the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) February 2007 verdict that genocide occurred in and around the municipality in July 1995. Silajdzic's agenda will further radicalize Bosniak politics, which will provide Dodik and the Bosnian Serbs with ready-made excuses to press their own anti-Dayton agenda. END SUMMARY The PIC in Context: Bosnia -------------- ¶2. (C) The political situation in Bosnia has worsened since the October PIC. Fueled by near constant rhetorical sparring about future constitutional arrangements and the competencies of the state, ethnic tensions have increased. Bosnian Serb leaders, particularly RS PM Dodik, have regularly attacked the legitimacy of the Bosnian state and undermined state-level institutions by preventing them from functioning. The Bosniak political leaders' tendency to take an all or nothing approach on issues and to seek political advantage at their rivals' expense have undermined the reform process, particularly efforts to pass critical police reform legislation. Croats, emboldened by the rhetoric from Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs, reiterated calls for changes to Dayton that amount to plans for a third (Croat) entity. As a consequence of all this (and the structural weaknesses of Dayton governance structures),the Bosnian state continued to struggle to perform the functions necessary to sustain itself and reforms required for Euro-Atlantic integration have stalled. Dodik's obstruction of an agreement on movable defense property threatens to derail Bosnia's aspirations for Intensified Dialogue at the Bucharest Summit. The Party for Democratic Action's (SDA) backing out of the Mostar/Sarajevo agreements on police reform is blocking signature of an EU SAA. OHR's Future -------------- ¶3. (C) We cannot consider dismantling the Dayton-established OHR framework while the state's sustainability remains an open question. There is consensus among most PIC countries that OHR must remain open beyond June 2008. There is also broad support for the HighRep's proposal to tie OHR closure to specific, "critical" objectives, whose implementation OHR assesses as essential to the creation of a peaceful, viable Bosnian state and would allow the transition from OHR to EUSR to go ahead. We have successfully pressed the HighRep to include Washington's-proposed rule of law objectives among those he will present to the PIC. We have not received any signals from Quint partners that these objectives are problematic. Our proposal for adoption of a framework on the implementation of the Constitutional Court's constituent people's decision, however, raised eyebrows among Quint members and was rejected by the Russian Ambassador. The Russians have also objected to elements of the HighRep's SARAJEVO 00000348 002 OF 003 approach and to our emphasis on rule of law. Their preference remains for OHR to close as soon as possible, and this could translate into an effort to minimize the number of objectives the PIC sets for transition to EUSR and/or an insistence on setting a new target date for closure. We should be prepared to defend our position on the importance of all of the Quint-agreed objectives and reject any Russian demands for setting an OHR end date at the Contact Group meeting prior to the PIC, and at the PIC itself. ¶4. (C) The reality is that Bosnia's problems go much deeper than the "objectives" exercise the HighRep has embarked on. We should be under no illusions that they will be sufficient to ensure Bosnia's sustainability, especially if current political trends continue. Robust international engagement will be required to reverse those trends and to accomplish even the limited objectives set by the PIC. We will have to argue forcefully, over Russian objections, that a stable security and political situation in Bosnia is the sine qua non for OHR's closure. We recognize that OHR's capacity and credibility are limited, and that they have continued to decline under Lajcak. Lajcak's management of the crisis over his October 19 measures is partially to blame for this. Nonetheless, our interests would not be served by allowing OHR's authority to wither further. Doing so would kill the objectives exercise before it even started. In that context, the PIC must provide clear political support to OHR, including a signal that it would support use of the Bonn Powers to accomplish the PIC endorsed objectives. The PIC in Context: Kosovo -------------- ¶5. (C) Though OHR's future is the major item on the PIC's agenda, discussion of Lajcak's proposed objectives is likely to be overshadowed by discussion of the growing crisis over the RS response to Kosovo's independence. Since May 2006, Dodik and senior RS officials have sought to push the boundaries of acceptable rhetoric and actions. Attacks on the state, demands for the return to the RS of competencies transferred to the state, and threats of a referendum have become so commonplace by Dodik and Bosnian Serb officials that they no longer raise eyebrows. However, Dodik and his SNSD allies managed to shock the international community again on January 31 when SNSD asserted that the RS already had the right to self-determination. RS officials, including Dodik, are now using Kosovo's declaration of independence to cement their rhetorical claims about an RS right to self-determination. These assertions constitute a fundamental challenge to Dayton. Republika Srpska's Future -------------- ¶6. (C) It is unlikely that Dodik will seek to exercise the self-proclaimed right to RS self-determination in the near term. Nonetheless, Dodik's rhetoric and actions over the last 20 months, particularly since August 2007, coupled with the newly asserted right to RS self-determination appear to be elements of a calculated strategy to eventually achieve an independent RS. Key components of Dodik's strategy involve attacking the state's legitimacy; preventing the state from functioning; arguing the state's poor performance is "holding back the RS;" reviving war time claims about Bosniak victimization of Bosnian Serbs; characterizing reforms as attacks on the RS; and finally, when it is judged to be the right moment, rolling it all up into a tidy justification for the RS to exercise its right of self-determination. HighRep Lajcak sees the danger, but not all the Europeans do, or care to. (Note: In the current regional climate, we doubt the Russians care. End Note) We must use the PIC to shake the Europeans out of their stupor and begin a serious discussion about steps we and they could take after the PIC to counter Dodik. Silajdzic is Waiting in the Wings -------------- ¶7. (C) Dodik is not the only challenge we face. The PIC will meet on the one-year anniversary of the ICJ's verdict that genocide was committed in and around Srebrenica in July 1995. Silajdzic assumes chairmanship of the Presidency shortly SARAJEVO 00000348 003 OF 003 after the PIC on March 6, and he has already signaled that he plans to once again make Srebrenica a political issue. We are hearing rumblings about plans to revive 2007's campaign for secession of Srebrenica from the RS. Once the dust on Kosovo settles, Silajdzic plans to reopen the constitutional reform debate and to press his case for a "Bosnia of regions" (read: abolishing the RS). All of this suggests we can anticipate a further radicalization of Bosniak politics in the months ahead. The destructive force of Bosniak nationalism has already claimed the U.S.-brokered package of constitutional amendments as a victim. It may yet derail the Mostar Declaration and Sarajevo Action Plan on police reform and further delay Bosnia's signature of its Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. In other words, even if Dodik decides that he has a tactical interest in keeping quiet after the PIC, Silajdzic's agenda will ensure that Bosnia's cycle of political crises will continue. Ultimately, Dodik will use Silajdzic's rhetoric and actions to justify a return his own anti-Dayton agenda. Breaking this vicious spiral will be critically important to acheiving the progress needed to ensure that OHR's mandate can credibly be ended. ENGLISH