BOSNIA - DIVISIONS, DIVISIONS, AND MORE DIVISIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001492 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR (JONES),EUR/SCE (HYLAND/FOOKS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL KJUS EU BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - DIVISIONS, DIVISIONS, AND MORE DIVISIONS DOMINATE TALKS WITH BOSNIAN POLITICAL LEADERS. REF: SARAJEVO 1418 Classified By: Ambassador Charles English. Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On September 9, as part of his two day visit to Bosnia, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Stuart Jones met with Republika Srpska (RS) Prime Minister Milorad Dodik and had dinner with political leaders from the six parties that make up Bosnia's state-level governing coalition and the leading opposition party. In his bilateral with DAS Jones, Dodik stressed his commitment to Dayton and Bosnia's EU path, and argued that he had played a constructive role in Bosnian politics by, inter alia, preventing an adverse reaction from Bosnian Serbs to Kosovo's independence or to the arrest of Radovan Karadzic. He characterized his comments about an RS referendum on independence as a reaction to calls for the abolition of the RS by Bosniak politicians. Jones welcomed Dodik's comments, but reiterated the USG's overall concern about the patterns of statements and actions we were seeing from him and his government. At the dinner, conversation focused on the international presence in Bosnia and constitutional reform. Political leaders' views expressed generally coincided with their public comments on both issues. The Bosniaks stressed the importance of continued international presence in Bosnia, including international participation in a constitutional reform process. These views were echoed by the Croats. The Serbs argued that the time for an international role in Bosnia had passed; local leaders needed to resolve their problems on their own, they maintained. The Serbs also said that they would refuse to participate in a constitutional reform process that did not take as its basis the Dayton constitution or ensure the continued existence of the RS. END SUMMARY Dodik: All's Well in the RS, But We're Under Assault -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) RS PM Dodik asserted that Bosnia was stable and moving in the right direction, citing the absence of any ethnic violence and Bosnia's June 16 signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement as evidence. Dodik also stressed that the political situation in the RS was stable and that his government would have no problems meeting EU requirements. Echoing themes from his reply to A/S Fried's July 18 letter, Dodik argued that he had effectively deflated potentially destabilizing reactions from the RS public to Kosovo independence and Karadzic's arrest; he also asserted that he had played a constructive role securing an agreement on the transfer of moveable defense property to the state and an amended BiH Election Law to allow all 1991 residents of Srebrenica Municipality the option to vote there in the upcoming municipal elections. Dodik also reminded DAS Jones that he and his party had supported the U.S.-brokered package of constitutional amendments in April 2006. Dodik said that he had accepted that Bosnia must have "one address when dealing with the EU," but noted that "the RS must be involved as well; not to obstruct, but so the RS knows what is going on, what the RS has to do for Europe." ¶3. (C) Dodik acknowledged that some of his public statements might be perceived as inflammatory, but argued that his comments were simply a reaction to those made by Sarajevo-based politicians, such as Bosniak member of the Tri-Presidency Haris Silajdzic, who refuses to recognize the RS and/or calls for its abolition. Dodik stressed that he had no intention of pursing RS secession, implying that his frequent references to an RS referendum on independence were tactical responses to political pressure from Bosniaks designed to preserve his credibility among the RS electorate, not an expression of his strategic objective. Dodik complained that he and the RS were under constant assault by Federation-based politicians, Federation-based media, and elements of the international community. The aim was to "criminalize" the RS, Dodik said, adding that this campaign posed a greater threat to Bosnia's territorial integrity and sovereignty than anything he or his government was saying or doing in the RS. Dodik complained bitterly about Principal Deputy High Representative (PDHR) Gregorian, implying that Gregorian was leading a conspiracy against him. Dodik bluntly said that he was "not going to put up with it anymore." More generally, Dodik argued that it was time for the international community to stop playing such an intrusive role in Bosnia. SARAJEVO 00001492 002 OF 003 U.S. Concern About Dodik's Statements and Actions -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) DAS Jones conveyed A/S Fried's thanks to Dodik for his considered response to A/S Fried's July 18 letter, but reiterated the USG's overall concern about the patterns of statements and actions we were seeing from him and his government. Jones stressed that a stronger Bosnian state did not mean a weaker RS, underscoring that state-building reforms necessary for EU accession were not directed against the RS or Bosnian Serbs. Jones also reminded Dodik that the U.S. had regularly criticized calls for the abolition of the RS and underscored that any change in