BOSNIA - POLITICAL MANEUVERING BEFORE THE PIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001739 SIPDIS EUR/SCE (HYLAND, FOOKS),NSC FOR HELGERSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PHUM KDEM BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - POLITICAL MANEUVERING BEFORE THE PIC REF: SARAJEVO 1728 Classified By: A/DCM Michael J. Murphy. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Going into next week's PIC, most Bosnian leaders are capitalizing on a climate of relative political optimism created by the three-party agreement that Milorad Dodik, Sulejman Tihic, and Dragan Covic reached on November 8 (reftel). Tihic, Covic, and Dodik have put elements of their agreement forward for Council of Ministers approval, and all three men have discussed possible personnel changes in the state-level coalition. Tihic and Covic are also taking bolder steps to sideline their rivals, Haris Silajdzic and Bozo Ljubic, who are also some of the more unhelpful players in Bosnian politics. But the Bosnian political scene is still rife with problems at all levels of government. The Federation coalition is in shambles, underscored by the acrimonious and unproductive exchanges among its leaders over possible Federation reforms. Controversial political rhetoric, after a brief post-election respite, has poked its head out of its hiding place, underscored by an interview in RS media in which Bakir Izetbegovic opined -- inter alia -- that mujahidin pose no threat to Bosnian security and that the RS treats Bosniaks like second-class citizens. In the RS, leadership changes within SDS might forecast a more robust challenge from that party to Dodik but in the meantime will propel a party already in disarray further into disarray. END SUMMARY. Impending PIC Propels Odzak -------------- ¶2. (C) Bosnian leaders are scrambling before the PIC to make tangible progress on the "Odzak Agreement," the joint statement that Party of Democratic Action (SDA) leader Sulejman Tihic, Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)-BiH leader Dragan Covic, and Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) leader Milorad Dodik devised on November 8 (reftel). The Council of Ministers on November 13 approved the elements of the statement outlining possible legislative compromises on a census, state property, and the budget. (Note: The legislation accompanying these items has not been drafted, let alone introduced into parliamentary procedure. End Note) Although the three party leaders are enthusiastic about implementing the statement as soon as possible, their motives differ widely. Covic told Ambassador that he and Tihic pushed for PM Nikola Spiric (SNSD) to act on the joint statement as quickly as possible, so as to test the Serbs' professed dedication to compromise. In contrast, SNSD parliamentarian Lazar Prodanovic told us that Dodik simply wants to show the PIC that Bosnian leaders can resolve disputes on their own and that OHR can therefore close. Covic remarked to Ambassador that opposition Social Democratic Party (SDP) leader Zlatko Lagumdzija criticized Covic and Tihic for "saving" Dodik, as Dodik can now point the finger at Silajdzic, who opposes the agreement, for obstructing it, and relieve some of the pressure on him to agree to and implement meaningful compromises. State-Level Coalition on Shaky Ground -------------- ¶3. (C) The steps of progress on the Odzak Agreement come amid a whirlwind of turmoil in the ruling coalition that will need to approve the agreement. Following disappointing results in the October 5 municipal elections, HDZ-1990 leader Bozo Ljubic announced on November 3 that he plans to resign as state-level Minister of Traffic and Communications and focus exclusively on preparing his party for the 2010 general elections. Although Ljubic declared that HDZ-1990 would propose a successor, other parties have balked at keeping HDZ-1990 in that position, sparking speculation on the fall of the coalition. Indeed, Ljubic's resignation precipitated calls for the removal of other ministers and probably figured into the Odzak statement's call for restructuring the Council of Ministers. Covic told Ambassador that he and Tihic want to oust Foreign Minister Sven Alkalaj (SBiH) and Security Minister Tarik Sadovic (SDA) but insisted to Dodik that a Serb minister be replaced as well. According to Covic, Dodik balked at this proposal but suggested replacing a Serb Deputy Minister. Irrespective of the possible ouster of individual ministers, though, the ruling coalition appears likely to remain intact. Changing the coalition would likely entail one of two options -- holding early elections, or convening a SARAJEVO 00001739 002 OF 003 minority coalition with the support of SDP. Our contacts in all parties -- including Covic -- have commented to us that the process of preparing for and holding elections would not be worth the minimal change they believe it would produce. And no one, except Tihic and Covic, appears to be willing to work with Lagumdzija. Dodik told Tihic and Covic that he dislikes Lagumdzija, and Lagumdzija is also anathema to the right wing of Tihic's party. Stagnation in the Federation -------------- ¶4. (C) While the state-level ruling parties are at loggerheads, the Federation struggles