SALEH'S STEWARDSHIP OF YEMEN A SUBJECT OF CONCERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 000711 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINS YM SUBJECT: SALEH'S STEWARDSHIP OF YEMEN A SUBJECT OF CONCERN Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Conversations this month with a range of interlocutors have revealed a growing sense of unease with the Saleh government's seeming inability to effectively address the problems of terrorism and internal unrest in Yemen. The consensus view holds that Saleh's preoccupation with the deepening crisis in the South, coupled with his reluctance to confront militarily Al Qaeda in Yemen (AQY), detracts from his ability to mobilize the ROYG against the terrorist threat. How to focus Saleh's mind on the gravity of the situation and the need for decisive action on terrorism, the flagging economy and political unrest was a recurring theme. End summary. ¶2. (C) Long-time Saleh advisor and former PM Abdul Karim al-Eryani encapsulated the view of many, asserting that "things are bad. The plan to pacify and win over Al Qaeda has failed, and there is no real strategy to deal with them at the moment." Eryani said that most of the meetings he attends focus on the situation in the south, and to a lesser extent, the Houthi rebellion in northern Saada governorate. GPC member and Parliamentarian Shaykh Mohammad Naji al-Shaif worried that al-Jawf, his home governorate, was 47 square kilometers of potential AQY training centers, out of sight and unmonitored. ¶3. (C) Regarding the south, Eryani claimed that the issue is less about separatist tendencies and more about economic hardships, which he asserted are a national, not regional, problem. He said that the ROYG needs a short-term economic solution in order to buy some time while it comes up with a comprehensive plan. "We must persuade the GCC to accept Yemeni workers," he said, asserting that for each Yemeni employed in Saudi Arabia, five more here would be fed each day, defusing potential for civil unrest as a result of the deteriorating economic situation. He bemoaned the lack of political will in Riyadh to provide Yemen with this release valve at a critical moment. ¶4. (C) Several interlocutors described efforts by Saleh to buy off southern opposition as a way to defuse the volatile situation there. The Saudi Ambassador asserted that Saleh had distributed 600 new cars throughout the south in recent months, and Al-Shaif said that during the forty days Saleh spent in Aden last fall he distributed three billion Yemeni 
riyals in payments, and handed out "thousands" of military promotions. Al-Shaif opined that it was too late to bribe the south and that all those favors were but a "drop in the ocean" of southern discontent. ¶5. (C) Hamid al-Ahmar, a leader of the opposition Islah Party and a son of deceased Shaykh Abdullah al-Ahmar, said that he was less concerned about a north-south split in Yemen than he was about a lack of resolution to problems in the south "leading to violence there between separatists and those supporting unity." That violence could spread northward, he said. Al-Ahmar said that he would travel soon to Dubai to meet with exiled southern leaders Haidar al-Attas and Ali Nasser Mohamed to "hear from them how to focus the south on issues like corruption" as a way to unite the opposition to Saleh's government around themes other than independence. ¶6. (C) The Saudi Ambassador noted that "Riyadh is very concerned with events in Yemen," particularly any event (e.g., Saleh's death) that would lead to "a sudden collapse" of the government, given the uncertainty surrounding Presidential succession. The Saudi Ambassador takes the view that the country is moving slowly towards some kind of fracture, predicting that the southern governorate of Hadramout "will be ready for independence in 2-3 years." ¶7. (C) Opposition leader Al-Ahmar was pessimistic about the ROYG's commitment to free and fair Parliamentary elections in 2009, asserting that the government "will wait so long to make preparations for the elections that they will be impossible." He stated that the political opposition "will not accept this, and the United States should make clear that it will not, either." (Note: the Ambassador has initiated a public effort to press the ROYG to take necessary steps to prepare for the Parliamentary elections, and the Embassy will continue to hammer home this point in public and private conversations. End Note.) Eryani said that he had been tasked by Saleh to try and persuade the opposition to accept a compromise regarding composition of the Supreme Council for Elections and Referenda (SCER),the authority charged with conducting elections in Yemen. At present, no commissioners have been appointed because of an ongoing dispute as to how many each faction will get, and how the chairman will be appointed. There is no evidence to date that Eryani's initiative has succeeded and, in fact, the sensationalist pro-government al-Naba News reported April 15 that an unidentified source within the GPC said the party would push forward its initiative to appoint judges as SCER commissioners, a proposal the opposition has rejected multiple times. ¶8. (C) Saleh's frame of mind remains an issue with many observers, particularly in view of continuing rumors that he is isolated and inattentive to senior advisors. Eryani conceded that Saleh's attention span suffers during periods of crisis, but disputed the notion that the President is isolated. Eryani said Saleh listens to his office director (and National Security Bureau chief) Ali al-Anisi and, depending on the subject, Abdul Kader Bajamal, Sultan Barakani and Eryani himself. (Note: Former Prime Minister and current Secretary General of the ruling GPC Abdel Kader Bajamal is a southern leader who came to the North in 1986. Sultan Barakani is a member of Parliament from Taiz and head of the GPC block in Parliament. End note.) ¶9. (C) Comment. Clearly, concern over the direction that President Saleh is taking Yemen is widespread, extending even to long-time advisors and senior members of his party. The extent to which any of these individuals are conveying directly to Saleh the need to take decisive measures to address the threats to Yemen's stability posed by terrorist activity, the flagging economy and political unrest is unclear, as is Saleh's inclination to listen to such advice even if it were offered. End comment. SECHE