ELECTION SHOWS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SANTO DOMINGO 000929 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CAR E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON DR SUBJECT: ELECTION SHOWS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF DOMINICAN DEMOCRACY ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The analysis of Post and other observers of the 2008 presidential election is that the Dominican democratic system has improved to the extent that widespread election day fraud, which occurred as recently as 1994, is now a thing of the past. Other strengths of Dominican democracy that were displayed during the election process include the performance of the Central Elections Board; the contribution of civil society; and election observation programs. The role of the USG was also a positive. Key weaknesses and areas for future attention include the use of government resources to favor the incumbent; the prevalence of clientism and lack of policy debate; and the absence of legislation to combat electoral violations and campaign finance problems. The election also showed that the once-dominant PRSC party is continuing its decline, and that President Fernandez's broad coalition played an important role in his first-round victory. Upcoming issues in Dominican politics -- including the role of the opposition, constitutional reform, cabinet changes, and the sustainability of economic subsidies -- will be reported Septel. Central Elections Board -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Central Elections Board (JCE) was almost universally praised for its organization of the election. The JCE received a 72 percent public approval rating, far higher than other government institutions here, and was described by the OAS as "an institution that has an important amount of legitimacy, credibility, and prestige." Participacion Ciudadana, the influential local democracy NGO, concluded that, "The Dominican Republic appears to have definitively overcome the culture of (election day) fraud. No longer does there exist the uncertainty that in the past consumed Dominicans each time they held an election." During the campaign, the JCE also showed its strength by standing up to the government and issuing a precedent setting ruling banning the so-called "Nomina CB," a special government payroll for members of the ruling PLD party. Civil Society -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Civil society played an important role in the election. While for the most part the election was devoid of policy discussion -- Fernandez refused to participate in a formal debate with his two principal challengers and all three candidates stuck mainly to generalities and negative tactics -- two civil society groups pushed the envelope by organizing events in which the candidates went on record on key issues. The NGO FINJUS held a series of forums where each candidate (on different days) gave a speech on corruption and fielded questions from a panel. The American Chamber of Commerce hosted a similar series of events in which the candidates spoke and took questions on economic and trade issues. ¶4. (SBU) A civil society organization, Participacion Ciudadana, also led a major election observation program. (Note: Both FINJUS and Participacion Ciudadana have received considerable funding from USAID.) Beyond these specific achievements, it is clear that the major NGOs here are key players. These are not organizations shouting at the government from the wilderness: Their reports receive front-page coverage in the press and their leaders circulate among the influential crowd. Election Observation Programs -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The domestic and international election observation programs were both successful. Participacion Ciudadana, using a USAID grant of US$400,000, fielded 4,000 observers. The NGO was able to field observers at a cost of US$100 per poll watcher; in contrast, each OAS observer cost approximately US$8,000. (Note: There is a case to be made for the OAS rethinking its model for observation. The current model was developed for countries with weak election agencies, which is no longer the case in most of Latin America. A new model, centered on a much reduced mission which works closely with local NGOs, would reduce the cost and effectively expand and deepen the OAS's observation.) Participacion Ciudadana also produced four detailed reports which received widespread attention here, and conducted an election day quick count -- a key guarantee against fraud -- SANTO DOMI 00000929 002 OF 004 which was accurate to 0.55 percent. ¶6. (SBU) The OAS's observation mission began poorly, suffering from a slow start (partly justified by the Paraguay election) and lack of significant funding from any country other than the U.S. However, in the ten day period before the election, the mission made a quick recovery, facilitated by a large, late contribution by Canada. ¶7. (SBU) The OAS's Preliminary Report made well targeted and timely observations: The days immediately prior to the election and the report's release had seen serious complaints by the leading opposition party, the PRD, that the new system to scan and transmit results electronically could lead to fraud. The PRD's persistent rhetoric raised the possibility that the party would use the new scanner system as a justification to dispute the results of the election. The OAS's early statement effectively put the PRD on notice that minor technical problems should not be hyped, saying, "The Mission notes the parties' concerns...; however, (the Mission) also understands that the scanning of the vote count sheets does not influence the final result.... Political parties have a responsibility to cooperate with the JCE by not generating misunderstandings...." ¶8. (SBU) The OAS report also provided helpful international backing to the JCE and Participacion Ciudadana. Those organizations had stuck their necks out by criticizing the ruling PLD party for using government spending to favor the incumbent candidate, and the OAS -- by making similar criticisms -- helped support local efforts to strengthen democracy. The USG -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Throughout the campaign, the U.S. was seen as neutral and none of the major parties attempted to pull us into the policy debate. Except for a few isolated voices, no one questioned the operational independence of Participacion Ciudadana and FINJUS based on their being USAID grantees. Early in the campaign, a JCE judge criticized the Ambassador for simply calling for a "free, fair, and transparent election;" however, the judge's comments appeared to have been based on a mistaken belief that the Ambassador's comments implied that the election process was being poorly managed by the JCE. The attendance of the Ambassador and other chiefs of mission at an election observation briefing by Participacion Ciudadana -- an important demonstration of our support for the NGO -- received positive press coverage, as did his visit to polling stations on election day (also joined by other ambassadors). ¶10. (SBU) After the election, the Embassy added its voice to local and international efforts to strengthen democracy here by stating in a press release that, "We share the concerns expressed by the JCE, Participacion Ciudadana, the OAS, and others regarding the need to establish a clear line between government spending and the expenditures of political campaigns." ¶11. (SBU) The USG has played an important role in eliminating widespread election day fraud and assisting the other achievements of Dominican democracy that were displayed during the 2008 election. Since the fraudulent election of 1994, substantial USAID funds have been used to strengthen the JCE, make it more independent, and support civil society monitoring of the Board. In addition, advocacy by Ambassadors, Public Affairs programming, and efforts by other Embassy sections has helped multiply the effects of our aid projects. Persistent Problems -------------- ¶12. (SBU) While considerable progress has been made in strengthening Dominican democracy, the 2008 elections also showed that there is much work yet to be done. Many of the weaknesses and areas for future attention here are common throughout the developing world. Abuse of Government Resources -------------- ¶13. (SBU) In a country that saw a dictator (Trujillo) and a strongman (Balaguer) rule for all but 13 years from SANTO DOMI 00000929 003 OF 004 1930-1994, the practice of Presidential re-election has been controversial for as long as anyone can remember. In 1994, as part of the political agreement that settled the contested election results, a constitutional amendment was passed eliminating re-election; however, the issue resurfaced when, in 2002, President Mejia pushed through a new amendment permitting a second term. ¶14. (SBU) Re-election remained highly controversial in 2008. In May 2007, the PLD's own Danilo Medina summed up his loss in the party primary by saying, "The state imposed itself." In March 2008, Participacion Ciudadana issued a damning report listing in detail a series of ways in which government spending was favoring President Fernandez's candidacy. Also in March, the press revealed the existence of a special government payroll, the "Nomina CB." The payments, which were not available to the public at-large, were made to members of the "Committee of the Base," which is the ruling PLD party's organization at the neighborhood level. The OAS, for its part, reported that, "it appears evident that a significant part of the information that the government transmits has an electoral objective...." In its final report, Participacion Ciudadana summed up the campaign with the conclusion that, "the use of public resources to benefit a single candidate... instead of diminishing, grew to a magnitude without precedent." Campaign Finance -------------- ¶15. (SBU) A second key weakness of Dominican democracy is the virtual absence of regulations on campaign contributions. Currently, there is no requirement to list the names of contributors, which has made it difficult to investigate serious allegations that all of the major parties have received contributions from narcotics traffickers at one time or another. ¶16. (SBU) On the positive side, the JCE has said that they will propose new Electoral and Political Party Laws intended to help prevent -- and if necessary punish -- these types of abuses. Among civil society, there is widespread support for increased regulation; however, time and again the political parties here have blocked reforms of this type. There may now be an opening to pass and implement these laws, since the PRD has indicated it would support the legislation. (Note: In 2007, the PRD joined the other major parties in scuttling a set of JCE rules that would have restricted campaign activities; however, it is possible that the party will reconsider its position given the likelihood that it will remain in the opposition for some time to come.) Clientism -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Another area where Dominican democracy needs to improve is the prevalence of clientism and lack of policy debate. President Fernandez once complained to us that the election is "about jobs." The tone and context of his remark made clear that he was not referring to the economic policies that help the private sector create jobs, but rather to his supporters requesting government positions. ¶18. (SBU) Leaving aside for the moment the fact that Fernandez himself is well placed to put controls on clientism, the point we are making is that during the campaign many government jobs were given out and many promises were made to Fernandez supporters. For example, noted political scientist Rafael Toribio told POLOFF that, after Fernandez has added positions to the Ministry of Environment for political supporters during the campaign, the Ministry had a total of ten assistant secretaries -- three of whom did not even have offices. ¶19. (SBU) All three major candidates spent far more time attempting to win voters through clientism than via policy proposals for improving the life of Dominicans. Neither Fernandez nor the PRD's Vargas published party platforms until the last month of the campaign, and the PRSC's Aristy never did. In contrast, to name only a few examples of clientism, Fernandez created dozens of new government positions for supporters; Vargas handed out a card to low income voters good for "future" government benefits; and Aristy handed out large quantities of cash, as well as salamis, chickens, and live pigs at his rallies. SANTO DOMI 00000929 004 OF 004 Toward a Two-Party System? -------------- ¶20. (SBU) For the Reformista Party (PRSC),the 2008 election was yet another example of their falling fortunes. This year the party, which held the presidency from 1966-1978 and 1986-1996 under Joaquin Balaguer, saw large-scale defections to other groups, principally Fernandez's PLD. With their candidate having just failed to reach the 5 percent mark, the Reformistas will see a considerable drop in their public campaign financing (80 percent of the state funds go to parties receiving over 5 percent, while the remaining 20 percent is shared by all smaller parties). The reasons for the Reformistas' decline are varied, but most analysts believe the party has never recovered from Balaguer's death in 2002 and blame the strongman for neither establishing a long-term ideology nor naming a successor. The Big Tent -------------- ¶21. (SBU) The 2008 election demonstrated Fernandez's excellent political skills, which, aided by clientism, help him form a broad coalition and cruise to victory. In a meeting with the Ambassador, a senior government official described the coalition as "the zoo" -- the alliance contained 12 parties from the left, right, and center -- but it was a winning formula. In the final count, the votes of allied parties amounted to almost 9 percent of the 54 percent that Fernandez received -- putting him over the 50 percent mark to win in the first round. (U) Please visit us at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/santodomingo/ FANNIN