IRAN ON BRINK OF DECISION TO ENGAGE ON P5+1 OFFER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000039 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/2/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MASS IR SUBJECT: IRAN ON BRINK OF DECISION TO ENGAGE ON P5+1 OFFER DUBAI 00000039 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Director, Iran Regional Presence Office, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Coverage in the Iranian press of Iran's reaction to the P5+1 proposal suggests that the Iranian government may propose talks based on the proposal's first step of pre-negotiations, featuring a "freeze for freeze." The Iranians continue to emphasize the common points of their May 2008 proposal and the P5+1 package and will likely attempt to add elements from their package as part of the pre-negotiations. Ali Velayati, the Supreme Leader's Foreign Policy advisor, raised the possibility of a six-week prenegotiation period in an article reflective of the Supreme Leader's views. The Majles, led by its newly elected speaker and former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, announced July 1 that it has concluded that negotiations should start and will debate on how to negotiate over the P5+1 proposal July 5. This Majles debate could lead to an announcement of Iran's official position. Meanwhile, as the Supreme Leader and Majles have stepped forward on this issue, President Ahmadinejad has been uncharacteristically silent. End Summary. Indication of Supreme Leader's Position Favoring Talks, Potential Short-Term Suspension of Enrichment ¶2. (C) Iranian press coverage of Iran's reaction to the latest P5+1 proposal markedly stepped up over the last week, given the P5+1 mandated June 28 deadline for an official Iranian response. On June 28, hardline paper Jomhouri Eslami, contained a long article by former deputy FM under Rafsanjani, Dr. Abbas Maleki. Maleki is close to the Supreme Leader's office. The article outlined Iran's own nuclear proposal, the P5+1 proposal, the common ground between both, and the possible outcomes of negotiations. (Comment: All in all, the article's moderate tone, which also emphasized the positive steps taken by the US in recognizing Iran's right to a peaceful nuclear program and committing to respect Article 2 of the UN Charter on the non-use of force, may represent an attempt to prepare constituencies for dialogue. End Comment) ¶3. (C) On July 1, the Supreme Leader's Foreign Policy Advisor and former Foreign Minister Dr. Ali Velayati extended upon Maleki's moderate tone on the P5+1 package in a lengthy article, again in hardline Jomhouri Eslami (Note: Jomhouri Eslami is considered a mouthpiece for the Supreme Leader's views, and given Velayati's position, his remarks can be read as made on behalf of the Supreme Leader. Endnote) Velayati called for Iran to take an active role in the international scene through active diplomacy, including moving forward on the P5+1 talks. He considered P5+1 talks as a starting point for such active engagement. He claimed that the US wanted to see Iran refuse the P5+1 offer so that it could later say to the international community "See, we told you there was no point in talking with Iran (direct quote)." ¶4. (C) Under these conditions, Velayati said, the best way for Iran to protect its rights, preserve its national interests, and to take an active role in the area of international diplomacy is to move forward with negotiations. He discussed the issue of uranium enrichment and appeared to advocate a six-week suspension to allow for "pre-negotiation" talks. Later he counseled Iranian policymakers and analysts to "speak with one voice" on the nuclear issue, given the capacity for rumor-mongering and misinterpretation. He added that current international sanctions efforts can be viewed as an attempt by the P5+1 to weaken the Iranian bargaining position. Therefore, he said, Iran should not allow itself to be weakened and could best address sanctions issues as part of the P5+1 negotiations. ¶5. (C) On July 2, Velayati further aired his - and purportedly the Supreme Leader's - views in another lengthy editorial published by the Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA) and also published concurrently in the French "Liberation," Italian "La Republica," and a Swiss paper. This article sought to provide the context for the Supreme Leader's role as final decision maker on the most sensitive matters effecting Iran, including the most difficult diplomatic decisions. It noted that the Supreme Leader preferred to let the three branches