SALEH'S STEWARDSHIP OF YEMEN A SUBJECT OF CONCERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANAA 000711

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINS YM
SUBJECT: SALEH'S STEWARDSHIP OF YEMEN A SUBJECT OF CONCERN

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Conversations this month with a range of
interlocutors have revealed a growing sense of unease with
the Saleh government's seeming inability to effectively
address the problems of terrorism and internal unrest in
Yemen. The consensus view holds that Saleh's preoccupation
with the deepening crisis in the South, coupled with his
reluctance to confront militarily Al Qaeda in Yemen (AQY),
detracts from his ability to mobilize the ROYG against the
terrorist threat. How to focus Saleh's mind on the gravity
of the situation and the need for decisive action on
terrorism, the flagging economy and political unrest was a
recurring theme. End summary.


2. (C) Long-time Saleh advisor and former PM Abdul Karim
al-Eryani encapsulated the view of many, asserting that
"things are bad. The plan to pacify and win over Al Qaeda has
failed, and there is no real strategy to deal with them at
the moment." Eryani said that most of the meetings he
attends focus on the situation in the south, and to a lesser
extent, the Houthi rebellion in northern Saada governorate.
GPC member and Parliamentarian Shaykh Mohammad Naji al-Shaif
worried that al-Jawf, his home governorate, was 47 square
kilometers of potential AQY training centers, out of sight
and unmonitored.


3. (C) Regarding the south, Eryani claimed that the issue is
less about separatist tendencies and more about economic
hardships, which he asserted are a national, not regional,
problem. He said that the ROYG needs a short-term economic
solution in order to buy some time while it comes up with a
comprehensive plan. "We must persuade the GCC to accept
Yemeni workers," he said, asserting that for each Yemeni
employed in Saudi Arabia, five more here would be fed each
day, defusing potential for civil unrest as a result of the
deteriorating economic situation. He bemoaned the lack of
political will in Riyadh to provide Yemen with this release
valve at a critical moment.


4. (C) Several interlocutors described efforts by Saleh to
buy off southern opposition as a way to defuse the volatile
situation there. The Saudi Ambassador asserted that Saleh
had distributed 600 new cars throughout the south in recent
months, and Al-Shaif said that during the forty days Saleh
spent in Aden last fall he distributed three billion Yemeni
riyals in payments, and handed out "thousands" of military
promotions. Al-Shaif opined that it was too late to bribe
the south and that all those favors were but a "drop in the
ocean" of southern discontent.


5. (C) Hamid al-Ahmar, a leader of the opposition Islah
Party and a son of deceased Shaykh Abdullah al-Ahmar, said
that he was less concerned about a north-south split in Yemen
than he was about a lack of resolution to problems in the
south "leading to violence there between separatists and
those supporting unity." That violence could spread
northward, he said. Al-Ahmar said that he would travel soon
to Dubai to meet with exiled southern leaders Haidar al-Attas
and Ali Nasser Mohamed to "hear from them how to focus the
south on issues like corruption" as a way to unite the
opposition to Saleh's government around themes other than
independence.


6. (C) The Saudi Ambassador noted that "Riyadh is very
concerned with events in Yemen," particularly any event
(e.g., Saleh's death) that would lead to "a sudden collapse"
of the government, given the uncertainty surrounding
Presidential succession. The Saudi Ambassador takes the view
that the country is moving slowly towards some kind of
fracture, predicting that the southern governorate of
Hadramout "will be ready for independence in 2-3 years."


7. (C) Opposition leader Al-Ahmar was pessimistic about the
ROYG's commitment to free and fair Parliamentary elections in
2009, asserting that the government "will wait so long to
make preparations for the elections that they will be
impossible." He stated that the political opposition "will
not accept this, and the United States should make clear that
it will not, either." (Note: the Ambassador has initiated
a public effort to press the ROYG to take necessary steps to
prepare for the Parliamentary elections, and the Embassy will
continue to hammer home this point in public and private
conversations. End Note.) Eryani said that he had been
tasked by Saleh to try and persuade the opposition to accept
a compromise regarding composition of the Supreme Council for
Elections and Referenda (SCER),the authority charged with
conducting elections in Yemen. At present, no commissioners
have been appointed because of an ongoing dispute as to how
many each faction will get, and how the chairman will be
appointed. There is no evidence to date that Eryani's
initiative has succeeded and, in fact, the sensationalist
pro-government al-Naba News reported April 15 that an
unidentified source within the GPC said the party would push
forward its initiative to appoint judges as SCER
commissioners, a proposal the opposition has rejected
multiple times.


8. (C) Saleh's frame of mind remains an issue with many
observers, particularly in view of continuing rumors that he
is isolated and inattentive to senior advisors. Eryani
conceded that Saleh's attention span suffers during periods
of crisis, but disputed the notion that the President is
isolated. Eryani said Saleh listens to his office director
(and National Security Bureau chief) Ali al-Anisi and,
depending on the subject, Abdul Kader Bajamal, Sultan
Barakani and Eryani himself. (Note: Former Prime Minister
and current Secretary General of the ruling GPC Abdel Kader
Bajamal is a southern leader who came to the North in 1986.
Sultan Barakani is a member of Parliament from Taiz and head
of the GPC block in Parliament. End note.)


9. (C) Comment. Clearly, concern over the direction that
President Saleh is taking Yemen is widespread, extending even
to long-time advisors and senior members of his party. The
extent to which any of these individuals are conveying
directly to Saleh the need to take decisive measures to
address the threats to Yemen's stability posed by terrorist
activity, the flagging economy and political unrest is
unclear, as is Saleh's inclination to listen to such advice
even if it were offered. End comment.
SECHE