EL SALVADOR: SECOND SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000078 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2018 TAGS: ES MARR MOPS PREL SUBJECT: EL SALVADOR: SECOND SURVEY OF IRAQ DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS REF: A. SECSTATE 04865 ¶B. SAN SALVADOR 00012 ¶C. 2007 SAN SALVADOR 2249 Classified By: Ambassador Charles Glazer for reason 1.4(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The government of El Salvador would have to overcome significant political and legal hurdles in order to continue to deploy troops to Iraq without a United Nations (UN) Chapter VII mandate. In December 2007, the Legislative Assembly approved troop deployments through June 2009; however the expiration of the UN mandate on December 31, 2008, combined with the legislative and presidential elections to take place in early 2009, allow for the possibility that the government would reconsider troop deployments prior to the election. Absent a UN mandate, post believes that maintaining an EASF presence would be difficult, but not impossible. End Summary. ¶2. (C) As requested ref (A),we provide the following additional assessment of the political and legal challenges El Salvador would face in order to deploy troops to Iraq in 2009 without the umbrella of a United Nations (UN) Chapter VII mandate. ¶3. (C) The government of El Salvador (GOES) has maintained a military presence in Iraq since August 2003. Besides the U.S., it is the only troop-contributing nation in this hemisphere. To date, the Armed Forces of El Salvador (ESAF) have rotated nine contingents through Iraq and have authorized a tenth set to arrive in February. According to the Salvadoran constitution, the President does not need Legislative Assembly approval to deploy the ESAF abroad (though there are differing interpretations of the Salvadoran Constitution.) In order to confer the maximum political legitimacy possible, however, President Saca sought and obtained (most recently in December 2007) a Legislative Assembly vote in support of allowing the ESAF to remain in Iraq until June 2009 (Ref (B)). This extension through mid-2009 was designed to put off future debate on reauthorization until after the 2009 elections. Further votes on troop deployment will depend on the outcome of both the presidential and legislative contests. ¶4. (C) President Tony Saca has stated on numerous occasions that the decision to deploy troops to Iraq is an expression of gratitude for the U.S. "standing by" the GOES during the Salvadoran civil war. He has also indicated that Salvadoran troops will remain in Iraq "for as long as they are needed." However, any decision to extend El Salvador's participation beyond June 30, 2009, will take place in the waning days of Saca's term. ¶5. (C) While we have no reason to doubt President Saca's resolve, there are several possible impediments, including public opposition, to continuing his seemingly open-ended commitment of Salvadoran troops to Iraq. A December 2007 poll from the Public Institute of the University of Central American (UCA) revealed that 83.4 percent of Salvadorans do not agree with President Saca's decision to send troops to Iraq. ¶6. (C) In terms of possible scenarios, a UN Security Council resolution would be the ideal means of securing any continued Salvadoran military presence in Iraq. Scenarios based on anything other than a UN resolution, while not impossible, would certainly prove far more difficult vehicles for continuing an ESAF presence. ¶7. (C) Moreover, while Legislative Assembly approval is not a legal prerequisite to an ESAF Iraq deployment, it is, most likely, a political necessity. Furthermore, we assess the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly would be hesitant to vote in favor of the continued deployment of Salvadoran forces to Iraq in the absence of a legitimizing UN resolution or, possibly, some other mechanism, such as a bilateral Iraqi request for a continuing troop contribution. To date, each legislative authorization for Salvadoran participation in OIF has specifically referenced the controlling UN resolution. ¶8. (C) Ref (A) requests an assessment of the domestic political conditions the host government might face in agreeing to a post-UN mandate deployment to Iraq. El Salvador is entering an electoral cycle that will feature municipal and legislative elections in January 2009, followed by Presidential elections in March 2009. In these elections, the ruling right-of-center National Republican Alliance (ARENA) will square off against the opposition left-wing Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) in what promise to be hotly contested elections. The most recent authorization has put off a decision about troop deployments until after the election; however, the outcome of the elections will determine the future of troop deployments, and it could become an electoral issue. The FMLN has consistently opposed sending Salvadoran forces to Iraq, even under the current UN mandate. Should the FMLN win the 2009 Presidential elections, and/or gain an upper hand in the Legislative Assembly, they will almost certainly move to terminate El Salvador's military deployment to Iraq in short order. ¶9. (C) Once the UN mandate expires in December, there is also the possibility that troop deployments reemerge as an election issue and the government is forced to reconsider its participation prior to the authorization,s expiration date of June 2009. In this scenario, the future of troop deployments would likely reflect a political climate in which elections would be imminent and could catapult the issue to the forefront. ¶9. (C) Ref (A) also requests that post explore whether the host government would be interested in benefiting as a third-party from a U.S.- Iraq Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). Poloff spoke with the Director General for Foreign Policy (Ambassador rank),who said that before he could provide a definitive answer he would need to consult with President Saca, the Ministry of Defense, and the Legislative Assembly. He said that for such an arrangement to be viable, it would need to pass scrutiny from all three parties. He added that this would be a difficult path since all previous efforts have been based on a UN mandate. At the same time, he said that since the GOES views the U.S. as a good ally, all involved would take this into account. ¶9. (C) Comment: Mission will continue to monitor and report on executive, legislative, and electoral developments that could impact any future Salvadoran deployments to Iraq. While participation without a UNSCR would not be impossible, the precedent established by the Salvadoran Assembly and the uncertain political climate will be make obtaining authorizations for future troop deployments difficult. If the FMLN were to prevail in the 2009 elections, future troop deployments would be most unlikely. End Comment. Glazer