BRAZIL'S ELECTRICITY SUPPLY IN PRECARIOUS EQUILIBRIUM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAO PAULO 000260 STATE PASS USTR FOR KDUCKWORTH STATE PASS EXIMBANK STATE PASS OPIC FOR DMORONSE, NRIVERA, CMERVENNE DEPT OF TREASURY FOR JHOEK DEPT OF ENERGY SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ENRG ECON ENV PREL BR SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S ELECTRICITY SUPPLY IN PRECARIOUS EQUILIBRIUM SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFED--PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY REF: A: Brasilia 0593; B: Brasilia 672; C: Sao Paulo 0031; D: La Paz 0462; E: 06 Sao Paulo 1059 ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Brazil's 2008 electricity supply will just cover demand, leaving the county in a state of precarious equilibrium. President Lula is lucky that it has been raining sufficiently over the last six years to feed Brazil's hydroelectric reservoirs (which account for approximately 80 percent of Brazil's electricity production),but he may not be as lucky next year. In addition, the GOB's improvements to the electrical system since 2001 have not overcome the fundamental problems of lagging investment in electricity production and an energy matrix that is heavily skewed towards this one source of power. Government investment to expand the electricity supply has been insignificant compared to growth in electricity demand, and prospects for private sector investment appear limited given the regulatory framework. Political uncertainties in neighboring Bolivia and Paraguay also may limit Brazil's supply of electricity. In addition, several large domestic hydroelectric generation projects are years from becoming operational. In short, Brazil's static energy balance shows a very tight picture between supply and demand through 2012 when new gas and oil discoveries could potentially come on-line. Brazil's options for strengthening the electricity balance in the near term are biomass generation, securing reliable sources of natural gas, conservation, and better energy efficiency. In the meantime, Brazil should expect higher electricity tariffs until it can develop a consistent supply of natural gas and get several large generation projects off the ground. END SUMMARY. Current Dynamics -------------- ¶2. (U) The Brazilian government appears to have averted an electricity crisis due in large part to pure luck. Because approximately 80 percent of Brazil's electricity supply is from hydroelectric power, rainfall is the most important determinant in avoiding an electricity shortage. (Note: See Ref A for more detailed look at breakdown of Brazil's generation capacity. End Note.) In December 2007, industry insiders were preparing for 
shortages because rainfall was 50 percent below normal; however, heavy rains in early 2008 have saved the GOB from the potential crisis in the short-term. The medium-term threat of an electricity crisis, however, is far from over. ¶3. (U) According to statistics from Brazil's National Agency for Electric Energy (Aneel) from March, Brazil had an installed capacity for electric power generation of 100,700 megawatts (MW),an increase of 3,400 MW over 2007. Although generating capacity vastly exceeds the demand of 64,000 MW (Ref B),it is theoretical because many gas-fired generators do not have adequate supplies of natural gas, and hydroelectric capacity is dependent on rainfall to fill reservoirs. Shortages in Brazil's natural gas supply (Ref C) limited gas-fired plants to producing only 35 percent of their 11,600 MW capacity in 2007. On the demand side, electricity demand growth tracks well with economic growth. According to the Energy Research Company (EPE),electricity consumption was up 5.7 percent in 2007 (GDP growth was 5.4 percent),the largest increase since the electricity rationing of 2001. Consumption was up across the various consumers: commercial consumption was up 6.6 percent, residential consumption up six percent, and industrial consumption up five percent. ¶4. (SBU) Government investment to expand the electricity supply has been lagging growth in electricity demand and prospects for private sector investment appear limited. The largest state-owned electricity company Electrobras' investment was down by seven percent last year in real terms from 2006 despite the GOB's promises for increased investment in the sector. Total public investment in the sector reached R$ 3.11 billion in 2007 (approximately USD 1.83 billion). David Waltenberg, an expert in legal and regulatory energy issues, told Econoff that distortions within the distribution system discourage investment and skew the electricity pricing structure. The President of AES Brasil, Britaldo Soares, told SAO PAULO 00000260 002 OF 004 Econoffs that new firms are unwilling to invest without more stable investment rules, availability of financing instruments, clearer environmental licensing procedures, and better pricing terms. AES Electropaulo's CFO Alexandre Innecco underscored this point by noting that from his point of view, only existing foreign companies