of the Iranian government handle Iran's affairs, and only got directly DUBAI 00000039 002.2 OF 003 involved in policy decisions on extremely sensitive matters. The piece then noted the Supreme Leader's 19 years of experience in this capacity, highlighting his experience with diplomacy as a tool to preserve Iranian interests and identity. After a brief - and quite balanced given the forum - overview of current regional issues, Velayati concluded by stating that to preserve the interests of future generations, a peaceful solution allowing them to inherit peaceful nuclear energy must be developed. Common Points of Two Packages Likely Starting Point ¶6. (C) Iranian officials have continually stressed that the common points of the Iranian and the P5+1 packages could be a good basis for negotiations. If they choose to accept a pre-negotiations start on the basis of the P5+1 proposal pre-negotiation phase, they will likely attempt to add elements of the Iranian proposal during this period. On June 27, Larijani called the European promises a 'mirage' and said the West does not want Iran to have its rights. However, he then shifted the focus to negotiations and said the logical way is straight forward. If talks resume, the West can reach a joint agreement with Iran and these agreements will be the basis for further measures. There's no need for a complete plan, he added, saying they can go step-by-step. Majles Stakes Out a Role ¶7. (C) The Majles, led by former nuclear negotiator Larijani appears to be at the forefront of the Iranian official reaction to the P5+1 proposal, along with Supreme National Secretary Jalili (Note: The Supreme Leader announced June 28 that Jalili, vice Majles speaker Larijani, is now his representative to the SNSC. A move one analyst believes will allow the President's office and the Supreme Leader to share nuclear "victories." Endnote) The majority of Iranian press coverage of the proposal appeared to cite Larijani and other MPs, and the role of the Majles in evaluating the proposal appears to be central. If true, the proposed Majles debate on July 5 over how to start negotiations could be significant and may lead to an official announcement of the Iranian position on the P5+1 proposal. ¶8. (C) Following the Majles' closed session with Atomic Energy Agency of Iran (AEOI) head Aqazadeh and Supreme National Security Council Secretary (SNCS) Jalili last week, Majles Energy committee head Emad Hoseyni stated July 1 that Aqazadeh's report said the call for enrichment suspension in the current P5+1 proposal is not as strong as in previous iterations. This comment could be an Iranian attempt to find a face-saving way to enter a pre-negotiation phase without suspending enrichment. Majles Energy committee head Hoseyni appeared to use Aqazadeh's report as a basis for advocating the start of negotiations, saying of the report that "it has a forward direction and we should start negotiations." Ahmadinejad Sidelined? ¶9. (C) One actor conspicuously absent from public debate over how Iran should react to the P5+1 package has been President Ahmadinejad. Other than two statements by his spokesman, Gholamhossein Elham, one on June 15 and another a week later, Ahmadinejad and his allies have been largely absent. Elham's statements declared Iran would never give up its right to enrich, and the first came on the same day EU Foreign Minister Solana presented the package. (Comment: We are led to conclude that Ahmadinejad's silence on this issue may represent the wishes of the Supreme Leader to conclusively assert his control over this portfolio. End comment) Comment ¶10. (C) Barring any last second reversal or events, it appears that Iran will shortly announce its willingness to enter some sort of talks over the P5+1 package, probably including a provision for prenegotiations during a temporary freeze on enrichment in exchange for a freeze on any further sanctions. The Supreme Leader's position, as described in great detail, appeared aimed at preparing the Iranian public for dialogue and the "freeze for a freeze" tack likely represents a face-saving measure meant to enter talks without appearing to concede to international pressure. On another front, FM Mottaki's announcement today of Iran's willingness to consider a US DUBAI 00000039 003.2 OF 003 Interests Section in Iran must have come with the Supreme Leader's authorization. It is still too early to tell if we are seeing a genuine shift in Iranian policy, but signs are encouraging that Iran may be preparing a new direction in its engagement with the international community. ASGARD