GEN PETRAEUS DISCUSSES IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN WITH ITALIAN LEADERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 001573

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS NATO IT AF IZ IR LE PK

SUBJECT: GEN PETRAEUS DISCUSSES IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN WITH ITALIAN LEADERS

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: Italy's leaders warmly welcomed the December 9-10 visit of U.S. CENTCOM Commander, Gen. David Petraeus. In his meetings with Prime Minister Berlusconi, Defense Minister La Russa, Foreign Minister Frattini, and Italy's military leadership, Petraeus stressed that the situation in Afghanistan remains difficult, that more forces - including a possible 20,000 additional U.S. troops - were required and that the new U.S. Administration would probably request greater contributions from ISAF partners. Although there was no concrete Italian response, FM Frattini suggested that Carabinieri training efforts could be expanded and CHOD Camporini suggested that troop levels in Kosovo could be reduced to free up troops for Afghanistan. Petraeus thanked Italy for its leadership of the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon and its commitment to the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). Foreign Minister Frattini also highlighted an Italian proposal to host a Foreign Ministers' conference on stabilizing the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region during Italy's G-8 presidency next year. End Summary

Italy's Top Leaders Listen to Petraeus
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2. (U) U.S. CENTCOM Commander Gen. David Petraeus met with Italy's top leaders during his December 9-10 visit to Rome. In addition to his meetings with Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, Defense Minister Ignazio La Russa, and Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, Petraeus met with the Chief of Defense, Gen. Vincenzo Camporini, Army Chief Fabrizio Castagnetti, the Commandant of the Carabinieri, Gen. Gianfrancesco Siazzu, and most of Italy's top military leaders. He also delivered a standing-room only lecture on recent progress in Iraq at the Center for American Studies in downtown Rome, an event moderated by the Ambassador and former Prime Minister Giuliano Amato.

Afghanistan: U.S. Committing New Forces, Italy Mum
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3. (C) Gen. Petraeus told Italian interlocutors that he had always expected Afghanistan to be ""the longest campaign of the long war."" He noted that the security situation had deteriorated over the last year and that, as a result, the legitimacy and credibility of the Kabul government had been badly tarnished. The decision to give Gen. McKiernan responsibility for both ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) had created the potential for greater unity of effort in Afghanistan. He also observed that the expansion of violence on the Pakistan side of the border, including attacks on ISAF and Afghan National Army supply convoys in Peshawar, made the overall situation more difficult. Petraeus noted that the U.S. was sending an additional brigade combat team to Afghanistan imminently and that this was the first part of the deployment of perhaps as many as 20,000 additional U.S. forces. He noted that President-elect Obama had focused on Afghanistan heavily during the campaign and that it was reasonable for NATO Allies to expect a request for them to contribute more as well. He encouraged Italy to look particularly at providing additional Carabinieri, CIMIC, and Guardia di Finanza (Financial Police) forces in addition to regular troops.


4. (C) None of the Italian interlocutors responded directly to Petraeus on increasing Italy's contribution. Foreign Minister Frattini noted that the current financial crisis had further eroded Italy's strapped defense budget and that Defense Minister La Russa was scrambling to make cuts and to save critical missions. CHOD Camporini noted that Italy had eliminated geographic caveats on Italian troops in ISAF, was in the process of standing up a battle group in Farah, fielding three additional Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) in addition to the four already deployed, moving two C-27J aircraft to Herat, and had deployed the first two of four Tornado aircraft to Mazar i Sharif. Camporini and Army Staff Chief Castagnetti both noted that the Tornados were capable of dropping laser guided munitions but had been sent to Afghanistan - for now -- to conduct reconnaissance missions only. Camporini complained that Italy was under pressure -- particularly by the UK -- to go beyond the counter narcotics tasks agreed to at NATO. Petraeus responded that addressing the narcotics issue and disrupting funding was critical to ""cutting off the oxygen"" that fuels the insurgency.