who have established themselves in Brazil are liable to increase investments in electricity generation in the short-term. (Note: While acknowledging the significant problems in the sector, private industry group representatives Luiz Fernando Leone Vianna of the Independent Energy Producers Association (APINE),and Paulo Pederosa of the Brazilian Association of Commercial Agents of Electrical Energy, both feel the positives outweigh the negatives, and believe there are some good opportunities for investment in this sector in Brazil. End Note.) Better System than 2001 but Not Enough -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The GOB's improvements to the electricity system since 2001, primarily increasing installed electricity generation capacity and interconnecting regional electricity transmission lines, have not solved Brazil's fundamental electricity problems and have not been enough to assuage the fears of renewed crises. For example on interconnectivity, AES's Innecco pointed out to Econoff that reservoirs have different generation capacities that limit the effectiveness of the interconnectivity of the grid. He noted that in some cases reservoirs in one region cannot substitute for a lack of water in another. Despite this imperfect substitution, Dilton da Conti Oliveira, President of the San Francisco River Hydroelectric Company (CHESF),told the Principal Officer in Recife that he was not worried about electricity shortages in the Northeast despite the lack of rain because CHESF was already "importing" electricity from other parts of the country thanks to the interconnected grid. (Comment: This comment by the head of CHESF illustrates the lack of understanding of imperfect substitution. Interconnectivity alone will not resolve electrical shortages. End Comment.) Supply Uncertainties Abound -------------- ¶6. (U) According to GOB figures, the static energy balance (assuming five percent growth in demand and a guaranteed natural gas supply) shows a very tight picture between supply and demand through ¶2012. On the supply side, the uncertainties are enormous. To increase the installed generation capacity by 4.5 percent per year, Brazil needs to make investments of R$ 18 billion per year (approximately USD 10.6 billion),according to the Federation of Industries of Sao Paulo (FIESP). New electricity generation projects such as the auction of the Rio Madeira mega-project Santo Antonio in December 2007 are an important step for the GOB, but are a far cry from solving the country's energy problems, and would not alleviate the intrinsic uncertainty of hydroelectric generation to meet future demand. Brazil would need to build one mega-complex per year from 2012 to 2016 to sustain five percent GDP growth. Furthermore, project delays are certain to occur due to environmental licensing concerns and financing. Currently, the Brazilian law requires multiple environmental impact assessments and the Brazilian Environmental Agency (IBAMA) employees are held personally liable for mistakes. The GOB initiated studies six years ago on the Rio Madeira projects and it will take a minimum of seven years to reach full operating capacity. Even privatizing existing generation facilities has been difficult in recent months. The Sao Paulo state government canceled its third attempt to auction Brazil's third largest generation companies Companhia Electrica de Sao Paulo (CESP) on March 26 because potential bidders balked when the GOB was unwilling to consider an extension of its generation contracts, which would have been the largest electricity privatization ever in Brazil. ¶7. (U) International pressures also could contribute to possible electricity shortages. The ongoing discussions between Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil (Ref D) to divide up Bolivian natural gas production will probably limit Brazil's supply of Bolivian natural gas to power its gas-fired plants. Another of Brazil's power suppliers, its neighbor Paraguay, is also threatening Brazil's SAO PAULO 00000260 003 OF 004 electricity supply in the coming months. President-elect Fernando Lugo wants to raise the tariff on electricity Paraguay sells to Brazil from the Itaipu Dam by 700 percent. Itaipu is the world's largest hydropower plant (14,000 MW),from which Brazil gets 20 percent of its energy supply. Biomass, Conservation, and Efficiency to the Rescue -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The timeframe for large projects and for further development of Brazil's natural gas resources provide opportunities for biomass generation to fill some of the gap. Most experts point to biomass electricity generation via bagasse, the biomass remaining after sugarcane stalks are crushed to extract their juice for ethanol and sugar production. The Director of the National Operating System (ONS) Hermes Chipp told Econoff that biomass projects and small hydro plants are fundamental for guaranteeing Brazil's energy needs through 2012. Separately, ABRACEEL's Pederosa also cited these as the two areas with the most growth potential for the Brazilian energy