BOSNIA - MUNICIPAL ELECTION RESULTS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE DOWNWARD POLITICAL TRAJECTORY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SARAJEVO 001593



SIPDIS



EUR/SCE (HYLAND, FOOKS),NSC FOR HELGERSON



E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2018

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, PHUM, KDEM, BK

SUBJECT: BOSNIA - MUNICIPAL ELECTION RESULTS UNLIKELY TO

CHANGE DOWNWARD POLITICAL TRAJECTORY



REF: A. SARAJEVO 1423 B. SARAJEVO 1518 C. SARAJEVO

1575 D. SARAJEVO 1585



Classified By: Ambassador Charles L. English. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (C) SUMMARY: Bosnians in all 141 municipalities and Brcko

District headed to the polls on October 5 to elect their

mayors and municipal councils. The major nationalist parties

-- the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA),the Croat

Democratic Union (HDZ-BiH),and the Serb Alliance of

Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) -- emerged victorious.

Among Bosniaks, Haris Silajdzic, who smashed his SDA rival

Sulejman Tihic in the Presidential race in 2006, suffered a

stinging rebuke in 2008. With SDA's big win, Tihic is now

poised to resume his pre-2006 position as the "big man" in

Bosniak politics, though he will still have to contend with

SDA's restive nationalist wing. Milorad Dodik and his SNSD

now control more than half of the mayoralties in the

Republika Srpska (RS) and have no viable opponents in the RS.

Dodik's post-election rhetoric as well as statements from

other senior SNSD officials suggest that SNSD is not inclined

to alter the course it has been on over the last two years

(i.e., undermining the state) in order to work with a more

moderate Bosniak leadership. Among Croats, Dragan Covic's

win was big enough to severely cripple his more nationalist

HDZ-1990 rivals, but not to kill HDZ-1990 off altogether.

The battle between SDA and HDZ-BiH for the mayoralty of

Mostar may provide an opportunity for HDZ-1990 to revive its

political fortunes. END SUMMARY.



Results Tap Tihic, Covic, and Dodik as Victors

-------------- -



2. (SBU) Bosnian voters headed to the polls on October 5 in

all 79 municipalities in the Federation, all 62 in the

Republika Srpska (RS),and Brcko District. Each municipality

elected a mayor and the delegates to its municipal council,

except Mostar and Brcko, which elected councils whose ruling

coalitions will choose their mayors. Election results are

still preliminary, as absentee ballots -- which were due on

October 5 -- have not yet been counted. However, with the

exception of Srebrenica and possibly Bratunac, where the

as-yet uncounted votes from the Federation and the Diaspora

could secure Bosniak victories (more on the elections in

Srebrenica will be reported septel),we do not expect the

results to shift significantly while the remaining votes are

tallied.



3. (SBU) Voter turnout reached 1,635,000 (roughly 55%),up

from 1,420,000 in the general elections in 2006 (48%).

Preliminary party results are as follows (Note: A two-thirds

majority vote is required to form a government in a

municipality -- a threshold that was not crossed by any party

anywhere. End Note):



a) Party of Democratic Action (SDA):

-- 237,000 votes, no change from 2006

-- 35 mayoralties, up from 33

-- 38 municipal council majorities, down from 46

-- Plurality in Mostar City Assembly



b) Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH):

-- 74,000 votes, down from 215,000 in 2006

-- 4 mayoralties in Federation, up from 2

-- 1 municipal council majority, down from 2



c) Social Democratic Party (SDP):

-- 190,000 votes, up from 143,000 in 2006

-- 10 mayoralties in Federation, down from 11

-- 1 mayoralty in RS, up from 0

-- 11 municipal council majorities, up from 2

-- Plurality in Brcko District Assembly



d) Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)-BiH:

-- 90,000 votes, up from 66,000 in 2006

-- 16 mayoralties in Federation, down from 20

-- 15 municipal council majorities, up from 21



e) HDZ-1990:

-- 43,000 votes, down from 49,000 in 2006

-- 4 mayoralties in Federation, up from 2

-- 3 municipal council majorities, up from 0





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d) Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD):

-- 200,000 votes, down from 270,000 in 2006

-- 3 mayoralties in Federation, up from 1

-- 41 mayoralties in RS, up from 17

-- 45 municipal council majorities, up from 14



f) Serb Democratic Party (SDS):

-- 123,000 votes, up from 108,000 in 2006

-- 0 mayoralties in Federation, down from 1

-- 16 mayoralties in RS, down from 32

-- 15 municipal council majorities, down from 35



Bosniaks: Two Thumbs Up for Tradition

--------------



4. (C) Sulejman Tihic's SDA was the clear winner in the

Federation, capturing more than three times the votes of

Haris Silajdzic's SBiH. SDA's triumph resulted in part from

a poorly-constructed and lackluster SBiH campaign (ref A) and

disgruntlement with SBiH's leadership in the municipalities.

