Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08SARAJEVO1587
2008-10-10 11:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sarajevo
Cable title:  

BOSNIA -- RADMANOVIC'S BLEAK ASSESSMENT OF

Tags:  PREL PGOV BK 
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VZCZCXRO3212
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #1587/01 2841117
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101117Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9074
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUZEJAA/USNIC SARAJEVO
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 001587 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA -- RADMANOVIC'S BLEAK ASSESSMENT OF
BOSNIA'S FUTURE

REF: A. SARAJEVO 1520 B. SARAJEVO 1547 C. SARAJEVO 1561

Classified By: Amb. Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SARAJEVO 001587 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA -- RADMANOVIC'S BLEAK ASSESSMENT OF BOSNIA'S FUTURE REF: A. SARAJEVO 1520 B. SARAJEVO 1547 C. SARAJEVO 1561 Classified By: Amb. Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a lunch with the Ambassador, Serb Member of Bosnia's Tri-Presidency and member of Republika Srpska (RS) PM Dodik's Alliance of Independent Social Democrats party (SNSD) Nebosja Radmanovic sent troublesome signals about the current political climate in Bosnia and the country's future. First, he said that the political situation is as bad now as it has been since the war. Second, he said that agreement was unlikely on the five objectives set by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) as a condition for OHR's closure and the transition to EUSR. Third, he emphasized that the RS leadership will not transfer any more competencies to the state. Finally, he warned that if the state level law enforcement or judicial institutions attempt to exercise their jurisdiction over Dodik or the RS government, Dodik's security forces will forcibly respond. (Note: Radmanovic was referring to the RS government's refusal to comply with a subpoena presented by the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA). End NOTE.) END SUMMARY. Radmanovic: Back to 1996 -------------- ¶2. (C) Radmanovic agreed that rhetoric had escalated too far. Despite physical and structural rebuilding of Bosnia, he said, relations between Bosnia's three constituent peoples have not changed at all since war's end. Radmanovic said that he will appeal for calm within his party, but quickly added that toning down Serb rhetoric was unlikely, if not impossible, in light of other parties' rhetoric. (Note: Radmanovic was plainly referring to Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Salajdic. End Note.) "Harsh rhetoric will demand a harsh response," he concluded. In response to the Ambassador's observation that SNSD had failed to engage constructively on a broad range of issues, Radmanovic argued that the only way to keep his party in constructive dialogue was for Bosniak politicians to come closer to Serb positions. (Comment: Radmanovic's position echoed views presented by Dodik in his September 18 RFE interview: Bosnia's future must be defined on the RS's terms--Ref A. End Comment.) Radmanovic lamented the failure of the April 2006 constitutional reform package, but said that Serbs would not now support the constitutional
compromises they achieved then. OHR's 5 2 Agenda is Dead in the Water -------------- ¶3. (C) Radmanovic was not optimistic about the prospects of completing the five objectives and meeting the two conditions the PIC set for OHR's closure. Radmanovic said Bosnia needed the help and advice of the international community, but should not have to take orders from OHR. An agreement on Brcko was impossible in today's climate, he said, because both parties (i.e., the RS and the Supervisor) have taken firm positions that are mutually exclusive. The RS says a constitutional amendment is out of the question, whereas President of the Brcko Arbitration Tribunal Owen and PDHR Supervisor Gregorian have said that one is necessary. Radmanovic asked the Ambassador to tell Gregorian to find a flexible approach. On the resolution of defense and state property issues, Radmanovic blamed the Bosniak Party for Democratic Action (SDA) for taking a position that excluded the possibility of compromise. He stated SNSD's argument, at odds with SDA's, that the clause in the July 2007 political agreement on defense property which gives the state "indefinite use" of immoveable defense property implies that the state has ceded all claims of outright ownership to property in future negotiations. No More Competency Transfers -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador noted that more reforms are required in order to ensure that Bosnia's state-level institutions are functional and efficient enough to meet the obligations associated with NATO and EU membership. These reforms will inevitably require the creation of new state-level competencies, the Ambassador said, adding that it does not hurt the RS to call for reform as part of the Euro-Atlantic integration process. "We have to be cautious there," Radmanovic replied. Compromise has been difficult to come by, he said, when it comes to transferring competencies to state institutions. He said that he speaks often to both RS and state-level Serb politicians about these disputes. He blamed SARAJEVO 00001587 002 OF 002 the Bosniaks, saying they asked for wholesale transfer of all competencies to the state, causing intransigence in the Serb ranks on reasonable transfers. Generally, the state already has the competencies that it needs, he said, adding that the RS is not prepared to support any more in today's environment. Violent Response if SIPA Moves on Dodik -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador underscored U.S. concern with the RS government's refusal to cooperate with the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) and State Prosecutor's Office, adding that we expect the RS government to respect all legal obligations vis-a-vis state-level law enforcement and judicial institutions (Ref B). Radmanovic then threateningly spelled out a dangerous scenario for Bosnia in the event that SIPA attempts to exert its jurisdiction over the RS. He did not deny that SIPA had authority to operate all over BiH, ("After all they provide my personal protection when I travel") but argued (implausibly) that they should not have authority to arrest entity police officers, referring to the September arrest of police officers in Srebrenica (Ref C). He then implicitly made the case that SIPA would have no authority to arrest (or, presumably, seize evidence from) any part of the RS government, saying that "If SIPA were to try to arrest Dodik or someone on Dodik's staff, they would come up against Dodik's protection forces and SIPA would cease to exist." He repeated this in nearly the exact words, and then continued, "I do not know what consequences that would have for Bosnia and Herzegovina." Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Radmanovic has typically been a more moderate voice than party head RS PM Dodik. At lunch he was anything but moderate. He presented a coherent message that was consistent with Dodik's September 18 RFE interview, and he backed Dodik's actions against state-level institutions. In commenting on the state of Bosnian politics, Radmanovic clearly implied that the RS's actions were the only option given the escalating tensions. Most ominously, he appeared to draw a line in the sand with respect to the RS's confrontation with SIPA by threatening the use of force should SIPA choose to exercise its legitimate authority to seize RS government documents or otherwise act against Dodik or his staff. ENGLISH

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