CHILEAN REACTION TO PERU'S SUBMISSION TO THE HAGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 000077 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/BSC E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV CI PE SUBJECT: CHILEAN REACTION TO PERU'S SUBMISSION TO THE HAGUE ON MARITIME ISSUE REF: A. SANTIAGO 00054 ... id: 138753 date: 1/25/2008 17:03 refid: 08SANTIAGO77 origin: Embassy Santiago classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: 08LIMA72|08SANTIAGO36|08SANTIAGO54 header: VZCZCXYZ0011 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHSG #0077/01 0251703 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 251703Z JAN 08 FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2693 INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 3305 RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 1928 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0152 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0765 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1649 RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JAN 5651 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 5425 RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 1207 RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 3904 RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY -------------- header ends -------------- C O N F I D E N T I A L SANTIAGO 000077 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/BSC E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV CI PE SUBJECT: CHILEAN REACTION TO PERU'S SUBMISSION TO THE HAGUE ON MARITIME ISSUE REF: A. SANTIAGO 00054 ¶B. SANTIAGO 00036 ¶C. LIMA 00072 Classified By: EPOL Counselor Juan A. Alsace. Reasons: 1.4 (B and D). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Chilean government categorically rejects Peru's maritime claim and has vowed to use all available legal resources to defeat it. In public, the GOC is taking the moral high ground: it has expressed its "profound regret" at Peru's decision and pledged continued cooperation with Peru. Privately, Chileans are livid that Peru has escalated the issue politically and argue that future cooperation will be difficult. The Chilean government is confident in its legal case, but believes "anything can happen" at The Hague. Chileans have expressed their support for the Bachelet government's position and thus far the issue has not become a domestic political one. End summary. ¶2. (U) The Chilean government officially responded immediately to Peru's announcement that it had submitted its maritime dispute to The Hague along familiar lines: --The Chilean government profoundly regrets Peru's submission to The Hague, since such submission disregards existing valid agreements between the two countries and practice observed by both countries for years; --Peru's demands refer to areas that without question are under Chilean sovereignty and jurisdiction. Chile will utilize all of the available legal resources to respond to this demand; and, --The Chilean government will try to ensure that relations with Peru continue along the lines of mutual cooperation and understanding. (Note: This official position, as reported in a statement issued by the Foreign Ministry on January 16, tracks closely with the private position outlined in a non-paper that MFA Director General for External Relations Carlos Portales delivered to U/S Burns in March 2007 during their meeting in Washington, D.C. Portales gave the Ambassador a similar paper on January 14 - ref. A) ¶3. (C) Publicly, Chileans across the political spectrum have denounced Peru's action and rallied behind the government. In anticipation of Peru's move, the Bachelet administration took several steps to build such support. For example, it established a Chilean legal and diplomatic team led by Foreign Minister Foxley that includes Deputy FM Alberto van Klaveren (agent before The Hague) and several senior Chilean diplomats. It also contracted several foreign legal experts. To further shore up domestic support, the GOC assembled a group of former Chilean foreign ministers (including those who served during the Pinochet era) to advise the Foreign Ministry on the issue. In the days leading up to Peru's submission, Foreign Minister Foxley met with the ex-foreign ministers, members of Congress, political figures, and leading business groups to brief on Chile's position, and to solicit their support. In each meeting, Foxley specifically stressed the importance of maintaining a single, unified Chilean position and of keeping the issue in legal channels, according to his chief of staff, Roberto Matus. Given that Chileans have been united on the issue for some time, obtaining consensus thus far has not been difficult. He also encouraged the Chileans to make public statements supporting the Chilean government's position and to pledge not to use the issue for "political gain" in Chile as the country moves further into campaign season. So far, Foxley's efforts have been successful. Concertacion coalition, opposition and business figures have publicly backed the government and endorsed a single Chilean foreign policy under the leadership of the Foreign Ministry. And the issue has not become a political one here. But while Foreign Ministry officials are breathing a sigh of relief, they caution that there is a lot of time between now and the 2009 elections for the center-right opposition to use the issue for its political gain. ¶4. (C) Privately, Chilean government officials are livid that Peru decided to "escalate the matter politically." Senior officials including Chile's Ambassador to the U.S. Fernandez and MFA DG for External Relations Portales contend that Peru remains trapped in the past and unable to look to the future. They argue that the Bachelet administration has gone out of its way to support the Garcia administration on several fronts, including the economic (U.S.-Peru FTA, APEC and the P4) and defense (resumption of two-plus-two meetings, confidence-building measures between militaries). And this is what Chile gets in return? ¶5. (C) For the GOC, there is no maritime border issue, since past agreements signed by Chile and Peru resolved the issue. The Chileans say their legal case is strong, but as former Army Chief of Staff Cheyre recently cautioned, victory is far from certain and "anything can happen" at The Hague. ¶6. (C) Senior GOC officials stop short of saying that Peru's submission to The Hague has prompted the Chileans to cease cooperation. However, they are clear that Chileans "need to be realistic in light of Peru's latest actions," according to the MFA's Portales, who noted to the Ambassador recently, "It is going to be very difficult for us to help Peru under these circumstances." Under Secretary of War Gonzalo Garcia told the Ambassador on January 23 that he doubted Chile and Peru would hold "two-plus-two" (foreign and defense ministers) meetings any time soon. ¶7. (C) Not all Chileans, however, have been supportive of Chile's overtures to Peru. Prominent Chilean businessman Andronico Luksic, whose family businesses lost nearly 200 million dollars in business disputes in Peru during the Lagos administration, questioned the Chilean government's support for Garcia during a recent dinner hosted by the Ambassador in honor of visiting USSOUTHCOM CDR Stavridis. Luksic's main point -- one that is shared by many Chileans including Foreign Ministry careerists who have served in Lima -- is that Peru is unreliable and Chile should remain firm against it. ¶8. (C) Comment: Peru's decision to take its dispute to The Hague did not surprise the Chilean government, which had prepared the Chilean public for such an eventuality for months. FM Foxley's around-the-clock meetings, the appointment of a bipartisan advisory committee of ex-foreign ministers, and the assembly of outside legal counsel all point to a government that had resigned itself that Peru would go forward. So far, the GOC's groundwork appears to have paid off domestically: Chileans across the political spectrum are publicly backing the government and thus far have refrained from using the issue for domestic political gain. ¶9. (C) Strong Chilean nationalist sentiment about attempts to redraw borders and frustration at what it sees as Peru's insistence on living in the past will not go away any time soon. The Chileans will not "bend over backwards" to cooperate with the Garcia administration. However, once the dust settles, Chile's interest in a stable and economically sound, outward-looking Peru will prevail. While the GOC may not actively seek out opportunities for cooperation, it likely will continue to pursue policies that can contribute to a positive agenda that looks to the future. Meanwhile, and despite the views of some Chilean businesspeople such as Luksic, Chile's growing private sector linkages with Peru are not likely to be affected by these developments. SIMONS =======================CABLE ENDS============================