SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY GUTIERREZ,S VISIT TO

UNCLAS SAN JOSE 000774 SENSITIVE SIPDIS COMMERCE FOR SECRETARY'S OFFICE SANTO DOMINGO PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY GUTIERREZ'S PARTY DEPT FOR WHA, WHA/CEN, WHA/EPSC AND EEB PLEASE PASS TO USTR AMALITO AND DOLIVER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CS ECON ETRD OVIP PGOV PINR PREL SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY GUTIERREZ,S VISIT TO COSTA RICA ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Embassy San Jose warmly welcomes Secretary Gutierrez, the first USG cabinet-level official to visit Costa Rica since HHS Secretary Leavitt in March 2007. Secretary Gutierrez,s visit comes as the Arias administration is into its third year, feeling embattled by challenges on CAFTA, the economy, domestic security, and early political maneuvering for the 2010 national elections. If Arias and his team can maintain their focus and unity, however, there are still opportunities for success ahead. CAFTA implementation should bring additional investment and trade, cement Costa Rica,s place in the regional and world economy, and help the country ride out the crisis caused by rising energy costs and U.S. economic woes. Merida Initiative assistance, coupled with pending domestic security legislation, should leave Costa Rica safer and better equipped to confront transnational crime. Improved budget management, new legislation and better planning should begin to make badly-needed improvements to Costa Rica,s national infrastructure. A we-are-with-you, you-can-do-this message may help President Arias and his team stay on track. Although determined to make his mark on the international stage, Arias,s most enduring positive legacy could be right here at home. END SUMMARY. =========================== CAFTA CONTINUES TO CONFOUND =========================== ¶2. (SBU) By the end of August, when the national legislature completed action on the 12th of 13 CAFTA implementation bills, entry-into-force by the (extended) October 1 deadline seemed within reach. Under new, more moderate leadership in the legislature, even the PAC opposition party wanted to put CAFTA behind it and get on to other initiatives. The September 11 ruling by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, which blocked action on the 13th CAFTA bill, thus came as a shock to all sides. The Court ruled that one section of the bill on IPR and biodiversity issues was unconstitutional, because the GOCR did not consult with Costa Rica,s indigenous communities, in accordance with ILO Convention 169, about CAFTA-generated changes in the existing biodiversity law that could affect those communities. �A; ¶3. (SBU) The Court decision re-galvanized the Arias administration, its pro-CAFTA allies in the legislature and the private sector into action. The relevant committee in the legislature has stripped the offending clause from the CAFTA bill; full plenary debate follows and another Constitutional Court review is possible. On September 16, Minister of Foreign Trade (COMEX) Marco Vinicio Ruiz opened a dialogue with USTR on the GOCR,s proposed way ahead, which included meetings in Washington on September 22 and 25. COMEX has also taken some preliminary (and positive) soundings with the other CAFTA partners about a further delay. ¶4. (SBU) The GOCR has not (yet) asked for a date-specific entry-into-force (EIF) extension, just USG understanding and flexibility. Once the USG agrees to another EIF delay, the GOCR believes the other CAFTA countries will follow suit. In a September 19 letter from President Arias to President Bush, and in private conversations with the Ambassador and Emboffs, senior GOCR officials have made clear they are determined to amend and complete the final CAFTA law as quickly as possible. After the Pathways to Prosperity Summit in New York on September 24, Arias told the media that he hoped to have CAFTA wrapped up by the U.S. elections. Minister of the Presidency Rodrigo Arias reiterated this timetable to the Ambassador on September 25, but it may be optimistic. Our best guess: Costa Rica may need until the end of the year to finally enter CAFTA into force. The delay is not all bad news, however; it allows both sides to wrap up a few pending technical issues as well. ================================= THE ECONOMY: NEW CHALLENGES . . . ================================= ¶5. (SBU) The Costa Rican economy continues to post positive economic growth, but slower than in 2007. Minister Arias (the president's brother) told the Ambassador on September 25 that real