AL-HOUTHI REBELLION: NO END IN SIGHT

S E C R E T SANAA 001165 E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2018 TAGS: PGOV PINS YM SUBJECT: AL-HOUTHI REBELLION: NO END IN SIGHT REF: A. SANAA 1040 ¶B. IIR 6 906 0162 08 ¶C. SANAA 715 ¶D. IIR 6 906 0154 08 ¶E. IIR 6 906 0156 08 Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Fighting between the al-Houthi rebels and ROYG forces has intensified this year, leading to increased efforts by the ROYG to quash the rebellion militarily once and for all and prompting it to seek aid from the US, Russia, Belarus, and Yemen's own militant tribes. As fighting has increased, so have claims of foreign involvement, mercenary soldiers, tribal recruits, and weapons taken from ROYG forces falling into the hands of Yemen's population (already awash in weapons),all of which may spell greater instability in the future. On top of this, the humanitarian situation has worsened, creating an internally displaced population estimated at 100,000. End Summary. Fighting Grows and Spreads Beyond Saada Governorate -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) In recent months, the al-Houthi conflict for the first time has expanded its area of military operations outside of Saada to the governorates of Amran, al-Jawf and Sana'a, outside the capital itself. Fighting in Harf Sufyan, in northern Amran, began on May 8 with an attempt to assassinate Amran's security director. Since that time the al-Houthis have controlled, with little interruption, the portion of the main road to Saada in that area. A foreign diplomat told a donor group meeting on July 6 that two of the three major roads to Saada were cut off by al-Houthi roadblocks. On May 17, NewsYemen reported clashes between armed men, presumed to be al-Houthis, and ROYG military in al-Jawf. Closer to Sana'a, as recently as July 4 ROYG forces shelled al-Houthi pockets of resistance in the valley of Bani Hushaysh just eighteen kilometers from the Embassy. Meanwhile fierce fighting continues daily in Saada governorate. ¶3. (C) President Saleh told White House Counterterrorism and Homeland Security Advisor Ken Wainstein on June 12 that ROYG forces were losing 40-50 soldiers and twenty to thirty vehicles each day to al-Houthis (ref A). On June 22, the Russian Ambassador to Yemen told an assembly of western security professionals that al-Houthis had taken possession of Russian made anti-aircraft launchers sold to Yemen in the 1990's. He added the al-Houthis were unable to use these for lack of a missing part. (Comment: Thus far, helicopters over Saada have been brought down by large caliber fire and not by missiles, suggesting the al-Houthis either don't have or have not yet used these weapons. End Comment.) Rebellion Crushed! Abdulmalik al-Houthi Dead! (But only in the Official News) -------------- -------------- ¶4. (U) Since the June 16 announcement that the Qatari mediation in the al-Houthi-ROYG conflict had failed for the fourth time, official media have reported a litany of decisive victories by the government forces over the al-Houthi rebels, including on June 24, a report that al-Houthi leader and Zaydi cleric Abdulmalik al-Houthi was killed or seriously injured. ¶5. (C) Each time the government proclaimed its success, however, other news sources reported renewed al-Houthi resistance, suggesting these victories were not so decisive. Long after Bani Hushaysh was declared won,, the Republican Guard, led by the President's son, Brigadier General Ahmed Ali Saleh, continued to bomb and "root out" al-Houthis there. Convoys to supply government forces in Saada likewise continue to face ambush and attack on roads reportedly cleared by government soldiers and garrisons said to have been liberated by 'heroic government action,' remain under siege. On the reported death of Abdulmalik al-Houthi, PolOff spoke to Bashraheel Bashraheel, owner and editor of Aden-based al-Ayyam newspaper, who dismissed reports of Abdulmalik's death. (Comment: News reports are unreliable at best in Yemen. ROYG control of electronic media, and the exclusion of any independent or international media from Saada provide observers with little information to go on. End Comment.) Saleh To the Tribes: Are You With Me? -------------- ¶7. (C) As the fighting between al-Houthis and ROYG forces has worsened, the ROYG has recently appealed to tribes for their support. Ruling General People's Congress (GPC) Party Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Mohammed Abulahoum told PolOff on June 22 that during the third week of June President Saleh asked for support against the al-Houthis from Saada shaykhs. Two shaykhs agreed to help but, in a tactic seen previously in Yemen, pinned their offer to tribal consensus and offers from each tribe of five hundred armed men. (Comment: The two shaykhs surely were betting that both of these requirements were unlikely to be agreed to, which turned out to be the case. End Comment.) ¶8. (U) On July 10, English Language Yemen Times newspaper reported that President Saleh had called on the tribes of Yemen to form a Popular Army of between ten and twenty thousand irregular tribesmen from the Hashid and Bakil confederations and tribes from Saada to face the al-Houthis. This report was accompanied by (1) suggestions by shaykhs for a return to the