BOSNIA - PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS IN WAR CRIMES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 001476 SIPDIS EUR (JONES),EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB),S/WCI (WILLIAMSON, VIBUL-JOLLES),INR (MORIN),NSC (BRAUN); OSD (BEIN) E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ICTY KAWC KJUS KCRM BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS IN WAR CRIMES PROSECUTION REF: A) SARAJEVO 1221 B) SARAJEVO 1087 C) 07 SARAJEVO 2073 D) 07 SARAJEVO 2555 E) SARAJEVO 1993 Classified By: Michael J. Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Earlier this month, the State Prosecutor's Office publicly debuted its demographic analysis and new case selection criteria for war crimes cases. The demographic analysis identifies the timeframes and places in which significant numbers of people were killed during the 1992-1995 war, while the new case selection criteria ensure that the office's limited resources will be focused on the most egregious war crimes cases. This new approach was something that we and others in the international community had been pressing for and which Ambassador Williamson praised in a September 15 editorial that was published in several local papers. Unfortunately, victim groups -- both Bosniak and Serb -- reacted negatively to the case selection criteria publicly despite signaling private approval earlier. Separately, the State Prosecutor's Office also completed a partial draft of a National War Crimes Strategy -- something that a Peace Implementation Council (PIC) insisted must be adopted by the Bosnian government. Not surprisingly, the Republika Srpska (RS) Ministry of Justice rejected the partial draft's recommendation to extend the international presence at the State Prosecutor's Office and the State Court beyond 2009. Other stakeholders, including some within the international community, were critical of the partial draft as well. The problems associated with the draft suggest that it, like state property and Brcko, could be a difficult PIC objective to meet, increasing pressure from some quarters to accept a lowest common denominator product rather than a strategy that advances our war crimes agenda here. END SUMMARY State Prosecutor's Office Unveils New Approach to War Crimes -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) During early September, the State Prosecutor's Office held presentations in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar, Tuzla, and Brcko in which it publicly unveiled its demographic analysis of war crimes committed in Bosnia during the 1992-1995 war. The analysis identifies the timeframes and places in which large numbers of people were killed both in absolute terms and as a proportion of local populations. The office also provided general information about its case selection criteria -- standards that local judicial officials and the international community had been pressing the office to develop for more than two years -- which are largely based on the demographic analysis. Acting Chief Prosecutor Milorad Barasin and David Schwendiman, the head of the Special Department for War Crimes, said that their office is using the new case selection criteria to ensure that it is giving priority to the most egregious war crimes cases. Victim Groups Blast the New Approach -------------- ¶3. (U) The new approach to war crimes prosecution was praised by prosecutors nation-wide, but was criticized by victims groups. The Mothers of Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, the most high-profile victims group, walked out of the State Prosecutor's Office's September 5 press conference in Sarajevo. They accused the State Prosecutor's Office of trying to ensure that an equal number of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs are tried by the State Court, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of victims were Bosniak (and by implication that the overwhelming majority of perpetrators were Serbs). The Mothers also accused the State Prosecutor's Office of putting aside more than 800 cases that were returned to Bosnia by the ICTY. Victims groups from the Republika Srpska charged that, in unveiling its new approach, the State Prosecutor's Office was essentially admitting that it had failed to prosecute cases involving Serb victims. Reactions of the Prosecutor's Office -------------- ¶4. (C) Contacts at the State Prosecutor's Office told us privately that they were surprised at the reactions of the victims groups, particularly the Mothers of Srebrenica, who they said allegedly had "staged" the September 5 press SARAJEVO 00001476 002 OF 003 conference walkout. Our contacts maintained that the group's leadership had been fully briefed on the new approach to war crimes prosecution and had privately expressed their support before the official roll out. The State Prosecutor's Office responded by issuing a press release on September 11, stating that the ethnicity of the alleged perpetrator has no bearing in its decisions to investigate and prosecute war crimes cases. In an interview the same day, Schwendiman elaborated that his office was pursuing a victim-based approach, and was investigating and prosecuting the most egregious war crimes committed against all ethnicities. He also explained that there had been some work done on the cases returned to Bosnia by the ICTY, but, that many of these cases were not ready for prosecution. On September 15, Adil Osamovic, RS Vice President and member of the Bosniak Party for Democratic Action (SDA),accused the State Prosecutor's Office of adopting the new approach in response to RS pressure to investigate and prosecute more cases involving Serb victims. The National War Crimes Strategy: Growing Problems -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Meanwhile, the State Prosecutor's Office is also continuing its work on a draft National War Crimes Strategy, one of three milestones in the broader rule of law objective set by the PIC in February for OHR's closure. To date, the office has completed six out of thirteen planned chapters of a strategy that is focused on prosecution efforts. The partial draft has been circulated to members of a working group chaired by Barasin and to other stakeholders for comment. The working group is supposed to revise the first half of the draft while the State Prosecutor's Office works on the second half. Contacts at the State Prosecutor's Office have told us they are being pressured by OHR and others to finish the job quickly. We have continued to underscore the message delivered to the HighRep by Ambassador Williamson during their July 11 exchange in Sarajevo: the U.S. wants meaningful implementation of the PIC rule of law objective and the international community should not sacrifice substance for speed on the war crimes strategy. ¶6. (C) Preliminary reactions to the draft suggest that a number of stakeholders -- including OHR, OSCE, the BiH Ministry of Justice, the RS Ministry of Justice, and the State Court -- find the partial draft problematic. Chief among the complaints are the lack of information about the processing of war crimes cases in the entities and the omission of costs associated with war crimes prosecution, the number of war crimes cases, a description of timeframes and resources needed to process them, and a listing of actors and responsibilities. OHR and OSCE also questioned whether it was appropriate to include extending the presence of international secondees past 2009 in the strategy. Notably, opposition to extending the secondees was one of a few substantive comments submitted by the RS Ministry of Justice. The Ministry argued that the departure of the internationals by 2009 would allow nationals to prove their expertise in handling difficult cases and to establish trust among all peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some members of the working group have anonymously leaked their concerns about the draft. The September 8 edition of Dnevni Avaz carried a quote from a working group member, that the draft was a "disastrous document, which does not resolve anything." State Court President Meddzida Kreso went a step further and unhelpfully submitted a competing draft national war crimes strategy to the working group. (Note: Some OHR staffers believe that Kreso's is a better document. End Note) Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The State Prosecutor's Office's new case selection criteria are a welcome milestone for war crimes prosecution in Bosnia. Unfortunately, but not unexpectedly, the reactions of victims groups have marred what should have been a good news story for the State Prosecutor's Office. The State Prosecutor's Office may have inadvertently hurt its own cause by designing a roll out strategy that underestimated the degree to which victims groups were prepared to play politics in an election year with the issue, despite expressing support in private. Official RS opposition to extending the secondees is another unfortunate, but not SARAJEVO 00001476 003 OF 003 unexpected, development -- though the RS Ministry of Justice position runs counter to private comments Dodik made to the Ambassador in which he said that he would support extending the presence of secondees working on war crimes. The RS position underscores the uphill battle we face in securing an extension for the secondees. Finally, the apparent problems with the National War Crimes Strategy suggest that state property and Brcko may not be the only PIC objectives whose resolution could be complicated. Our challenge will be two-fold: getting the HighRep to focus on the issue, while at the same time, ensuring that he resists the temptation to accept a lowest common denominator outcome that undermines our war crimes agenda in Bosnia. ENGLISH