GDP growth for 2008 should be approximately 4.0 percent, down from 8.8 percent in 2007. While unemployment may remain low, near 5 percent, inflation may rise significantly, due to the worldwide food and fuel price crisis. The inflation rate was 8.5 percent in 2007, but has reached 15 percent over the last six months. Minister Arias predicted to the Ambassador in June that nine percent of Costa Rica,s 2008 GDP would go to fuel costs, nearly double the 2007 total of 5.5 percent. This is not where the Arias administration expected to be entering the last two years of its term, and not where the Arias brothers wanted Costa Rica,s economy to be with a U.S. economic crisis brewing. ¶6. (U) Exports continue to drive Costa Rican economic growth, and traditional agricultural products (primarily coffee, pineapple, sugar cane, and bananas) are doing well, backed by high added value goods and services, including microchips from Intel, and regional back-office operations by Western Union, Proctor and Gamble and HP. However, the government and private sector worry about the eventual impact of the U.S. economic crisis, especially on the tourism sector (still a major earnings generator and job creator) and the real estate industry (which depends heavily on U.S. and Canadian investors and retirees). In addition, Costa Rica,s cumbersome and hyper-legalistic bureaucracy impedes business development and investment. In the World Bank,s 2008 Doing Business Index, Costa Rica ranked 115th (out of 178) on the ease of doing business, 113th on starting a business, 158th on protecting investors and 162nd on paying taxes. Despite these impediments, in 2007, Costa Rica attracted the second largest amount of FDI in the region, after Chile ($1.8 million),according to UN statistics. ¶7. (U) The good story in the GOCR financial picture is the Finance Ministry's stewardship. Government tax revenues have increased due to astute management of collections, spending scenarios and multi-year budgeting, with the GOCR realizing a surplus in 2007 for the first time in 50 years. On-site advisers from Treasury's Overseas Technical Assistance programs have played a major and positive role in this success. ====================== . . . AND OLD PROBLEMS ====================== ¶8. (U) Even without the fuel and food price crisis, the GOCR needs all the revenue it can collect and investments it can attract. Public infrastructure improvement remains the most daunting challenge. Highways, airports, ports, electrical capacity, waste treatment and wireless telecommunications all suffer from years of negligence and limited capacity, slowing development. The lack of coordinated local, regional or national development plans and unbridled development, especially in the high-end resorts along the northern Pacific Coast, compound the problem. ¶9. (U) A proposed IADB Bank loan of USD 850 million promises relief to the beleaguered highway system (if approved by the national legislature). An ambitious mega-port scheme may finally revamp the major (but tumbledown) Caribbean port of Limon, but financing is a challenge and a new concessions law should be completed first. Houston Airport System,s winning the rights to complete development of the major international airports in San Jose and Liberia is good news and will bring long-needed expansion, but only if the GOCR,s dense regulatory system approves. CAFTA, plus free trade agreements with the EU (under negotiation) and China (planned) will place more pressure on the creaky national infrastructure. ========================================== LOOKING FOR &FRIENDS8 IN THE WRONG PLACES? ========================================== ¶10. (SBU) To ease the budgetary pain caused by rising fuel prices, the GOCR agreed in principle in July to join Petrocaribe. The Petrocaribe deal would allow Costa Rica to purchase crude from Venezuela at 40 percent of the price within 90 days followed by payment of the remaining 60 percent over a 25 year term at 1 percent interest. The deal has no effect on reducing prices to the consumer; it simply &manufactures8 government revenues from the payment terms. The GOCR originally proposed to "escrow" the proceeds from crude transactions into a trust fund for the future payments, but this has fueled a debate in the legislature about how best to use the "found" revenues. The GOCR hopes to join Petrocaribe before the next summit of that organization, in December. Negotiations have been slow, however, and it is not clear whether the notoriously slow national legislature can approve membership in time. ¶11. (SBU) Media and public opinion have been