Doha-brokered peace; (2) concerns by shaykhs over the damage to infrastructure in Saada; and (3) fears that the aftermath would bring a mushrooming of revenge feuds, which already plague Yemeni society. ¶9. (C) The cool reception Saleh's overtures received from the shaykhs was not entirely unexpected. Hasan Zaid, Secretary General of the banned Al-Haq Party, told PolOff that government action was driving tribesmen in Saada and the surrounding area into the al-Houthi camp. Abulahoum told PolOff on June 22 that government attempts at containment were so mismanaged they created disgruntled people ready to side against the government. He added that he had denied the army's request for access to his tribal lands ) saying his tribe would keep the al-Houthis and the government out. Shoura Council Member Mohammed al-Taib told the Deputy Chief of Mission that many of those fighting the government in Saada were not actually al-Houthis or sympathizers. He claimed these fighters were disaffected tribesmen angered by neglect from ROYG leadership. On June 21, NewsYemen reported that GPC representative Shaykh Bakeel Abdu Hubaish said that the ROYG army swelled the number of al-Houthi sympathizers, because it violated citizens' rights. He also accused the al-Houthi leadership of violations. ¶10. (S) Military sources told EmbOff this week that the government has already recruited some three to five thousand tribesmen from Amran Hashid tribes (ref B). Both ROYG and al-Houthis used tribesmen in fighting in 2007. A British diplomat told PolOff of concerns that tribal involvement had begun an epidemic of revenge killing exemplified in the death of Shaykh Shaiya al-Bakhtan in February (ref C). National Democratic Institute (NDI) Senior Program Manager and Tribal Conflict Management coordinator Nadwa al-Dawsari told PolOff dozens of revenge killings had occurred but that tribesmen considered these private affairs and therefore did not report them. ¶11. (S) Comment: President Saleh has a number of reasons to bring the tribes into the al-Houthi conflict. On the one hand, it allows him to spread blame for any defeat on the tribes rather than ROYG security forces. This would undermine the public image of tribes and their leadership, who pride themselves on their martial heritage, and might provide a pretext for Saleh to free himself from the substantial payments the state presently provides shaykhs, which it cannot afford. On the other hand, if successful in gaining tribal support, he can use the tribesmen as shock troops, weakening the tribes by decimating their soldiering class. The ROYG has used tribesmen in previous conflicts to turn the tide, always with results that prolonged conflict and exacerbated tribal hatred. Revenge feuds from earlier wars still plague tribal society and some degree of Southern discontent is a direct result of tribal looting of southern cities after the 1994 civil war. End Comment. President's Son Sallies Forth into the Breach -------------- ¶12. (C) Many believe President Saleh assigned his son and Republican Guard Commander Ahmed Ali Saleh to the fighting in Bani Hushaysh to burnish the son's military credentials, which would serve him well should he 'inherit' the presidency. Victory, however, has been difficult to claim, and the Republican Guard found fighting the al-Houthis in Bani Hushaysh hard slogging. Ahmed Ali's Republican Guard is tasked with defending the regime, which makes its deployment in Bani Hushaysh near the capital reasonable. Military sources note, however, that if the Republican Guard was deployed on a large scale to Saada, and if Ahmed Ali were to go with them, they would fall under the command of Northwestern Regional Commander and First Armored Brigade Commander Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (ref D). (Note: Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and Ahmed Ali Saleh are the considered competitors to eventually succeed Saleh as President. A strong showing by either in this war could grease their way into the presidential palace. End Note.) ¶13. (C) Al-Taib told the Ambassador and DCM in late June, that Ahmed Ali sent only two units of Republican Guard to Saada. (Note: The size of these units is unknown and are presumed to be small. The Republican Guard is estimated at 10,000 or division size. End Note.) Al-Taib said President Saleh is committed to fight it out in Saada, until the al-Houthis can't take it anymore and sue for negotiation or a cease-fire. Al-Taib said President Saleh is personally directing the war , helping to both ensure the war is managed to his liking and that credit for any victory stays out of Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar's hands. Who's Supporting Whom? -------------- ¶14. (S) Claims and counterclaims of foreign support for each side in the conflict abound. The ROYG argues at every turn that Iran and its surrogate, Hizballah, inspire, finance and train the al-Houthi rebels. (Comment: The Ambassador carried back to the Department in June a dossier of alleged evidence of the Iranian hand in the Saada conflict, which GRPO is in the process of translating. Thus far, the material we have seen does not/not make the ROYG's case, but we welcome any more detailed analysis others may wish to provide. End Comment.) At the same time, reports