Bosnia's constitution would require consensus among Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. Inflammatory rhetoric makes reaching such compromises more difficult, Jones added. Jones noted that the U.S. wants OHR to close, but that this would only happen if the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) objectives and conditions were met. With this in mind, Jones asked Dodik to engage more constructively on Brcko and state property. Jones made clear that the U.S. interprets the PIC's "compliance with Dayton" condition to include no secessionist rhetoric from the RS, including questioning the permanence of Bosnia. Finally, Jones stressed that PDHR Gregorian has the full support and confidence of the USG. Dinner With Political Leaders -- Bosniaks: We Need Your Help -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) A dinner with the six coalition party leaders and the leader of the main opposition party underscored the deep, often unbridgeable, divisions that continue to plague Bosnian politics. (Note: Participants included: 1) Sulejman Tihic, SDA; 2) Safet Halilovic, SBiH; 3) Milorad Dodik, SNSD; 4) Mladen Ivanic, PDP; 5) Dragan Covic, HDZ-BiH, and 6) Bozo Ljubic, HDZ-1990, from the governing coalition, and 7) Zlatko Lagumdzija, SDP from the opposition. End Note) The Bosniaks -- Tihic and Halilovic -- underscored the continued need for a strong international presence in Bosnia, arguing that OHR should not close until either Dayton is fully implemented or constitutional reform has taken place. They stressed that RS politicians immediately after the war had prevented Bosniaks from returning to their homes, entrenching the wartime ethnic cleansing and ensuring that the Dayton constitution's blocking mechanism, such as entity voting, would always function as a tool for the Serbs to prevent the state from functioning. Tihic warned that Bosnian institutions were not strong enough to stand on their own without international support, let alone meet the EU accession requirements, observing that he was not "personally optimistic about Bosnia's future." Tihic stressed that though he preferred a new constitution, he was willing to accept a step-by-step approach to constitutional reform. Lagumdzija stressed the importance of American leadership in Bosnia, particularly at NATO, noting that further progress towards NATO membership would ease fears among Bosnia's ethnic groups about their intentions towards one another. Lagumdzija warned that a European-led NATO mission in Bosnia would lack the credibility required to keep defense reforms and the NATO accession process on track. Dinner With Political Leaders -- Serbs: No We Don't -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Not surprisingly, the Bosnian Serbs -- Dodik and Ivanic -- rejected their Bosniak colleagues gloomy assessment. Each argued that "there was no reason" Bosnia could not meet EU requirements with the current constitution; the problem, they argued, was one of political will. For their part, the RS and Bosnian Serbs were ready to meet EU requirements, but "Sarajevo-based politicians" were seeking to use the EU accession process to impose their "preferred constitution" at the RS's expense. Dodik attacked the Federation-based politicians for seeking "to deprive Serbs of their right to identify themselves as such" by opposing inclusion of questions about ethnic identity, religion, and language in and EU-mandated census. Dodik also complained that the international community had imposed too many reforms "on the RS" and that "the RS would no longer accept this approach." Dodik and Ivanic argued that any constitutional reform must be negotiated without international community involvement, adding, "the RS would only accept technical assistance" from the international community. Dodik also underscored that he and his party would not agree to participate in any constitutional reform talks unless it was SARAJEVO 00001492 003 OF 003 clear that Dayton "would provide a basis for those talks." His party supported a federal system of government and Croat aspirations for a federal unit, but also insisted that the RS with its current borders be one of the federal units inside Bosnia. Dinner With Party Leaders - Croats: Actually, We Do -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Though the Croats, particularly HDZ-1990, have stressed their support for creation of a third entity during the municipal election campaign, neither Croat leader explicitly raised the issue at dinner. Instead, both Covic and Ljubic stressed the vital role the international community has played in Bosnia and the need for it to continue until constitutional reform is completed. Covic underscored the need for U.S. leadership in Bosnia, particularly on constitutional reform. Both men argued that the governing structures created at Dayton were too inefficient to meet the EU accession requirements, and underscored that the current two-entity system was unacceptable to Croats. Ljubic noted that OHR, which he stressed, was part of "Dayton Bosnia," was the only structure capable of "de-blocking" the country's governing structures. To maintain the Dayton governing structures but close OHR would sentence Bosnia to permanent political stalemate, or worse, Ljubic argued. Both Covic and Ljubic called on the U.S. to lead a constitutional reform effort immediately after the October municipal elections. Covic observed that there was a limited window of opportunity for political parties to reach agreement in 2009 before the 2010 election year. ENGLISH