matrix in the near term. ¶9. (SBU) According to the Brazilian Sugar Cane Industry Association (UNICA),Brazil's sugar/ethanol facilities have an installed capacity of 1,800 MW, of which 780 MW was sold to the grid during sugar cane harvest last year. With increased use of biomass from sugarcane and the implementation of high pressure boilers, UNICA estimates biomass could produce up to 15 percent (11,500 MW) of Brazil's energy needs by 2015. Cogeneration can be as inexpensive as the incremental cost of installing a more efficient boiler up to an investment-intensive technology overhaul to maximize electricity generation. General Electric (GE) Regional Manager Guillermo Brooks told Econoff that GE and others are interested in developing better technology to improve efficiency, but that sugar/ethanol facilities would need economies of scale in order for the investments to be economically viable. Cogeneration is a complimentary power source to hydroelectric generation (wet vs. dry seasons),the construction time for a cogeneration plant is about two years (five years for hydro),and provides a natural hedge for sugar/ethanol production. (Note: In order for bagasse plants to supply electricity to the grid, either the state or federal government will need to ensure access from these plants to the grid either through building the transmission lines or providing economic incentives for the companies to do so. End Note.) ¶10. (U) Another short-term option is energy conservation and efficiency. Because conservation was so successful in 2001, however, Innecco told Econoff that rationing would be less effective because many consumers have maintained their conservation efforts. Brazil would unlikely see a comparable drop if residential rationing measures were instituted again; instead, he said that the savings would have to come from industry, which would result in a larger economic impact. Despite Innecco's skepticism, the National Program of Electricity Conservation (Procel) estimated that if consumers reduced consumption by five percent, Brazil would conserve about 2,500 MW. Brazil has an estimated USD 2.5 billion in untapped energy efficiency improvements every year despite having had an energy efficiency program since 1985. A recent World Bank study showed that Brazil is a difficult place to promote energy efficiency because of the lack of available financing for energy efficiency projects and high interest rates. The main source of funding instead comes from a federally mandated fee charged to utility companies for efficiency measures. Although the fee encourages some efficiency projects, Brazil needs to create other incentives to fund energy-saving projects. ¶11. (SBU) Illegal connections to the electricity grid cost distributors approximately R$ 5 billion (USD three billion) per year and Brazil's average commercial losses exceed five percent of generated electricity, compared with the worldwide average of one percent. AES started a program in June 2005 to formalize illicit electricity connections in Sao Paulo. In 2007, AES Electropaulo estimated more than 300,000 illegal connections in its operating area. These consumers abuse the system and have no incentives to reduce their consumption. AES' pilot program working with USAID to formalize illegal connections showed a 30 percent consumption SAO PAULO 00000260 004 OF 004 reduction (Ref E) by bringing participants into the formal system and educating them how to conserve and to be accountable for their electricity consumption. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The tight supply and demand picture for electricity undoubtedly means higher electricity tariffs for residential and industrial consumers until bigger projects come online in 2012. Financial interlocutors point to higher energy costs as one of the major inflationary concerns in the Brazilian economy in 2008. Although generators will initially bear the brunt of some of the up-front costs of higher generation costs, eventually they will pass them on to consumers. Brazil's electricity generation capacity in 2008 depends on a number of external factors largely out of the control of the government such as weather, the results of Paraguay's attempts to renegotiate the Itaipu contract, and supplies of natural gas from Bolivia and Argentina. Brazil needs to start advancing innovative ideas to bridge the gap and increase electricity supply. The GOB is beginning to recognize biomass as a viable alternative and the private sector is beginning to finance these ventures. As the 10th largest energy consumer in the world, the World Bank expects Brazil to double its energy usage by 2030, but without the right government incentives for production, conservation, and/or efficiency, Brazil will have a hard time doing this. Barring much larger investments in the energy sector, the Brazilian economy could face a significant constraint on its growth. The next cable in this series will focus on regional influences on Brazil's energy sector. END COMMENT. ¶13. (U) This cable was coordinated and cleared by Embassy Brasilia. WHITE