OVERVIEW OF REFUGEES IN YEMEN: A MIXED BAG OF MISERY

UNCLAS SANAA 000320



SIPDIS



SENSITIVE



NOFORN



SIPDIS



DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP AND PRM

CAIRO FOR REFCOORD MARY DOETSCH

NAVCENT FOR VADM KEVIN COSGRIFF



E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PREF, PHUM, PREL, PGOV, YM

SUBJ: OVERVIEW OF REFUGEES IN YEMEN: A MIXED BAG OF MISERY



REF: 07 SANAA 2300



1. (SBU/NF) SUMMARY: According to the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),there were 117,363 recognized

refugees in Yemen at the end of December 2007. The number of

unregistered migrants may equal or exceed this. While their national

origin largely determines their experiences, the ROYG's lack of

capacity and concern are a problem for all. Since the influx is

likely to continue, it may be time for outside assistance to focus

on economic integration rather than simply relief. END SUMMARY.



2. (SBU/NF) The vast majority (110,616) of the 117,363 recognized

refugees in Yemen are Somalis. They are followed by Iraqis (3,747),

Ethiopians (1,988),Palestinians (440),Eritreans (415),and around

157 others, including Sudanese, Syrians, Vietnamese and other

Africans and Arabs. While refugees are spread throughout Yemen's

urban centers, large numbers of Somalis reside in the Kharaz refugee

camp west of Aden or in Basateen, a majority-Somali suburb of Aden

city. There is also a small but growing second generation of Somali

refugees born in Kharaz camp. Many refugees intend to use Yemen as a

jumping-off point for destinations in the Gulf or Europe. Although

no statistics are available, Marcus Dolder, the Representative in

Yemen of the International Committee for the Red Cross/Red Crescent,

has estimated that as many as half of all arrivals in Yemen move on

via land routes to Saudi Arabia.



3. (SBU/NF) The high percentage of recognized Somali refugees

derives from the ROYG's policy of granting automatic refugee status

to all Somalis who reach Yemen. While the origins of this policy

remain murky, sources in UNHCR and in the Yemeni parliament have

said that it is intended to reciprocate past Somali political

support for President Saleh and the ROYG. The refugee figures above

do not include many thousands of migrants who have not been granted

refugee status by the ROYG or UNHCR, the majority of whom are

Ethiopian. Ethiopian migrants, like Somalis, face enormous risks in

the dangerous sea crossing to Yemen (see reftel). Although NGO

figures for shore arrivals along Yemen's Gulf of Aden coast show a

roughly 40/60 split between Ethiopians and Somalis, most Ethiopian

migrants scatter to the cities immediately rather than attempt to

claim asylum. The ROYG generally views Ethiopian arrivals as illegal

economic migrants. According to Saado Quol, head of UNHCR's Aden

office, the ROYG has moved since early 2006 from a strategy of

periodic urban roundups of Ethiopian migrants to capturing

Ethiopians as they arrive on Yemen's shores. After a period of

detention, most are deported to Ethiopia in cooperation, according

to Quol, with the Ethiopian Embassy in Sanaa.



4. (SBU/NF) The ROYG is generally more sympathetic towards Iraqi and

Palestinian asylum seekers and does not obstruct their applications

for refugee status with UNHCR. Their situation is further helped by

their small numbers, good job prospects resulting from their

relatively high level of education, and their ability to assimilate

into Yemeni society. Iraqi Christians, however, sometimes face

low-level social discrimination and, according to UNHCR Protection

Officer Samer Haddadin, the situation of Iraqi Mandaeans is tenuous.

A sect that is neither Christian nor Muslim, the Mandaeans face

strong social pressure to convert to Islam, and are a UNHCR priority

for resettlement in the United States or Europe.



5. (SBU/NF) Some problems are shared by all refugees in Yemen

regardless of national origin. Although Yemen is a signatory to both

the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967

Protocol, the ROYG's obligations have not yet been enshrined in

national law. Although the ROYG set up the National Committee for

Refugee Affairs (NACRA) in 2000 to deal with refugee issues, the

committee is reactive and essentially a forum to give the Interior

and Foreign Affairs ministries a veto on refugee issues, which are

primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of Human Rights.

Although the ROYG claimed that a draft refugee law had been

submitted to parliament in 2004, it was never approved, and Adel

Jasmin, the UNHCR Representative in Yemen, says he now believes the

draft never actually existed. Shaykh Nabil Basha, a ruling party

parliamentarian on the human rights committee, said in a January

meeting that no powerful ministries have given their backing to

refugee legislation. A new draft refugee law, announced in February

2008 by the Ministry of Human Rights, has yet to be seen by UNHCR

(septel). Without enforced refugee legislation, even recognized

refugees have no legal recourse when they are denied their rights

under the 1951 Convention. Currently, for example, the ROYG refuses

to approve travel documents for refugees, despite UNHCR offers of

assistance. Additionally, many non-Somali asylum seekers awaiting

UNHCR's refugee status determination are denied the right to work or

attend public schools.



6. (SBU/NF) Several refugees have also complained of corruption

among Yemeni UNHCR employees. Since it is local staff who schedule

refugee status determination interviews, arrange for work and

residence permits, and control access to international staff, asylum

seekers have alleged that cases have been delayed by a year or more

until bribes are paid.



7. (SBU/NF) COMMENT: As instability in the Horn of Africa region

continues, the flow of refugees to Yemen is unlikely to diminish.

UNHCR's strategy to deal with the crisis is based on three "durable

solutions:" voluntary repatriation, integration in the country of

first refuge, and resettlement in a third country. Since only a few

hundred refugees in Yemen are either repatriated or resettled each

year, integration is the default option for the vast majority. Until

now, donor and NGO assistance has mainly focused on immediate

humanitarian concerns, such as improving living conditions in Kharaz

camp. However, the USG should now consider focusing funding for

UNHCR and implementing NGOs toward projects targeting the

integration of refugees into the Yemeni economy. These could include

vocational training, legal aid programs, and basic education

support. The USG should also coordinate with UNHCR to pressure the

ROYG to complete and enforce legislation that guarantees the rights

of refugees as outlined in the 1951 Convention. The economic

opportunities created by more successful integration would be the

most effective long-term means of alleviating the humanitarian

crisis faced by refugees in the camps and urban areas. END COMMENT.



SECHE