U/S ROOD DISCUSSES IRAN, MISSILE DEFENSE WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ROME 000988 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/06/2018 TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC MCAP MARR NATO ETTC KNNP IAEA ENRG, TRGY, IR, RU, IT SUBJECT: U/S ROOD DISCUSSES IRAN, MISSILE DEFENSE WITH ITALIAN POLDIR TERZI REF: ROME 774 ROME 00000988 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Acting Political Minister-Counselor Gabriel Escobar for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Italian MFA Political Director Terzi thanked U/S Rood on June 23 for the U.S. assistance in including Italy in pre P5+1 consultations on Iran. He said Italy was pushing for stronger EU measures against Iran and wanted to include a robust discussion of Iran by the Quint on the margins of the upcoming G8 Ministerial in Kyoto. He outlined specific Italian restrictions on the Iranian banking sector in Italy and stressed the evolution of Italy's Iran policy since the new Berlusconi government took office. He said Italy was looking at ways to reinvigorate G8 action on Nonproliferation under its 2009 Presidency, including a new emphasis on nuclear safeguards and new language on nonproliferation in the final statements. U/S Rood updated the Italians on the U.S.- Russian strategic dialogue and thanked Italy for its support of language in the Dublin Convention on Cluster Munitions that preserved interoperability. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) U/S Rood met with Italian MFA Political Director Giulio Terzi on June 23. Terzi who has recently been appointed Italy's next Ambassador to the UN was accompanied by his successor - Luca Giansanti, currently the Vice Director General in the Bureau for European Integration; Deputy Political Director Filippo Formica; Non Proliferation office Director Emanuele Farruggia; Export Control office Director Roberto Liotto, and a civil service nuclear weapons expert. Rood was accompanied by Hugh Amundson (T),Richard Nephew (ISN) and poloffs. Iran/Nuclear: Italy takes hard-line, seeks greater inclusion -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Much of the discussion focused on Iran. Terzi led off, thanking U/S Rood for U.S. assistance in including Italy in pre P5+1 Quint Iran consultations and described his view of the evolution of Italian Iran policy since the Berlusconi government was formed in May 2008. Terzi noted that, thanks to the U.S. push, the other EU3 were actively including Italy in EU Iran discussions and drafting meetings and that Italy had played an active role in pushing for a robust draft of the EU Common Position on UNSCR 1803 implementation. He argued that Italy has been a strong proponent of tough EU sanctions on Iran - characterizing Italy's position as more aggressive than other EU3 members (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom). Terzi made a push for Italy's inclusion in the P5+1 - at least through consultative mechanisms - and a "Quint" (EU-3 plus United States and Italy) Ministerial (or Political Director) - level consultation on the margins of the G-8 meeting this week in Kyoto. He noted that Italy believed the Iranians had no intention of accepting the P5+1's recent offer and that the strategy of ratcheting up pressure on Iran would need to continue. However, he also suggested that the delivery of the updated package had important public diplomacy effects that should be exploited. ¶4. (C) Acting U/S Rood agreed that while we believed the updated package was a good offer, we also assessed that Iran will not accept it. Instead, Iran will likely continue to play for time by stringing out its response to the package as long as possible, just as Iran has repeatedly used the IAEA investigation and process to delay action against it. U/S Rood argued that Iran was striving to convince the world of a "fait accompli" vis-Q-vis its nuclear program that would culminate with acceptance of its enrichment capability. Terzi asked for the U.S.'s technical assessment of Iran's progress. Rood noted that there was great uncertainty and unpredictability associated with Iran's centrifuge program, but that it was evident they are making some progress. Rood noted that the IAEA reported Iranian success in uranium enrichment, despite using what the IAEA considered to be an inherently unreliable centrifuge design (the P-1/now being referred to ROME 00000988 002.2 OF 005 as the "IR-1"). ¶5. (C) Terzi argued that Iran's progress demonstrated the need for intrusive inspections and verification of Iran's nuclear program. He suggested that the implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol be made compulsory for Iran. U/S Rood agreed, but noted that this has