A PRAGMATIC SHIFT OR MERELY A TACTICAL MOVE TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000750 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV ES SUBJECT: A PRAGMATIC SHIFT OR MERELY A TACTICAL MOVE TO WIN? HOW THE FMLN'S HISTORY IS INFLUENCING ITS ACTIONS TODAY. Classified By: Ambassador Charles L. Glazer, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In 1980 the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front Party (FMLN) began as a loose coalition of leftist groups united with the goal of bringing down the conservative government. The tumultuous history of the FMLN continues to influence its actions and internal struggles today, as the party struggles with modernization and its various factions vie for greater influence. As we move toward the 2009 legislative and presidential elections, the ongoing struggle between the hardliners and the members who are pushing to modernize the party, will have an important impact on public perception as to who would really govern in an FMLN administration, more moderate presidential candidate Mauricio Funes or the hardliners that have historically wielded power within the party. End Summary. -------------- In The Beginning -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) was formed in 1980 when four left wing organizations and the Communist Party of El Salvador joined forces to overthrow violently the Salvadoran government. Although the war officially began in 1980s following the formation of the FMLN, some of the groups had been waging a low-level insurgency against the government throughout the 1970s. ¶3. (SBU) The FMLN was formed by a coalition of five groups: The Communist Party of El Salvador (PC),the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL),the Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP),the National Resistance (RN),and the Revolutionary Party of Central America Workers (PRTC). At present the PC, and to a lesser extent the FPL, are by far the most influential factions. ¶4. (SBU) The Communist Party (PC) was formed in the 1930s, and although it initially sought to achieve its goals by political means, it did ultimately support military action during the civil war. The Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) was founded by Cayetanio Carpio, former Secretary General of the Communist Party in the 70,s. The FPL was essentially a splinter group of the PC that promoted armed struggle and rejected the PC,s attempts at non-violent change. They formally joined the FMLN as the Revolutionary Popular Block Party (BPR). ¶5. (SBU) Joaquin Villalobos founded the Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP) in 1972. It focused on armed conflict and terrorism, and joined the FMLN as the Salvadoran Revolution Party (PRS). The National Resistance (RN) emerged in 1975, after the ERP leadership allegedly assassinated a group within the ERP that supported socialist/communist indoctrination. Their armed wing during the civil war was called the Armed Forces of the National Resistance (RN-FARN). The Revolutionary Party of Central America Workers (PRTC) was an organization operating in El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Guatemala that advocated for regional revolution instead of individual movements within the individual countries. -------------- During the War -------------- ¶6. (SBU) During the 12 year Salvadoran civil war (1980-92), the FMLN attempted to overthrow the government utilizing a strategy that included armed struggle, terrorism, and socialist/communist political indoctrination. The liberation theology movement within the Catholic Church and labor unions largely supported these efforts. The group also received monetary support and arms from the Soviet Bloc and Cuba. ¶7. (SBU) In January 1981, the FMLN launched a large military offensive, gaining territory in the northern and eastern departments of Chalatenango and Morazan, both of which continue to be FMLN strongholds to this day. In October 1984, President Napoleon Duarte (1984-1989) began peace talks with the FMLN; however, the final peace accords would not be signed for another eight years. During this time thousands more died in the fighting and the FMLN committed several high profile killings, including U.S. Embassy Marine Security Guards and other official Americas. ¶8. (SBU) In May 1987, the FMLN issued a lis of conditions for peace including the establishmnt of a transitional government without election, the imposition of a socialist economy, and onging government support for FMLN guerrilla forces ¶9. (SBU) In 1988 and 1989, the FMLN went on a killing spree that included several democratically-elected mayors, Attorney General Roberto Garcia, Minister of the