BOSNIA - DODIK REMAINS TOP DOG IN THE RS DESPITE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SARAJEVO 001193 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE(HOH/FOOKS); OSD FOR BEIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PHUM ECON KDEM BK SUBJECT: BOSNIA - DODIK REMAINS TOP DOG IN THE RS DESPITE FAILURE TO DELIVER ON BIG ECONOMIC PROJECTS REF: A. SARAJEVO 1113 ¶B. SARAJEVO 532 ¶C. SARAJEVO 1051 Classified By: Michael J. Murphy. Reason 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During his 2006 election campaign, Republika Srpska (RS) Prime Minister Milorad Dodik promised the RS public that he would revitalize the RS oil industry and the Gacko thermo power plant, finish the highway connecting Banja Luka to Croatia, and build a comprehensive network of highways in the RS. After two years, Dodik has not demonstrated results on any of these projects. Despite these failures, which opposition politicians have sought to highlight, there has been little to no public outcry. Though some independent polling suggests Dodik's popularity is no longer at stratospheric heights, the disorganized political opposition has been unable to capitalize on this. Dodik has also effectively stamped out the independent media and NGO sector in the RS. Even the independent private sector (i.e., business people who are not friends of Dodik) claims to be under attack. This environment makes it harder for the opposition or critics outside the RS to break the spell Dodik has cast over the RS public, which means, even with his drop off in support, Dodik remains as popular as he was in the run-up to his landslide 2006 general election victory. This is, in part, because he has made effective use of the proceeds from the Telekom Srpske privatization, but also because Dodik is seen as the only leader able to effectively stand up for Serb interests against Bosniaks and the international community, which has manifest itself in what amounts to a robust nationalist, anti-state agenda. If the current environment in the RS persists, Dodik seems poised to remain on top of the RS political pyramid for some time. END SUMMARY A) DODIK'S PROMISES The Highway to Croatia - A Thorn in Dodik's Side -------------- --- ¶2. (SBU) When Dodik came to power in 2006, he inherited the disastrous, partially-completed Banja Luka - Croatia highway project from the previous Serb Democratic Party (SDS) administration. The SDS launched the project to complete the 32 mile highway in 1999, and started construction in 2005 - before it resolved property disputes with property owners along the route. The property issue continues to haunt Dodik today. Several kilometers are finished, but work on the phase one segment cannot go on due to several property owners who refuse to move and another who has launched a lawsuit for damages. Although phase one is at a stalemate, construction of the phase two segment started in March 2008, and is scheduled to be finished by the end of 2009. We hear that property issues on that segment are not resolved either. Oil Industry Privatization: Where's the Beef? -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Although Dodik continues to tout the privatization of the three RS oil industry companies (the Brod oil refinery, the Modrica Lubricant refinery and the Banja Luka-based Petrol chain of gas stations) as a huge success, facts on the ground tell a different story. The RS government signed the sale agreement to the Russian firm Neftgazincor (a subsidiary of Zarubezhneft) in February 2007, amid much media fanfare about how the new Russian owners will make enormous investments in the companies and get them operational again. According to a document adopted by the RS National Assembly (RSNA) in July 2008, the Russian firm paid 110,409,900 and 15,445,664 Euros to the RS government and the RS pension fund, respectively, for their shares in the companies in October 2007. Since then, the Russian firm took over management of the companies and announced plans for an overhaul of the Brod refinery and start up of production. To date, nothing has happened. Dodik and media outlets friendly to him have continued to make excuses for why the Russians have yet to take any action. Gacko/CEZ Power Plant Project Stalled -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Dodik has not had better luck with his promise to SARAJEVO 00001193 002 OF 004 revitalize the Gacko thermo power plant (TPP),near Trebinje. In September 2007, the RS government and the Czech Utility Company (CEZ) signed an agreement whereby CEZ and the RS electric company (ERS) formed a joint venture company, Nove Elektrane Republike Srpske (NERS). Under the terms of the deal, ERS was to transfer the assets of Gacko's 300 Megawatt (MW) TPP and coal mine to NERS. CEZ was supposed to invest 1.4 billion Euros to reconstruct the existing TPP, construct a new 600 MW TPP (Gacko II),and to open a coal mine in the Gacko Basin. To date, CEZ has not invested a cent. The project got bogged down almost immediately, when small shareholders in the Gacko TPP filed a lawsuit against the RS government and CEZ, in an attempt to stop the transfer and claim lost dividends. The court in Trebinje ruled against the shareholders, and their appeal is still ongoing. Meanwhile, CEZ is trying to purchase