Silajdzic's waning popularity over the past two years,

culminating in this election defeat, suggests that voters are

disenchanted with his leadership and do not see him as a

politician who can deliver on his promises. Indeed, SDA

officials are interpreting their party's triumph as heralding

the demise of Haris Silajdzic and SBiH, asserting that the

results show Bosniak voters moving in a progressive,

"non-nationalist" direction. SDA did not run a traditionally

nationalist campaign at the municipal level, but this does

not mean nationalism did not drive SDA voters. As one SDA MP

put, "The most important outside reason (sic) for SDA's

victory was Milorad Dodik." Bosniaks are increasingly

worried about Dodik's intentions, and may have judged that

their wartime "protector" would be better able than Silajdzic

and SBiH to protect their interests.



SDA Victory Cracks Open a Window for Moderation

-------------- --



5. (C) Coupled with post-election backing from the Islamic

community and the popular Bosniak daily Dnevni Avaz, SDA's

victory -- at least initially -- will embolden Tihic to

challenge Silajdzic. Party Vice-President Mirsad Kebo told

us that Tihic is planning to attend the RS National Assembly

(RSNA) session on October 13 and extend an olive branch to

the Serbs, stressing that the RS is an integral part of

Bosnia and that Silajdzic's statements to the UNGA and

Council of Europe (refs B and C) hold no merit. Despite his

good intentions, though, Tihic has demonstrated over the last

two years that he is risk-averse and does not have the full

support of his party. The right wing of SDA, particularly

supporters of Bakir Izetbegovic, will likely continue to

limit Tihic's room for maneuver, and Silajdzic will certainly

accuse Tihic of "accepting less than the Council of Europe

report" (ref C) and cooperating with "those responsible for

genocide," if he tries to steer Bosniak politics back to the

center. Radical messages are likely to continue to resonate

with a Bosniak populace already anxious by Serb anti-Bosniak

diatribes. Once the euphoria of the elections subsides,

then, any enthusiasm Tihic has for bold steps may subside.



Dodik and SNSD Unlikely to Change Course

--------------



6. (C) Even if Tihic overcame opposition from within his

party and weathered the predictable Silajdzic diatribes, its

remains unclear whether Dodik would accept a Tihic peace

offering or reciprocate by moderating his own statements and

actions. In the months prior to the elections, Dodik stopped

making distinctions between Silajdzic and other Bosniak

political leaders. In his September 18 Radio Free Europe

(RFE) interview, Dodik claimed that there were no reasonable

Bosniak interlocutors for him or his party. This rhetoric

did not stop after the elections. Dodik has already

dismissed the idea of cooperating with Tihic, telling

Belgrade media that SDA is a "completely uninteresting party

located in the other part of Bosnia. To me that other part

of Bosnia feels like a foreign country." SNSD Secretary

General Rajko Vasic also underscored in an October 8

commentary that SNSD's post-election agenda would mirror its

pre-election attacks on the state (Ref D).



7. (C) SNSD's election victory effectively crippled its two



SARAJEVO 00001593 003 OF 004





main opponents, quashing any hope that an effective

opposition to Dodik will emerge in the near-term. Although

SNSD did not, as it had hoped, capture the mayoralties in

Bijeljina and Doboj and has only a simple majority in the

municipal councils it won, SNSD more than tripled its

mayoralties and cut the SDS mayoral map in half. In the

areas where he needs it, Dodik can most likely count on

continued support from coalition partner PDP, because --

despite an exchange of threats between Dodik and senior PDP

officials about breaking their coalition in Banja Luka -- PDP

leader Mladen Ivanic is unlikely to challenge Dodik, since he

sees Dodik as someone who can protect him from corruption

charges. SDS is in disarray due in part to widespread

dissatisfaction with Mladen Bosic's leadership, and there is

some quiet talk that his days as party leader are numbered.

Bosic's ouster could portend the resurgence of radical

leadership in the party, to which Dodik would likely respond

by making even stronger appeals to Serb nationalism.



Among Croats, the "New HDZ" Falls Short

--------------



8. (C) Although their mayoral numbers increased from two to

four (including a joint candidate in Ravno with HDZ-BiH),the

elections came as a big shock to HDZ-1990, which had expected

to win at least seven municipalities. The defeat effectively

dashed the party's hopes of emerging in the 2010 general

election as a strong alternative to HDZ-BiH in Croat majority

areas. HDZ-1990 suffered from poorly established party

infrastructure and weak leadership in the cantonal

governments. Its campaign centered on nationalist themes,

particularly calls for a third entity, and on slandering

HDZ-BiH. The party had lost the confidence of voters by

performing poorly in office at the canton level after having

promised in 2006 to "do better" than HDZ-BiH. Finally,

HDZ-1990 lacked the support it enjoyed in 2006 from the

Catholic Church and Croatian PM Ivo Sanader. HDZ-1990's

Central Board plans to convene within 20 days and discuss

Bozo Ljubic's rumored resignation. His solid support base

within the party probably precludes his ouster, but Ljubic

may resign as Minister of Traffic and Communications in order

to focus exclusively on the 2010 elections.



