Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ROME888
2008-07-18 14:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

ITALY: SUPPORTIVE ON INDIA-IAEA SAFEGUARDS

Tags:  IAEA ETTC KNNP AORC PARM PREL IT 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000888 

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y. Change text paragraph 4.
Changes apply to content of message

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2018
TAGS: IAEA ETTC KNNP AORC PARM PREL IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: SUPPORTIVE ON INDIA-IAEA SAFEGUARDS
AGREEMENT, BUT ASKS URGENTLY FOR MORE INFO

REF: SECSTATE 74896

ROME 00000888 001.4 OF 002


Classified By: Economic Minister Conselor Tom Delare
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000888 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y. Change text paragraph 4. Changes apply to content of message SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2018 TAGS: IAEA ETTC KNNP AORC PARM PREL IT SUBJECT: ITALY: SUPPORTIVE ON INDIA-IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT, BUT ASKS URGENTLY FOR MORE INFO REF: SECSTATE 74896 ROME 00000888 001.4 OF 002 Classified By: Economic Minister Conselor Tom Delare for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Italy will seek to be supportive of India in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),but MFA officials urgently request information on the Indian sites to be placed under safeguards, and on the likely substance of the NSG waiver request. If it is not possible for them to receive a draft of the waiver request for review in July, then an NSG meeting date very early in September may present problems for the GOI. See also paragraphs 3 and 6 for other GOI questions. End summary. ¶2. (C) On July 17 PolOff and SciCouns delivered reftel points, encouraging Italy to support approval of the India-International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement at the August 1 IAEA Board of Governors meeting, to MFA Non-Proliferation Office Director Emanuele Farruggia and MFA Disarmament and Nonproliferation Agreement Implementation Office Director Vittorio Rocco. Farruggia had attended a meeting with an Indian Embassy representative and the MFA Deputy SYG earlier in the day on the same issue. He said they had assured the Indian Rep. that Italy would seek to be supportive in both the IAEA and in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),but that in return Italy asked for more active engagement from India in disarmament matters such as the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. ¶3. (C) Farruggia noted two key concerns about the safeguards agreement had arisen in discussions within the Italian Government (GOI) and among IAEA representatives in Vienna: 1) the absence of the annex listing the civil facilities to be placed under safeguards; and 2) the possible corrective measures India might take in case of an interruption of fuel supply. Farruggia and Rocco both noted that the GOI would be vulnerable to criticism from Parliament and pro-disarmament groups for approving the agreement without having at least a list of the facilities which will be placed under safeguards, if not the complete declaration, and asked for U.S. help in obtaining that information. On the corrective measures: they appreciated the U.S. explanation of the preambular nature of the text, and the reassurances regarding the permanent nature of the safeguards, but would welcome additional information ROME 00000888 002.4 OF 002 as to what "corrective measures" India might have in mind. ¶4. (SBU) Farruggia and Rocco both stressed the importance that Italy historically has given to disarmament issues. They also noted that for Italy, a key point is that by approving the safeguards agreement and/or supporting the NSG full-scope safeguards requirement waiver, they are not acknowledging India as a military nuclear power. Rather, they are making an exception for cooperation with India in the civil nuclear field. ¶5. (SBU) Regarding the upcoming NSG meeting, Farruggia noted that he had heard that it may be early in September, and that the GOI will essentially be closed for all of August. He requested that the U.S. provide, if at all possible, a draft of the waiver request, so that it can be considered in Rome while the key players and political-level officials are still present. He expressed concern that an early September meeting date may present problems for Italy if they do not have the chance to circulate the key elements of the waiver request for GOI consideration in July. ¶6. (C) Separately, EconOff presented reftel points to Counselor Roberto Liotto of the MFA,s economic bureau, who has the lead on Nuclear Suppliers Group issues. Liotto also stressed the need for the GOI to receive a draft of the NSG waiver request as soon as possible, noting that if the NSG meeting is held very early in September, and the documents for the meeting have not been reviewed by the GOI in July, it may be impossible for the GOI to prepare for the NSG meeting. Liotto noted that he had seen, 18 months to two years ago, an NSG confidential document laying out what India would need to do to win the NSG,s blessing for trade in civil nuclear goods. He asked if the U.S. plans to circulate an updated version of the document. ¶7. (C) Comment: In Post's judgment, a meeting date in the week of September 15 likely would give the GOI just enough time for internal consultations, if the waiver request is not available for review until August. End comment. SPOGLI

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