the shares of the most vocal opponents to the deal, but is bogged down in negotiations over an acceptable price. In March 2008, the RS government temporarily suspended the entire deal until CEZ and the shareholders reach an agreement. Dodik's RS Highway Network in Limbo -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Another one of Dodik's high profile promises was to build a network of 432 kilometers of highways across the RS. The Dodik-controlled RS media has given this project, like the others, continued, extensive, positive coverage, starting with Dodik's November 2006 signing of a memorandum of understanding with the Austrian firm Strabag for a three billion Euro investment. At the time, construction was scheduled to begin in the spring of 2007. To date, construction has not started, and the parties have not even finalized the contract. The exact terms of the concession have changed several times, as the parties attempt to reach an agreement that will allow Strabag to make a profit on the profitable segments while still building the unprofitable ones. There is also a dispute over who will finance the expropriation of land along the highway routes, which is estimated at 300-400 million Euros. On April 21, RS Minister for Transport and Communications Nedeljko Cubrilovic admitted to us that the parties may never reach an agreement. He said that if there is no deal, the RS government could start negotiations from scratch with other interested potential investors; or consider breaking the package apart and making a deal on the most profitable segments. B) SILENCING HIS CRITICS Opposition Vainly Tries to Puncture Dodik's Image -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Dodik's failure to follow through on his promises has not gone unnoticed. The main opposition parties in the Republika Srpska National Assembly (RSNA),including the SDS and the Serb Radical Party (SRS),have repeatedly attacked Dodik and his government over all of these projects, alleging incompetence, corruption, and lack of transparency and results. However, Dodik has complete control over the RSNA. He exercises strict party discipline over the 41 RSNA deputies from his Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD). In addition to the SNSD votes he controls, he needs only one more vote from among the 15 MPs representing the parties of his coalition partners to get the minimum 42 votes necessary to push through whatever he wants or to block measures proposed by the opposition. Additionally, infighting within the SDS has prevented the party from functioning effectively. SDS caucus chief Borislav Bojic told us on July 15 that, "there is no alternative to Dodik on the RS political scene." He alleged that the SNSD has become, "more radical than the SDS ever was," but admitted that, "it will take a few years for the public to realize what is going on," because Dodik is, "a master illusionist." No Independent Watch Dog to Check Dodik -------------- ¶7. (C) Almost all of our non-SNSD interlocutors, including Branislav Borenovic, caucus chief of Dodik's coalition partner the Party for Democratic Progress (PDP),tell us that Dodik has direct control over or influence on the RS media. The RS government directly owns Radio-Television RS (RTRS), the main source of news. Any pretence of distance between SARAJEVO 00001193 003 OF 004 the two will be eliminated soon, when RTRS moves into its new headquarters in the RS administrative center, adjacent to the RS government building. RS print media is also almost all firmly under Dodik's control, albeit indirectly. Dodik's close friend Zeljko Kopanja owns the two main dailies: Nezavisne Novine ("Independent" News) and Glas Srpske (Voice of Srpska). Other RS dailies are also pro-government, or at least unlikely to actively criticize Dodik. The one paper that tried - Patriot - went out of business after only a few months in print because no one would advertise in it. Until recently, one of the few credible voices actively and publicly criticizing Dodik was that of the BiH office of the international anti-corruption watchdog NGO Transparency International (TI). TI has frequently sparred with Dodik in the media over the past year, and issued reports alleging fraud and corruption in the Brod refinery and Gacko deals, as well as in the construction of the RS government building. In July, however, Dodik effectively silenced TI, when his media launched a vicious campaign alleging that TI itself is corrupt (Ref A). As a result of the media uproar, TI temporarily suspended operations in BiH, citing, "security concerns." Dodik Seeks to Tighten His Grip on the RS Even Further -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Having all but stamped out the independent media and NGO sectors, and with no functional political opposition to speak of, Dodik has turned his efforts to tightening control over his own party and other possible sources of independent thinking. The SNSD recently announced that it will require all of its candidates for local elections to sign contracts with the party, obliging them to either resign from office or pay a 50,000 KM fine to the party in case of any, "drastic breach of party discipline." The candidates will have to sign blank resignations in advance. The RSNA is currently considering