Presidency Jose Antonio Rodriguez Porth, Supreme Court President Francisco Guerrero, and other high profile victims. In November 1989 the FMLN launched the &Final Offensive8 on San Salvador which resulted in more than 2,000 civilian deaths. -------------- After the Peace Accords -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The FMLN laid down its arms and became an official political party in December 1991, one month before the FMLN and the Salvadoran government signed the Peace Accords ending the 12-year conflict. (Note: the Peace Accords did not mention amnesty for crimes committed during the conflict, but the 1993 Amnesty Law has been an essential part of their success. End note.) In March 1994, the FMLN, as an official political party, participated in its first presidential election. ¶11. (SBU) Despite legal recognition as a party, the coalition groups that made up the FMLN retained their identities and organizational structure. However, this arrangement quickly proved troublesome and the five groups formally dissolved in 1995 to create a unified party. Despite the unification, strong loyalties and divisions still exist today, and many members continue to identify themselves with their original associations. Newer FMLN members, particularly those who joined the party within the last five years, are far less likely to identify themselves with the PC, FPL, or other factions that existed during the war. ¶12. (SBU) Further tensions emerged in 1999 when the FMLN nominated former guerrilla commander Facundo Guardado as its presidential candidate. This caused a deep division within the party and two organized factions emerged, the "Renovadores", led by supporters of Guardado, and the Revolutionary Socialist Current (CRS),led by hardliners Shafik Handal and Salvador Sanchez Ceren. Guardado, although a popular former guerrilla commander, was considered too moderate by hardliners within the party, particularly the CRS. After losing the election and engaging in several public spats with other FMLN members, Guardado lost control of the party at the next national council (one of the FMLN,s principle internal governance bodies) when the majority of the posts went to Handal and Sanchez Ceren,s bloc. ¶13. (SBU) Even though ARENA has won every presidential election since the Peace Accords, the FMLN has made some inroads. In the March 2000 elections, the FMLN won 31 of 84 Legislative Assembly seats and won 78 of 262 municipalities. In March 2006, the FMLN won 32 of 84 seats (ARENA won 34 seats) at the Legislative Assembly. In 1997, the FMLN formed a coalition with the Democratic Change Party (CD) and the Unity Movement Party (MU) to win the mayorship of San Salvador, the most populated municipality in the country. The FMLN's strategy focused on populous urban areas, in addition to retaining a few rural strongholds from the war years. Currently the FMLN holds 11 of the 14 municipalities in the greater San Salvador area. -------------- The FMLN' Leadership Today -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The current FMLN leadership is composed of three branches: The Political Committee, the National Council, and the Department Coordinators. The Political Committee, the real power within the FMLN, is composed of 20 people, most of them members of the Communist Party (PC) or the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL). The National Council is composed of 36 people and, much like the Political Committee, most belong to the Communist Party or the FPL, except for a few who are members of the Revolutionary Party of Central America Workers (PRTC). According to several long-time observers of the FMLN, the PC has steadily maneuvered its former members into key positions of power utilizing its superior organizational skills. ¶15. (SBU) Current prominent members of the Political Committee include General Coordinator Medardo Gonzalez, Deputy General Coordinator Luz Estrella Rodriguez de Zuniga, Supreme Electoral Tribunal Magistrate Eugenio Chicas Martinez, Jose Luis Merino, Norma Guevara, San Salvador Mayor Violeta Menjivar, Deputy Blanca Flor Bonilla, Youth Representative Hortensia Margarita Lopez, Orestes Ortez, Santa Tecla Mayor Oscar Ortiz, Sigfrido Reyes, and Vice Presidential candidate Salvador Sanchez Ceren. ¶16. (SBU) Current representatives of the PC are Deputy Blanca Flor Bonilla, Jose Luis Merino, former Deputy Lilian Coto, San Salvador city hall counselor Norma Guevara, Director for International Issues Otto Sigfriedo Reyes, and Supreme Court Justice and 1999 Vice Presidential Candidate Victoria Marina de Aviles. Representatives of the FPL are San Salvador Mayor Violeta Menjivar and Legislative Assembly Chief of Faction Salvador Sanchez