with even more coalition pitfalls. Ambassador has engaged Tihic, Covic, and Lagumdzija extensively on the need for good governance in the nearly-bankrupt Federation and the responsibility of those three men to make the entity work. In what appeared to be a positive step toward progress, the leaders of the parties in the Federation ruling coalition (SDA, SBiH, HDZ-BiH, and HDZ-1990),as well as the Federation leadership, convened on November 12 to cogitate on revitalizing the government. According to Federation Deputy PM Gavrilo Grahovac (SBiH), Federation PM Nedzad Brankovic (SDA) devised a detailed reform package that included changes in public administration, reducing the number of cantons, and restructuring social and veterans' benefits. But at the meeting, Brankovic proposed only to reduce the number of ministries from 16 to 12, a move the press suggested was motivated solely by Brankovic's desire to eliminate his enemies. Brankovic's proposal failed, as did Tihic's proposal -- which Silajdzic vehemently opposed -- for a law on strategic partners in the energy sector and a law to privatize BiH Telecom. The parties could not agree to a single conclusion at the meeting. Covic told Ambassador that Silajdzic was a particularly difficult interlocutor and that he focused almost exclusively on the energy sector. The media report that the coalition leaders will meet again in two weeks. Izetbegovic Gives Controversial Interview in RS -------------- -- ¶5. (SBU) SDA Vice President Bakir Izetbegovic stirred emotions in the RS in a November 13 interview for the RS tabloid "Press," in which he opined that mujahidin who arrived during the 1992-95 war pose no threat to Bosnia's security climate. Acknowledging that the mujahidin had committed some war crimes, he stressed that the Serb army was far more responsible for the wartime bloodshed. When asked whether the USG had requested the removal of Security Minister Sadovic for ties with Islamic extremists, Izetbegovic declared that Sadovic is an honest and direct man with no ties to extremists, although he sometimes lacks diplomatic tact. (Note: The Sarajevo-based, pro-Bosniak daily Dnevni Avaz reported the same day that the SDA leadership is considering replacing Sadovic as Security Minister, citing his inability to work with the international community. End Note) On the RS, Izetbegovic was much more conservative. He stressed that any attempt to abolish an entity without the consent of all three constitutive peoples would be an anti-Dayton and unconstitutional act which he could not support. He noted that the current, entity-based division of Bosnia is not a problem as long as Bosniaks can exercise the same rights in the RS as Serbs enjoy in the Federation, but he added that Bosniaks currently are treated as second-class citizens in the RS. Dodik's Opponents Regroup -------------- ¶6. (C) Amid the exigencies in the state-level government and in the Federation, the RS opposition is sorting out its own political future. Citing the party's poor showing in the October 5 municipal elections, Serb Democratic Party (SDS) chairman Mladen Bosic on November 3 offered his resignation to the SDS Presidency. SDS held its main board session on November 12 and will convene a party convention on November 22, at which the party will decide Bosic's fate. A rumored possible successor to Bosic is former SDS chairman Dragan Cavic, who -- along with his predecessor Dragan Kalinic -- has publicly expressed interest in returning to politics. After lambasting Bosic in the press, Cavic spoke of the need to move SDS in a more progressive direction and distance the SARAJEVO 00001739 003 OF 003 party from its ties to Radovan Karadzic. (Note: Although Cavic and Kalinic retain significant influence within SDS, OHR removed Kalinic from his position in 2004 for obstructing Dayton and supporting Karadzic, and has not reinstated him. End Note) Some have speculated that Cavic and Kalinic could revitalize SDS and pose a viable opposition to Dodik's SNSD. In the meantime, though, the leadership transition and the need for the new chairman to pull together the disparate elements of the party will leave the only real opposition party in the RS in disarray, further strengthening Dodik. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Bosnian leaders have taken the political initiative by launching negotiations on critical issues, including the very structure and efficiency of the government. For this we publicly and privately applaud them. But as we look toward the PIC, we would be wise to approach our response to these initiatives -- particularly as they pertain to the closure of OHR -- with caution. For all their enthusiasm -- much of which, at least on Dodik's part, is probably derived more from a drive to convince the PIC to close OHR than from a genuine desire for compromise -- Bosnian leaders have yet to prove that they are capable of putting even one of these agreed-upon items into practice. Moreover, the political imbroglio in both entities does not portend a favorable climate for implementing compromises. In our engagement with political leaders, we will continue to encourage further dialogue at all levels of government, but will also keep a careful eye on each key player, particularly Dodik. ENGLISH