a draft law that gives Dodik the right to override decisions made by his ministers and the director of government agencies. Finally, the RSNA recently passed in a first reading a new law banning public protests in front of the RS government building, on regional and local roads, near hospitals, near schools or kindergartens during school hours, in national parks or near cultural monuments. The law is now in the public comment stage, and will return to the RSNA for a second reading. ¶9. (C) We also heard allegations that Dodik is pressuring perceived opponents in the private sector. On July 16, Slavisa Krunic, owner of the successful, RS-based private security firm Sector Security, informed us that Dodik's bodyguard Milos Cubrilovic and Cubrilovic's "kum" (best man), Velibor Sotra have pressured him to sell his firm to their own Alpha security firm. Krunic said that his firm is "black-listed" by Dodik and therefore cannot obtain any government contracts. He speculated that Dodik "wants control over Sector Security's 900 men in uniform." C) DODIK STILL KING IN THE RS Despite Unfulfilled Promises, Dodik Remains Popular -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Despite the growing list of failed projects and unfulfilled promises, Dodik remains the RS's most popular politician. He is widely admired as a leader who is not afraid to stand up for Serbs against the international community and Bosniaks in Sarajevo -- all of whom he actively portrays as enemies of Serbs and the RS. He frequently touts the RS as "doing better" than the Federation economically and politically -- and people believe him. Although specific categories of people -- like Brod refinery workers -- are disillusioned with the failure of economic projects, for the most part the RS public is reluctant to pass judgment against Dodik and seems willing to wait and see. For his part, Dodik is a star at self promotion, and continues to tout all of these projects as huge successes that will result in big payoffs despite "delays." ¶11. (C) In addition, Dodik has achieved progress in enough areas to buy him more time to try and make progress on the rest of his promises. He frequently hails the privatization of Telekom Srpske as an enormous success that filled the RS coffers with cash. The RS investment development bank has SARAJEVO 00001193 004 OF 004 implemented a complex program for cycling the telecom funds out into the economy by means of low interest loans for small and medium sized businesses and first home purchases, as well as grants for projects in less developed municipalities, with a focus on the impoverished Eastern RS. The RS government frequently distributes funds to various "social categories," including the indigent, war veterans, workers in struggling state-run companies, and others. Although Dodik is widely seen as corrupt, he is also seen as someone who "spreads the wealth," both to his inner circle and beyond (Ref C). This strategy earns him fierce loyalty. Despite criticisms of the huge costs of the new RS government building and administrative center, many RS Serbs seem privately pleased to have their government housed in such world-class facilities. ¶12. (C) The RS public also credit's Dodik for other erceived "successes" during his tenure. He is sen as winning the case against the Federation ovr indirect taxes, and getting back 20 million KMfrom central institutions. The public credits him for paying back old currency account holders who lost their savings during the war (in direct violation of state law and leaving Federation account holders in limbo). Dodik has increased average salaries in the RS, bringing them in line with salaries in the Federation. He is seen as fighting the further transfer of competencies to the state. Finally, the RS public believes that Dodik was the winner in the showdown with the Office of the High Representative (OHR) last fall, and that, as a result, he has effectively abolished the Bonn powers. COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) Milorad Dodik remains the most popular politician in the RS, just as he was when he won a landslide victory in ¶2006. Although he has failed to fulfill many of his election-year promises, he has held on to the goodwill and respect of the RS public by judiciously distributing RS government largesse and by pursuing an often aggressive nationalist agenda centered around anti-state, anti-Bosniak (i.e., mainly anti-Silajdzic),and anti-international community themes. He has also vigorously sought to silence or intimidate his critics. As a consequence, the lack of concrete results is unlikely to dramatically impact the prospects for Dodik's SNSD in the 2008 local elections. Several interlocutors, including Bosniak RS Vice President Adil Osmanovic, have told us that, although Dodik is well positioned for the 2008 local elections, he might face more difficulties in 2010 if he cannot convert his pledges into concrete results. That may be true, but people in the RS seem increasingly resigned to the idea that the SNSD has almost complete control over all financial and political resources. More importantly, they see Dodik and the SNSD as the only political actors capable of protecting the RS from what they are told are growing threats from Sarajevo-based politicians. ENGLISH