5. (C) Frattini noted that he had received a very discouraging report from the Italian UN Ambassador on the Security Council trip to Afghanistan and was troubled by limited prospects for a comprehensive political solution. The Foreign Minister also floated the idea of the Carabinieri expanding their role in the training of Afghan police forces, along the lines of its program in NTM-I in Iraq (Note: Italy currently has 34 Carabinieri training the elite Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) in Adraskan and has shown interest in expanding training to include all of Afghanistan rather than just Regional Command West). Gen. Petraeus welcomed the idea. IT Army Chief LTGEN Fabrizio Castagnetti characterized EUPOL Afghan Police training efforts as a ""miserable failure"", specifically characterizing German efforts as ""pouring money into a program that doesn't work"".

Pakistan: Fundamentalists ""Existential Threat""
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6. (C) Petraeus characterized the Mumbai attacks as a ""9/11 moment"" for Pakistan. The Zardari government now must contend with fact that the fundamentalist movements Pakistan once nurtured and harbored now represent an existential threat to Pakistan that constitutes a greater threat than the one posed by India. He added that Pakistan's economy was also nearing collapse, and that it had been down to three weeks of foreign exchange before the IMF bridge loan. Berlusconi told Petraeus that he had talked to President Zardari at the request of India's PM Singh and had reinforced the need to crack down on Pakistan's indigenous Taliban. Berlusconi recounted that Musharraf had once told him that ""he closed an eye"" to keep the peace and now Pakistan was reaping the consequences of that choice. Berlusconi advocated pushing international financial institutions to help Pakistan but only on condition that the GOP take serious action against terrorists and extremist groups on its soil.

G-8 Conference on Pakistan-Afghanistan
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7. (C) Frattini highlighted the Italian proposal to host a ministerial-level conference on stabilizing the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region as part of its presidency of the G-8. He added that he plans to invite foreign ministers from regional powers, India. Egypt, the Gulf States, and China, in addition to G-8 and Afghan and Pakistani leaders to the meeting, currently slated for late June 2009, probably on the margins of the June 26 G-8 Foreign Ministerial in Trieste. He noted that he had received positive feedback on the idea, including from Pakistani and Afghan officials. Frattini noted that he was wrestling with the idea of including Iran in the event and was eager to talk to the new U.S. Administration before making a decision. Petraeus encouraged the Foreign Minister to talk to the incoming administration as soon as possible to ensure that this was compatible with our approach.

Iraq: Learning the Right Lessons
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8. (U) Gen. Petraeus reported that in Iraq the full spectrum surge - troops plus civilian capabilities - had resulted in an over 90 per cent drop in violence to levels not seen since 2003. But he characterized the current situation in Iraq as remaining fragile and reversible. He thanked the GOI for its enduring support in Iraq - singling out the work of the Italian Army and Carabinieri in NTM-I and that of Anna Prouse, the Italian head of the PRT-equivalent in Dhi Qar Province. Petraeus underscored that two critical elements to the progress in Iraq were adequate resources to conduct counterinsurgency operations (and especially to hold areas that have been cleared) and keeping up the military pressure on the insurgent groups. He noted that because of the challenges of terrain, logistics, and insurgent safehavens in Pakistan, Afghanistan would be a different and, perhaps, more difficult challenge.

Iran: Changing the Regional Equation
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9. (C) Prime Minister Berlusconi told Petraeus that Italy seeks to maintain good relations with most countries so that it can serve as an intermediary and a bridge. He noted that Italian companies operating in Iran provided him with both information and leverage on Iranian actions. Petraeus argued - and Berlusconi and Frattini agreed - that Iran was seeking to become a regional hegemonic power and was pumping its money and resources into Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan to try to wield greater influence. Petraeus noted that the Quds Force, working directly for Supreme leader Khamenei, managed Iranian policy towards Iraq, western Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza, not President Ahmadinejad. So modifying Iran's behavior depended on presenting the Iranians with a new reality on their western border. He noted that the UAE alone had a larger and more capable air force than Iran and that the key was to push for a more uniform front - integrated air defense in the Gulf, greater Arab solidarity in their approaches to Iraq, etc. - to change Iran's decision calculus.