been attempted in the past at the UNSC and met with Russian and Chinese objections. U/S Rood noted further that UNSCR 1737 contained a provision requiring Iran to provide all cooperation and access requested by the IAEA, but that sensitivities on the part of IAEA Director General ElBaradei have limited the utility of this decision. Terzi noted that DG El Baradei now seemed to be more concerned with Iran's nuclear program than in the past, particularly with respect to the outstanding issues associated with nuclear weaponization. U/S Rood agreed, but also argued that El Baradei remained focused less on the technical mandate of the Agency and more on "preventing conflict." This bifurcated view of his role, in turn, minimized his willingness to be tough on Iran. ¶6. (C) U/S Rood noted it was increasingly clear that Iran had engaged in a variety of activities associated with weaponization and that the U.S. believed that some of these activities continued after the late 2003 halt of warhead development work. He noted that it was unclear whether Iran's weaponization work had resumed, but that failure to address the IAEA's "serious concerns" strongly suggested that Iran was, at a minimum, attempting to preserve its options for the future. ¶7. (C) Terzi and Formica argued that this spoke in favor of action by the IAEA Board of Governors, but regretted that the 2-5 June meeting took no action on Iran. U/S Rood agreed that IAEA Board action would have been preferred, but that discussions with the Russians and Chinese made clear that such action would have come at too steep a cost in terms of the substance of such action. Rood noted that, over time, the Board's failure to act on a case as serious as Iran would have deleterious effects for the IAEA safeguards system more generally. This was a disturbing trend-line, especially given the Board's likely need to take action on Syria and any other cases in the future. Iran/Sanctions: Russian and Chinese Obstacles -------------- ¶8. (C) U/S Rood welcomed Italy's support for tough EU action on Iran, arguing that Iran must be presented with as many signals as possible that its failure to address international concerns would bear serious consequences. U/S Rood noted, however, that the metric with which to measure the impact of sanctions should not be the amount of assets frozen; but rather, we should concentrate on the market-based impact on the perception of risk for business in Iran. ¶9. (C) Terzi agreed, but noted that the role of Russia and China with respect to EU sanctions cannot be downplayed. He described how Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov had registered concerns to EU Ambassadors in Moscow with Russia's exclusion from discussion on notional EU measures that would go beyond UNSCR 1803; Terzi noted with amusement that these measures were required only because Russia had prevented the UNSC from adopting such measures in the first place. Terzi noted that China had been emphatic that its economic interests in Iran, which are substantial and growing, be preserved. U/S Rood agreed that Russia and China presented a difficulty with respect to Iran, but said engagement of both within the P5+1 had brought returns. U/S Rood noted that Chinese authorities did not want to appear alone in the international community in defense of Iran. Russia, on the other hand, lacked a coherent policy on Iran, changing views depending on the situation at hand and players involved. U/S Rood noted that RosAtom's leadership, in particular, had in the past indicated their desire to be rid of troublesome Iranian business. Iranian Banking: Terzi Denies Italy is a hub ROME 00000988 003.2 OF 005 -------------- ¶10. (C) U/S Rood raised the issue of Iranian banking relationships and presence in Italy. He noted that Italy was perceived as a banking hub for Iran and that Italy should take advantage of UNSCR 1803's request for vigilance to take strong steps to prevent Italian-based Iranian banks from providing support to Iranian proliferation and terrorism activities. Terzi pushed back adamantly on this characterization, stressing that Italy had already taken significant steps in this direction. Terzi argued that Italy, under Berlusconi, had been assertive in ensuring that Bank Melli was included on the list of additional designations that the European Union adopted on 23 June ¶2008. He said Bank Sepah had been "virtually" shut down, with all transactions stopped and under the constant supervision of the Bank of Italy. He noted that the Bank of Italy had released circulars last year, and again recently, cautioning the Italian banking community about conducting business with Iranian banks. Terzi said that he had read that, of the reported 70 billion euros that Iran allegedly withdrew from Europe several weeks ago most came from Italy (COMMENT: press reports from 16 June 2008 reported that Iran had withdrawn 75 billion euros from Europe in response to sanctions concerns). ¶11. (C) Formica added that, in addition to steps already taken with respect to Bank Sepah and Bank Melli, Italy intended to "put Bank Saderat into a straight-jacket" in the near future and was pushing for a robust EU Common Position on UNSCR 1803 which he expected to be approved at the July GAERC.