of large infusions of Saudi cash to the ROYG in support of its military campaign appear often in independent media. ¶15. (S) While Yemeni suspicions of Iran seem heartfelt, they do not/not appear to have stunted the bilateral relationship. Yemen's official news agency SABA reported on May 4, that Foreign Minster Abubakr al-Qirbi while in Tehran negotiated greater economic cooperation with Iran. In April, Iranian Foreign Minster Manouchehr Mottaki visited Yemen, advancing various Iranian economic projects, especially in the crucial areas of oil and energy. As recently as June 23, Iranian warships were allowed to refuel and re-provision in Aden (ref E). Internally Displaced Peoples: A Growing but Indeterminate Number -------------- -------------- ¶16. (U) Meanwhile, the situation of civilians in Saada worsens each day. Islamic Relief Country Director Khalid Ahmed Almulad told a donor group meeting on July 6 that there were 61,000 internally displaced people (IDP) in Saada city with roughly 11,000 living in tents in Saada city's seven IDP camps. He produced a map which showed concentrations of IDPs in neighboring governorates of Amran (7,200) and al-Jawf (8,000). IDPS also are congregated along the Saada borders trying to avoid the areas of fiercest fighting. These include along the al-Jawf border in Kitaf and al Buqa (1,750),al-Safra (1,000) and al Hishuah (1,050), along the Saudi-Hajja border in al-Dhahir (8,000),in Baqim to the far north (2,100) and in the isolated eastern district on the Saudi border in Ghamir (2,800). The conflict has created artificial price inflation in Saada. Fuel prices in some places in Saada have quadrupled. Basic food stuffs, like chicken and wheat have almost doubled at a time when people have been torn away from their subsistence livelihoods. ¶17. (C) International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Country Representative Marcus Dolder told PolOff that it is hard to estimate the total number of IDPs in Saada, as many relocate with relatives and do not register with authorities. Dolder told PolOff that it was not uncommon for three displaced families, each numbering seven people, to live in one small room in Saada city. Outside of Saada city people have moved to gathering points not recognized by the ROYG. Atlanta-based International Community Services (ICS) NGO Manager Marius Posthumus said that there were at least 10,000 IDPs in al-Jawf and Amran Governorates each. He added that IDPS are beginning to spread into Hajja Governorate too. ¶18. (C) The ROYG strictly limits foreign activity in Saada governorate, arguing that it is unable to ensure the safety of foreign aid workers. Posthumus, Dolder and other NGO leadership have noted that this has limited the international community's ability to assist IDPs. ICS Country Representative Drew Whitson told PolOff that ROYG authorities took him into custody in Amran Governorate where he was assisting IDPs, with permission from the governor of Amran. The arrest of Whitson and his team is the only case post knows of in which ROYG authorities forcibly limited foreign access to areas outside of Saada. Medicins Sans Frontieres, France (MSF/F) has withdrawn its international staff from Saada due to security concerns and ROYG-imposed restrictions on movement which prevent its staff from reaching those in need. MSF/F believes that people are dying in Saada for lack of basic health-care. ¶19. (C) On July 6, the Ambassador brought together members of the donor community in Sana'a to discuss how best to convey to the ROYG the dire need for humanitarian assistance to IDPs in war-torn Saada. The group considered sending a tripartite delegation to the ROYG consisting of the Presidency of the European Union, a representative of the United Nations and a representative of the NGO community. This idea appeared to founder in the face of French insistence that it, as President of the E.U., could not represent the United States and Japan. On July 13, the Ambassador broached the issue directly with Deputy Prime Minister for Security and Defense Affairs Rashad al-Alimi. Alimi expressed his Government's concern for the innocent victims of the war. He stressed his desire to open both major roads to Saada that are currently blocked in order to allow humanitarian shipments of food and fuel. He also asserted that the ROYG will open up its strategic warehouses of food and fuel in the region to assist. "The soldiers cannot eat while the citizens starve," he told the Ambassador. COMMENT -------------- ¶20. (C) The human suffering and economic costs of the conflict in Saada are soaring. Neither side is likely to win a decisive victory and neither has displayed many redeeming qualities that would allow it to claim the moral high ground in this struggle. Both the ROYG and the al-Houthis have frittered away opportunities for peace. The ROYG is preoccupied by the al-Houthis, allowing other dangers posed by dwindling resources, tribal unrest, religious extremism and southern discontent to fester. While, to date, reports of foreign support for each side are inconclusive, the longer this conflict goes on, the more likely it is that influential neighbors will be drawn into it, slowly turning what began as an internal disturbance into one with regional implications. End Comment. SECHE