ITALY: FM D'ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 000071 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT. FOR EUR E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2018 TAGS: PREL NATO UNSC EUN IT SUBJECT: ITALY: FM D'ALEMA ON KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, MEPP AND LEBANON: ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN BROAD AGREEMENT WITH U.S. Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD SPOGLI, REASONS 1.4 B AND D. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) Ambassador called on FM D'Alema January 15 to run through key foreign policy issues in advance of PM Prodi's February 4 visit to Washington. D'Alema was in a constructive mood and said Italian foreign policy on key issues was largely convergent with that of the U.S. He said that Kosovo would require delicate, cautious management, that the international community should not be in a rush to recognize Kosovo upon a declaration of independence, and that, while Italy would follow Contact Group consensus, in his view waiting a few weeks to have 20 European countries recognize would be better than having five or six do so in a first round. Acknowledging that ISAF had an insufficient number of troops, D'Alema said Italy could not further augment its military presence in Afghanistan for domestic political reasons, but continued to hope for an international conference (after the nomination of the new UNSYG Special Rep and new EU rep) to re-launch public support for the Afghanistan mission among skeptical Europeans. On Iran, he stressed that Italy should be included in decision making discussions since Rome paid a higher price for adhering to sanctions than the other countries involved. He said he was "not negative" about another UNSCR on Iran, but the Russians would be a problem and the Chinese were uninterested. D'Alema praised President Bush's engagement in the Middle East, though he held out little optimism given the unpromising situation on the ground. On Lebanon, he said Italy supported the Arab League proposal, thought General Sleiman was a good candidate for the presidency, hoped negotiations would continue and assessed no threat of generalized violence. End Summary. -------------- Kosovo - "A Disaster to Be Managed" -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) Ambassador called on FM D'Alema January 15 to discuss key foreign policy issues in advance of PM Prodi's February 4 visit to Washington. D'Alema called Kosovo "a disaster to be managed." He said Kosovo as a state would be unsustainable economically and otherwise, and it was anyone's guess how long its independence could last. The current delicate moment called for the absolutely lowest profile. Silence until mid-March would be best, in his view. Much depended on the outcome of the Serbian elections. If Tadic were to lose leaving Kostunica and the nationalists in power, it would be even worse. He mused, "why recognize independence the day after it is declared? It doesn't have to be done that way." D'Alema believed the declaration could go forward as agreed, with a coordinated text (that Italy had worked on),and then attention would turn to the unknown number of countries who would recognize it. He suspected the Contact Group and a few others would recognize immediately, but many would hold back, creating a "differentiated situation." Regarding the EU mission, he said that even those who do not recognize independence would not object. ¶3. (C/NF) D'Alema said Serbia's reaction could involve a "panorama of possibilities," depending on who wins the ROME 00000071 002 OF 004 Serbian elections. Serbia could: close the border with Kosovo; cut electricity and roads into Kosovo; break relations with countries that recognize Kosovo; break relations with the EU for sending the ESDP mission; and/or break relations with NATO. Russia was likely to condemn the declaration and any recognition. Beyond official Serbian and Russian reaction, there could be a response from north Kosovo municipalities with Serb majorities to reject Kosovo independence and insist on maintaining links with Belgrade. NATO, D'Alema said, could not react with force, but would need to manage its mandate of ensuring free passage, protection of sites and minorities and preventing violence in a very complicated environment not foreseen in its Rules of Engagement. D'Alema also worried about reactions in southern Serbia. He suggested there could be mass movements of people that would look like (or amount to) ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, he added, if a church were to be burnt down, the image seen by the rest of Europe would be one of Muslims attacking Christians, in which case Kosovo would get no sympathy. We were entering a scenario that was fraught with danger, he said, in which the international community needed to stay calm and quiet and offer maximum security. Fortunately, Kosovo's leadership (with whom he'd been in touch) understood this, and was neither too aggressive nor in a hurry. ¶4. (C/NF) D'Alema told the Ambassador that he would attend an informal dinner with his British, French, Germany and Slovene counterparts and Javier Solana in Ljubljana on Saturday January 19 to discuss Kosovo and craft a united position