INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN SAADA: A QUESTION OF DEFINITION AND STRATEGY

UNCLAS SANAA 000158



SIPDIS



NOFORN

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS



DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP AND PRM

CAIRO FOR REFCOORD MARY DOETSCH



E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PREF, PHUM, PREL, PGOV, YM

SUBJ: INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN SAADA: A QUESTION OF DEFINITION AND

STRATEGY



1. (SBU/NF) SUMMARY: According to a recent estimate, the number of

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the Saada Governorate who

require food aid has grown to 77,000. This number, however, does not

accurately reflect the complex reality of population movements in

Saada as a result of the conflict there, and true IDPs may represent

only a third of this number. For its part, the ROYG has decided that

active cooperation with international agencies may serve its

interests in Saada. END SUMMARY



2. (SBU) At a January 6 donor community meeting chaired by the World

Food Program (WFP) in Sanaa, WFP's Country Director for Yemen

Mohamed El-Kouhene and the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR) Representative in Yemen Claire Bourgeois discussed

their assistance to IDPs in Saada. WFP began limited nutritional

assistance to approximately 36,000 IDPs in June 2007, and El-Kouhene

encouraged further donor country support for a joint WFP/UNHCR plan

developed in December to provide food aid to 77,000 IDPs in two IDP

camps in Saada city through March 2008. UNHCR also provides non-food

assistance such as tents and blankets to IDPs.



4. (SBU/NF) El-Kouhene admitted that the 77,000 figure for IDPs in

Saada was an approximation, developed in cooperation with UNHCR by

adding 10% to an earlier International Committee of the Red

Cross/Red Crescent (ICRC) estimate. El-Kouhene said perhaps only

one-third of the 77,000 were actually unable to return to their

homes due to the conflict, and that much of the remainder had

returned to their villages but remained reliant on outside

assistance because the conflict had destroyed their assets. He said

WFP and UNHCR had agreed to classify all people receiving food aid

as IDPs both to facilitate planning and to avoid adding controversy

to an already volatile situation.



5. (SBU/NF) In a separate meeting on January 27 in Sanaa, Samer

Haddadin, UNHCR Protection Officer responsible for Saada, lauded

ROYG support for his agency's operations there. While acknowledging

that it had taken almost a year to get initial ROYG approval for a

UNHCR office in Saada, Haddadin said cooperation was now good. The

ROYG currently provides security for UN operations, and has also

expressed interest in UNHCR training on IDP registration.

Additionally, it has encouraged UNHCR to expand its aid, and has

asked the ICRC to construct on its behalf a third camp for IDPs in

Saada city.



6. (SBU/NF) According to Haddadin, Saada Deputy Governor Salem

Al-Wahishi is the key figure in ensuring cooperation. Haddadin said

the contrast between the ROYG's cooperation with UNHCR on the IDP

issue and its general lack of assistance on other issues, such as

East African refugees, derives from the ROYG's desire that

international aid serve its interests. He elaborated that allowing

the UN and NGOs to distribute assistance in Saada is designed to

reduce local opposition to the government. Haddadin added that he

was happy that, instead of constraining UN operations in Saada,

local government has been "complaining that we don't do enough."



7. (SBU/NF) COMMENT: Current figures on IDPs are largely a UN

construct to facilitate aid planning for those affected by the

conflict in Saada. More accurate data is unlikely unless the UNHCR

and ROYG begin a registration process. However, continual flare-ups

of fighting in Saada mean that population movements are likely to

continue, as will the need for outside assistance. Haddadin's

interpretation of the positive role of the ROYG makes sense in the

larger context of ongoing government attempts to negotiate and

co-opt support in Saada. By supporting UNHCR and WFP aid to IDPs in

Saada, the ROYG probably hopes to be associated with these services

and, as a result, bring about a reduction in anti-government

opposition. While the potential for success of this strategy is

unclear, for the time being, the ROYG's unusual level of cooperation

with UN agencies in Saada is helping them provide assistance to

IDPs. END COMMENT.





BRYAN