HDZ-BiH Recaptures Croat Hearts

--------------



9. (C) HDZ-BiH secured the largest number of mayoralties and

councils among Croat parties but fell short of recapturing

the dominance it enjoyed prior to HDZ-1990's 2006 split.

Political wrangling between the HDZs cost the Croats three

municipalities in central Bosnia with majority Croat

populations -- Busovaca, Jajce, and Novi Travnik -- where SDA

captured the mayoralties. HDZ-BiH's campaign focused almost

exclusively on the accomplishments of the local governments

and scarcely touched on broader issues such as the "third

entity" idea that Ljubic embraced. Covic, one of the

country's savviest politicians, told the Ambassador on

October 9 that his party's defeat of HDZ-1990 and SDA's

triumph over SBiH might make it possible to form a new

government in the Federation, which excludes both losing

parties and brings in the SDP. Covic the next day publicly

alluded to a Federation government shake up, but there are

difficult obstacles to overcome. Though HDZ-BiH, SDA, and

SDP have the required majorities in both houses of the

Federation to bring down the current government, a new

government would have to be appointed by the Federation

President "in agreement with both Vice Presidents." One of

the current VPs is from SBiH.



Love Could Dim Amid Mostar Loss

--------------



10. (C) Mostar politics could also dim the prospects for a

revival of the pre-2006 partnership between HDZ-BiH and SDA.

The elections in Mostar, the "Croat capital," dealt a major

blow to HDZ-BiH. SDA captured the majority of the City

Assembly positions, with the relatively unknown National

Party of Work for Progress (NSRzB) taking second place, and

HDZ-BiH falling to third, cutting its Assembly representation

in half. If the Assembly elects a Bosniak mayor, as SDA has

argued it should, given the party's Assembly majority,

HDZ-BiH would be seen by many Croats of having "lost the

Croat capital" to the Bosniaks. Such an outcome would



SARAJEVO 00001593 004 OF 004





significantly undermine the party's credibility and hand

HDZ-1990 a desperately needed nationalist issue with which it

could seek to revive its political fortunes. Tihic will

likely be under similar pressure from his right wing to form

a coalition with NSRzB to secure Mostar for the Bosniaks.

Allegations -- and formal appeals to the Central Election

Commission -- that NSRzB paid voters each 100 KM (roughly 71

USD) for their votes probably likely means that the City

Assembly will not move quickly to elect a new mayor. How

Tihic and Covic chose to manage this sticky political issue

could have political implications well beyond Mostar.



SDP Fails to Save the Country from Nationalist Chaos

-------------- --------------



11. (C) Although its turnout increased over the 2006

elections -- and its leaders cast its results as a win for

the party -- SDP fell short of its expected mayoral and

council gains. SDP campaigned heavily on local issues and

hoped to ride the popularity and successful track records of

their mayors to a broader victory, but these factors did not

help them break SDA's stronghold within the Federation. SDP

competed in past years for funding for election projects from

the European Socialist Party and Labor Party, but the Central

Election Commission forbade these links this year, leaving

SDP with far fewer funds than other parties. And "Our Party"

(Nasa Stranka, NS) -- which also bills itself as a

progressive, pro-European, multiethnic party -- almost

certainly ate into the SDP vote. Most importantly, SDP

continue to suffer from stale leadership in Zlatko

Lagumdzija, which has sparked rifts and disenchantment within

both the party and populace. These trends bode ill for SDP's

re-emergence in the coming years as a powerful moderate,

multiethnic alternative to nationalist leaders.



Comment

--------------



12. (C) The outcome of the municipal elections is unlikely to

change the tone of Bosnia's politics or the country's

downward trajectory. The strengthening of Tihic and Covic

and weakening of Silajdzic and Ljubic may open a window of

cooperation for SDA and HDZ-BiH (something we have already

encouraged privately). It may even open a narrow window for

cooperation between those two parties and SNSD. However, an

emboldened Dodik -- who, even after the elections, continues

to spout unnecessary invective at the Bosniaks -- may decide

to close that window. There is no sign that Dodik plans to

end his two-year long campaign against the state and

state-level institutions. In fact, SNSD officials' public

and private comments suggest just the opposite. This will

provide ample fodder for Silajdzic to continue with his

destructive rhetoric and to undermine any attempt by Tihic,

assuming Tihic makes one, to move Bosniak politics back to

the center.

ENGLISH