divided on the issue, with some commentators and politicians voicing concerns about the future &political8 price of joining Petrocaribe. Senior officials in the MFA and Presidencia insist the GOCR is going into this deal with eyes wide open, however, with no intent to take more drastic steps such as also joining ALBA. GOCR officials describe joining Petrocaribe as &economic pragmatism,8 given the high fuel prices worldwide and that Venezuela is already Costa Rica,s major supplier of crude oil (87 percent of its imports). ================= THE PEOPLE WORRY ================= ¶12. (U) Economic concerns have overtaken rising crime as the major worry of Costa Ricans. In the national UNIMER poll conducted August 28-September 4, 44 percent of those surveyed listed the economy/cost of living as their top preoccupation (up from 28 percent in March). Sixteen percent listed crime and violence. Eighty-four percent viewed 2008 (thus far) as economically worse than 2007; seventy-five percent expected 2009 to be worse, still. Not surprisingly, the overall ratings for President Arias and his administration have also suffered, with 29 percent of those polled rating his performance as good or very good (down from 50 percent in March and a steady 45 percent since August 2006). His confidence rating has also dropped to its lowest in this administration. Over half of those polled said the GOCR was doing a poor job of protecting citizens, security. Politicians and pundits acknowledge to us that most recent Costa Rican administrations have lost support at their half-way mark, but the decreases for Arias have been precipitous. ¶13. (SBU) Rising crime and a broken judicial system continue to worry Costa Ricans, however, with good reason. Although crime rates here are less than elsewhere in Central America (e.g., a homicide rate of 8 per 100,000 persons versus the region's rate of 36 per 100,000),they are higher than in the U.S. (5 per 100,000 persons). They also illustrate a deteriorating security picture in a country where case resolution rates have plummeted. In 1995, there were 143 crime events per 100,000 with a resolution rate of nearly 25 percent. In 2007, the crime rate was 887 per 100,000 persons with a resolution rate of just over two percent. Although Costa Rica may not be as dangerous as its neighbors, it is no longer as safe as it once was, and its current legal-judicial system is not up to the challenge. =================== US ASSISTANCE FLOWS =================== ¶14. (SBU) Although Costa Rica is economically-developed enough to have &graduated8 from most forms of USG assistance, it still needs help, especially on security issues. From 2004 to 2007, overall USG assistance to Costa Rica, including regional programs such as CAFTA trade capacity building and a large debt-for-nature swap under the Tropical Forest Conservation Act, fluctuated annually from USD 27 million (FY 2004) to USD 5.9 million (FY 2007). Under the Merida Initiative regional security plan, Costa Rica will receive USD 4.3 million in security- and law-enforcement-related funding in FY08 funds alone, another USD 9.4 million in FY09, and significant funding in FY 2010. For FY 2008, the majority of this assistance will help modernize and refurbish the Costa Rican Coast Guard, with healthy amounts of assistance also going to/for the national police, improved border inspection equipment and training, a regional fingerprint system, a regional center for drug crime intelligence, firearms destruction and improved prison management. ¶15. (SBU) The Merida Initiative builds on close and successful bilateral counternarcotics cooperation with Costa Rica. In 2007, the GOCR interdicted more than 30 tons of cocaine and 4.5 tons of marijuana, coming in second only to Panama among Central American countries in the amount of cocaine seized in 2007 and 2006. In 2008 to date, the GOCR has interdicted nearly 16 tons of cocaine and over USD 800,000 worth of seized assets. These numbers hint at what Costa Rica could do with more and improved resources, but they also indicate the magnitude of the challenge. The USG estimates that approximately 60-75 percent of the drug flow from South America to Mexico and the United States runs through Costa Rican territory or national waters. ======================== THE PRESIDENT COMPLAINS ======================== ¶16. (SBU) Facing all these challenges, down in the polls, and disappointed by the latest CAFTA setback, President Arias has been critical in recent public comments. In a Washington Post op-ed on August 16, he called the Merida Initiative &stingy8 in light of what the USG is