(Note. MFA Non Proliferation Office Director told poloff after the meeting that Formica had been referring to language in the draft EU common position on UNSCR 1803 implementation which would call for all transactions of Saderat in the EU to be reported to host country banking authorities and shared with all EU member states. End Note) Terzi also noted that Italian export credits to Iran were down (from approximately $3 billion to 1.8-1.9 billion) and that Italy was effectively issuing no new export credits to Iran. He stressed that stories regarding new relationships between Italian firms and Bank Melli have proven to be false. Terzi requested any additional information available from the United States regarding Iranian banking in Italy. ¶12. (C) Terzi then noted that he had recently reviewed the issue of Iran's significant import of refined petroleum products, suggesting that while this might not yet be an area ripe for sanctions, consideration to it should be given. He further noted that, as opposed to in other areas, Italian firms would not be substantially affected by a ban of such products to Iran; instead, he said that his research indicated that British, French, Dutch, Russian, and American firms would be the most heavily impacted. U/S Rood expressed surprise that Terzi had discovered U.S. connections to Iran's petroleum sector and requested any additional information Terzi could provide in this regard. U/S Rood also noted that, while there had naturally been consideration of a wide range of sanctions options over the past several years, the energy sector had not been targeted to date because of the obvious concerns regarding possible Iranian retaliation with regard to crude and natural gas exports as well as a desire to avoid perceptions that the international community is intentionally harming the Iranian people. (note MFA Non-Proliferation Office Director later clarified with poloff that Terzi had misspoken and that according to Italian research there is no evidence linking U.S. firms to sales of refined petroleum products. end note.) ¶13. (C) Lastly, Terzi requested an update on the status of pending U.S. legislation that would stiffen U.S. domestic Iran sanctions. U/S Rood noted the Administration's long-standing concerns with respect to this legislation, and noted that discussions between the Administration and key Members of Congress on how to address these concerns continue. Italian G8 Presidency: Nuclear Safeguards, Non ROME 00000988 004.2 OF 005 Proliferation -------------- -------------- ¶14. (C) Terzi said the Italians have been considering making nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation objectives a focus of their 2009 G-8 Presidency. In particular he said they were considering making nuclear safeguards a part of the Outreach Session. They would also like to avoid repeating past language on nonproliferation and would be looking for new deliverables. The Italians were considering an initiative to redirect scientists within the Global Partnership framework. Rood welcomed these suggestions and added that broadening the geographic coverage of the Global Partnership should be another deliverable consistent with the commitment made by G8 members this year under the Japanese Presidency. Rood asked the Italians to push the EU to join the U.S. and Norway by contributing to the proposeed international nuclear fuel bank to be administered by the IAEA and noted that only 45 million euros were needed before it could come into fruition. Terzi said they would consider encouraging an EU contribution. Separately, Rood also stressed the importance of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. Progress in U.S.- Russia Strategic Dialogue -------------- ¶15. (C) U/S Rood briefed Terzi on the latest developments in the U.S.