Ceren, the current vice presidential candidate. Representatives of the ERP are National Council Member and Youth Representative Gloria Maria Anaya Perla. Representatives of the PRTC are Supreme Electoral Tribunal Magistrate Eugenio Chicas and National Council Member Carlos Rodriguez. (Note: The FMLN requires that at least 30 percent of elected positions be held by women.) ¶17. (SBU) In addition, there are fourteen Department Coordinators, one from each department. The Department Coordinators have closer ties to the party base and typically serve as a conduit between the FMLN leadership and the base. -------------- Moving Toward the Center? -------------- ¶18. (C) Although many in the FMLN continue to oppose any move to the center and cling to pre- and civil war rhetoric and ideology, the party leadership has apparently taken the decision that in order to win, some changes, particularly the nomination of a candidate without war baggage, are necessary. FMLN insiders, including Assembly Deputy Hugo Martinez, who has no clear association with the wartime factions, tell us that the Funes campaign is drawing new supporters to the party, many who are actively helping the campaign. Some of these reportedly come from the ranks of traditional ARENA supporters, particularly small businesses, and (they claim) even some former ARENA members. While they do not see these newcomers creating conflict with the hardliners in the short term, they do see a looming challenge in how to deal with these new additions after the election in order to keep them in the party. This challenge will be easier if the FMLN wins, but if it loses, its rigid structure and ideological strictures are ill suited to keeping this new membership satisfied. -------------- Funes and the FMLN -------------- ¶19. (SBU) In November 2007, the FMLN nominated Mauricio Funes, a popular television personality, as its presidential candidate and Salvador Sanchez Ceren, a long-time hardliner from the FPL, as the vice presidential candidate. Funes, relationship with the FMLN is, however, still uncertain and likely evolving. ¶20. (C) Although the FMLN,s Political Committee's support for Funes stems from an obvious desire to win the upcoming elections, potential rifts in the relationship have appeared. The FMLN,s choice of Funes, a former television personality, as their candidate was an acknowledgment that the FMLN needed a new face, and not a longtime FMLN hardliner, in order to mount a serious run at the presidency. Nonetheless, Funes, independent streak and sometimes prickly nature (he is currently feuding with El Diario de Hoy, a leading daily newspaper),have already resulted in a few public squabbles with party officials. ¶21. (C) The FMLN has loudly criticized both dollarization and CAFTA since their adoption in 2001 and 2004; however last year Funes stated that he would not reverse either measure. Sigfriedo Reyes, member of the Political Committee and FMLN,s spokesman and Director for International Issues, quickly countered that that if the FMLN won the election, the &party8 would analyze the situation and make a decision. Many political analysts see this, coupled with Funes, refusal to answer questions about Venezuela, as potential rifts between Funes and the hardliners that control the party. Some analysts are predicting an early &divorce8 between Funes and the FMLN if Funes wins the election. Some party insiders, in contrast, claim to see less conflict between Funes and the old guard than they had expected. ¶22. (C) Comment: The battle for the future of the FMLN will play out both publicly and privately over the remaining ten months of the campaign. The legislative slate, which will be announced in July, will be a signal of party direction, as internal rules require that at least six deputies stand down. It is clear that Funes' candidacy is causing many swing voters to give the FMLN a second look (at least for now),and demonstrates that some may be willing to overlook Sanchez Ceren on the ticket. But many months remain before voters must cast their ballots and ARENA will use this time to remind voters of the FMLN's bloody history. ¶23. (C) Comment continued: While the FMLN has a history of expelling reformers who deviate from ideological purity, the defenders of the faith are now the ones taking small steps to modernize with an eye toward electoral victory. Neither extreme outcome (i.e. the FMLN turns into Euro-style Social Democrats or Funes wins and is expelled by hardliners) seems likely at present. We expect, rather, that the remaining months of the campaign will allow the FMLN and Funes to forge a modus vivendi and seriously challenge ARENA for the ultimate electoral spoils. End comment. GLAZER