spending on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. During a swing through Europe in early September, Arias lauded Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez for his &generosity8 and asserted that Venezuela is providing Latin America and the Caribbean assistance &at least four or five times higher8 than that from the U.S. When Russia deployed two TU-160 bombers to Venezuela later in the month, Arias claimed the move was &justified8 in light of NATO,s pressure (via Georgia and the European missile defense initiative) on Russia. At home, meanwhile, Arias used his national day speech on September 15 to emphasize how &tired8 he was of the criticism of his administration, of constantly confronting obstacles to his initiatives and of Costa Rica,s overall &ingovernability.8 ¶17. (SBU) Commentators and Embassy contacts were as perplexed and surprised by these outbursts as we were, with a number of interlocutors privately assuring us that Arias, remarks did not accurately reflect GOCR policy nor Costa Ricans, views of the United States (or Venezuela). Minister Arias told the Ambassador the remarks were taken out of context. In general, Costa Ricans continue to have a very positive view of the United States, and Arias,s policy through his first two years has been very similar to the USG,s, based on the four pillars of security, prosperity, opportunity and democracy. In his comments to the new OAS Peace Forum and UNGA September 23-24, Arias reverted to familiar themes, calling for increased foreign assistance to countries that disarm (the Costa Rica Consensus),a UN treaty limiting conventional weapons, and enhanced international efforts to preserve and protect the environment (Peace with Nature). These have been the international hallmarks of his administration. ¶18. (SBU) Arias has some basis to feel frustrated, however. Since early 2008, he and his administration have been under relentless attack in the media (led by the country's leading daily and a major TV channel) for irregularities in relations with Taiwan and later China. (Costa Rica switched recognition in June 2007.) On Taiwan, controversy has swirled around the use of assistance directed to Costa Rica via the Central American Integration Bank (BCIE). The Housing minister had to resign and faces charges for using USD 1.5 million of those funds to pay for consultants and staff instead of helping one of San Jose's poorest communities, as intended. ¶19. (SBU) On China, the Arias administration refused to publicize the (very favorable) terms of an agreement that had Beijing purchase USD 300 million in Costa Rican bonds. No criminal wrongdoing has been discovered, but Arias and his team were criticized for covering up the details of the deal, which suggested that Beijing had &purchased8 Costa Rican recognition. In addition, pre-election maneuvering has begun for the 2010 contest, with Arias,s PLN party split, and key ministers (including VP and Justice Minister Laura Chinchilla and Finance Minister Guillermo Zuniga) having to step down no later than February 2009 (by law) in order to launch their campaigns. ===================== A VISIT TO INVIGORATE ===================== ¶20. (SBU) Although the GOCR had hoped the Secretary's visit would be a CAFTA completion celebration, it can still provide a needed shot in the arm to the Arias Administration. A you-can-do-it message should help President Arias stay on track, and focus the country to look beyond entry into force to the future opportunities CAFTA offers. (The visiting business delegation will help reinforce this message.) If Arias and his team can maintain their focus and unity, there are plenty of opportunities for success ahead, despite the recent domestic challenges Costa Rica is facing. Now is the time for leadership, not drift. Now is not the time for unwarranted public criticism of the USG or unmerited public applause for Venezuela. Now is the time for Costa Rica to model effective, &deliver-the-goods8 democracy for the region, to offset the illusive attraction of the populist alternatives. ¶21. (SBU) Costa Rica can and should implement CAFTA quickly (and the GOCR seems intent on doing so). Coupling revamped domestic security legislation with Merida Initiative assistance will better equip Costa Rica to address its law enforcement challenges. Add to that better financial management and vigorous infrastructure development, and Arias can complete his term leaving Costa Rica much better off than when he began. This strategic conversation may find timely resonance with Arias and his team during the Secretary's visit. CIANCHETTE