to serve as a basis for EU consensus. He repeated that in the weeks ahead we all needed to avoid unnecessary provocation and exercise prudence. He ended the Kosovo discussion by saying that having only 4 or 5 EU states recognized independence would send an unhelpful, destabilizing message, whereas a strong and helpful one would be sent if all could wait a few weeks (until mid March) to get 20 or so EU states to recognize. -------------- -------------- Afghanistan-Needed: More Troops (Not Italians),Conference -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) The Ambassador told D'Alema it would be helpful if Italy could do more in Afghanistan, especially in training police and border guards. D'Alema replied that Italy could not increase its military footprint, having already pushed the limits Italian domestic political constraints would allow. Italy had reinforced its troops and added significant equipment in the past few months without unwanted noise or attention. D'Alema cited two problems in Afghanistan: 1) the military, both ISAF and the Afghan Army, were too small (Note: This is the first time we've heard D'Alema admit more troops were needed. He added that he would not say so in public. End note.); and 2) the international community needed to publicly re-launch the Afghan mission. European publics thought the situation there was getting worse and had no hope that it could be fixed. It was important to get the new UNSYG Special Representative nominated and working. Italy supported Lord Ashdown, whom the Italians know and like. It would also be important to get a new EU representative in place. D'Alema speculated there may be an Italian candidate (Note: We have heard rumors that Italy may propose Trade/EU Minister Emma Bonnino for this position. ROME 00000071 003 OF 004 End note.),but it was too early to say how that would play out. ¶6. (C/NF) Immediately after the selection of these international figures, D'Alema said, an international conference should be held at which President Karzai could describe for the sake of public opinion the positive developments that have been achieved and the way forward. D'Alema said such a conference should also consider the situation in Pakistan. Germany would be the ideal host, he said, but Italy would be prepared to host as well should the Germans decline. D'Alema believed such a conference could usefully reduce the gap between governmental understanding of the challenges, successes and needs in Afghanistan and public perception. The French had told him that President Karzai was hoping for a donors' conference, which, he said would be useful, but only after a political conference to re-launch international support for Afghanistan. -------------- Iran - Italy Feeling Excluded, Trade Falling -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) D'Alema told the Ambassador that Italy's trade with Iran fell 13 percent last year, and that Italian exports to Iran fell 21 percent. Italy was applying sanctions and paying a high price, yet was still being excluded from key discussions and decisions regarding Iran. Others, he said, were paying less but getting to do a lot of talking - at talks in which Italy should reasonably be participating. D'Alema said he was not negative about a third UNSCR on Iran, but noted that Russia was opposed and that Kosovo was playing a role in hardening the Russian position. We should spend the time to work for Russian cooperation and aim for mid-March, he said. He also noted that China seemed uninterested in a third UNSCR. -------------- MEPP, Lebanon -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) D'Alema praised President Bush's engagement in the Middle East Peace Process and said he was glad to see the President devoting so much effort, but he held little hope for getting a deal signed by the end of 2008 because the situation on ground was not promising. Turning to Lebanon, D'Alema said Italy supported the recent Arab League proposal, and believed that General Sleiman was a solid, qualified presidential candidate. He called the situation there fragile and said he hoped negotiations would continue until a breakthrough was achieved. Italy did not believe Lebanon was headed toward civil war or generalized violence. The paradox, he said, was that the split in the Christian community that made civil war highly unlikely was also making it very difficult to solve the government crisis. Finally, D'Alema said that in Italy's judgment, terrorism in Lebanon was mainly al-Qaeda related rather than linked to Hizballah, that many of the terrorists were neither Lebanese nor Palestinian, and that they were getting to Lebanon via Syria. ¶9. (C/NF) Comment: D'Alema, who can often be sarcastic or contentious in office calls, was in an unusually conciliatory mood, saying several times that Italy's views on most of ROME 00000071 004 OF 004 these issues were convergent with those of the U.S. He offered a very positive assessment of President Napolitano's December trip to the U.S., in which he participated and from which U.S.-Italy relations received a good bounce. The one point on which friction was, and will likely remain, palpable was Italy's sense that it was being wrongfully excluded from key discussions on Iran. End Comment. SPOGLI