Syria: Undermining Iranian Influence
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10. (C) Petraeus argued that wresting Syria from Iran's influence was critical to an enduring solution in Lebanon and also to modifying Iranian behavior in a substantial way. He argued that Iran continued to buy its influence in Syria; Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, could easily outspend the Iranians in Syria and undercut Iran's hold. Petraeus noted Syrian officials were well aware of the activities of Al Qaeda for foreign fighter facilitators on their soil and added that the 90 percent drop in the numbers of fighters and suicide bombers entering Iraq was thanks to actions by governments in North Africa and the Region, and was not due primarily to any Syrian efforts. Claiming that Italy had lukewarm relations with Syria, Berlusconi told Petraeus that he believed President Assad's wife might be a positive influence. The Prime Minister said that he had sent his wife on a cultural trip to Syria to meet with her and that his wife found her ""balanced and positive.""

Lebanon: Good Job on Sensitive Mission, but significant problems remain
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11. (U) On Lebanon, Petraeus thanked the Italians for their leadership of UNIFIL and praised the Italian commander, General Graziano, for running an effective operation. Gen. Camporini noted that UNIFIL's operations had been both praised and criticized by both sides so he knew it was doing its job. However, IT Army Chief LTGEN Castagnetti characterized UNIFIL Rules of Engagement (ROE) regarding weapons searches and seizures as ""strict"", which did not meet the expectations of some Italian politicians who want a more robust search and seizure effort. Additionally, Castagnetti lamented the lack of synergy in UNIFIL security sector reform and that there was no common effort among UNIFIL members to support the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Looking for More Troops
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12. (C) Chief of Defense Camporini told Petraeus that it was time to reexamine commitments in Kosovo. While the issues are not settled there, Camporini argued that the current military presence was probably excessive. The 16,000 NATO troops in Kosovo are an enormous force and he argued that an over-the-horizon battle group would be a significant deterrent. He argued - and Petraeus agreed - that these forces could be reduced to free up more troops for Afghanistan. Comparing the forces committed in UNIFIL with those under ISAF, Camporini noted that if they had the same troop-to-territory ratio in Lebanon that Italian forces had in western Afghanistan, Italy would have 22 troops in southern Lebanon, not 2,200. The Chief of Defense noted that in the recent defense review, the General Staff had pegged its ""level of ambition"" at deploying 12,000 troops on overseas missions at any one time. Unfortunately, they have only been given funding to keep the current level - about 8,000 - in the field.

Comment
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13. (C) Italy's leadership was mostly in listening mode, eagerly looking for indications of any change of direction by the incoming Administration but also looking for ideas on how -- and if -- to use lessons from the U.S. surge in Iraq to turn around what is perceived as an increasingly negative situation in Afghanistan. As Italy's economic malaise becomes more acute, all government budgets are being scrutinized and slashed. Apparent cuts to the MOD budget have left military leaders with the unpalatable choice of cutting investment and infrastructure in order to maintain current missions. The Berlusconi government has also been highly resistant to pressure for greater contributions in Afghanistan, arguing that Italy, as the sixth-largest ISAF contributor, has done enough or repackaging troop commitments made during the final days of the Prodi government as ""new"" contributions.


14. (C) Petraeus' Italian military interlocutors, however, gave clear indications that they feel their troop levels in Afghanistan are too low relative to those of Kosovo. If, as CHOD Camporini suggested, Italy is capable (funding and political will permitting) of deploying an additional 4,000 troops abroad, there should be some room to negotiate further Italian troop increases for ISAF. (Note: During the Petraeus visit, MOD La Russa announced that he would seek Parliamentary consent for a temporary increase of up to 600 additional troops in Afghanistan in 2009, and the Cabinet forwarded to Parliament a decree with this request the following week). The GOI may be engaged in an exercise in advanced expectation management to deter the incoming U.S. Administration from pushing too hard and too publicly for more forces, or it may be holding back so that the GOI has something new to offer after January 20. What Italy eventually provides, however, may prove minor indeed.


15. (U) General Petraeus has cleared this message.
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