- Russia Strategic Dialogue. The U.S. was still engaged in talks with Deputy FM Kislyak and others about the possibility of including Russia in a regional Missile Defense Architecture, but the Russians were more interested in the discussions regarding Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs). Rood had discussed this most recently in Oslo with Kislyak, who seemed more optimistic about the process than in past encounters. These measures would allow Russian inspections and monitoring of the sites, shared threat assessment consultations and exchanges of technical information. The U.S. would also agree to keep the interceptors separate from the silos, maintain the radar site in standby mode and enable the Russians to verify that it was not switched on or pointing in their direction. Terzi said that the MD portion of the Bucharest Summit declaration made it clear to the Russians that they would not find any divisions on MD within the Alliance. He noted that more work was needed to work out the financial and technical aspects of NATO's interface with the new MD architecture, but that these were minor details. ¶16. (C) In response to Terzi's questions about press reports on the "Lithuanian option," Rood stressed that the U.S. was committed at the highest levels to reaching an agreement with Poland on MD (the Secretary had spoken with the Polish FM on this issue a few days before),and that the U.S. regarded the strengthening of the overall defense relationship as a separate track that should not be linked to the MD negotiations. Rood said he stressed to his Polish interlocutors that their insistence on questioning NATO's commitment to Article V security guarantees in public undermined its effectiveness. The U.S. has told the Poles that they are our "first choice" for the interceptor site, but we would "reluctantly" look elsewhere if necessary. Rood stressed that the U.S. has had consultations with Lithuania on a range of security issues, but that we were not currently planning to open missile defense negotiations. Post-START, INF -------------- ¶17. (C) Rood provided Terzi with an update on the status of Post-START talks with Russia. The U.S. side spoke with Deputy FM Kislyak most recently on June 16. The key difference between the two sides was that the U.S. wanted a treaty or binding agreement limiting deployed missiles, whereas the Russians wanted a treaty that limits overall delivery systems. The U.S. wanted to preserve a global strike capability and the ability to use delivery systems for conventional weapons in cases where a nuclear response ROME 00000988 005.2 OF 005 would be disproportionate (in CT operations, for example). In general Rood noted that the Russians still had a Cold War threat perception of the U.S. as their greatest threat whereas the U.S. was no longer focused on the Russian threat, but rather on the Iranian, North Korean and terrorist threats. Rood speculated that an agreement was likely but that the Russians may be trying to stall until closer to the Treaty's expiration (the START Treaty does not expire until the end of 2009). ¶18. (C) Terzi asked about the U.S. impressions of the Russian proposal to multilateralize the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF),given that the treaty had proved a useful means of reaching real weapons reductions. Rood said that the U.S. supported calling on other countries to follow the U.S./Russian example in reducing their own stockpiles, but did not believe that an expanded treaty would be feasible (countries like India, Pakistan, Syria and North Korea would likely insist on retaining these capabilities) or verifiable. NPT --- ¶19. (C) Rood expressed frustration with the repetitive nature of NAM comments during the last NPT prepcom in Geneva and noted that the U.S. had made a unilateral decision to drastically reduce its stockpile of nuclear weapons over the last few years; in fact, we would soon be at 25 percent of Cold War levels. Rood noted that the U.S. was actively assisting developing nations in the acquisition of peaceful nuclear capabilities in return for voluntary agreements not to pursue domestic enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. The U.S. has already signed MOUs with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Bahrain. Cluster Munitions -------------- ¶20. (C) Rood thanked Italy for its support within the group of like-minded states on language in the Dublin Convention on Cluster Munitions that preserved allied interoperability and U.S. stockpiles on U.S. bases in Europe. He stressed that the next step would be to reach a new understanding on cluster munitions at the CCW and to get NATO Allies to adopt explicit language laying out what Article 21 meant in practice, in order to avoid misunderstandings down the road. Terzi noted that the GOI had faced strong public and parliamentary pressure to go along with the Oslo Process but had nonetheless fought for the Article 21 provision because it believed in preserving interoperability and understood the implications for U.S. forces based in Italy of an overly restrictive ban. ¶21. (C) U/S Rood has cleared this cable. SPOGLI