ITALIANS TELL DAS HALE LEBANON HAS MADE MAJOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001514

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC LE IS SY IT
SUBJECT: ITALIANS TELL DAS HALE LEBANON HAS MADE MAJOR
PROGRESS

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Classified By: Barbara A. Leaf, Political Minister Counselor, for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Begin Summary: In a Dec. 2 meeting in Rome with NEA
DAS David Hale, MFA DG for the Middle East Ragaglini said the
GOI thought Lebanon had come a long way since the end of
August 2006, and that UNIFIL had played a crucial role in
bringing stability and calm to the south, given the political
and operational constraints it faced. Ragaglini reviewed GOI
efforts over the previous summer to encourage the GOI toward
direct negotiations with Israel, but said the Lebanese
leadership remained reluctant, given its own sense of
relative weakness and its fear that Israel would immediately
put on the table the politically un-doable - dismantling
Hizballah. He underlined Rome,s belief that USG direct
engagement in mediating Israeli-Syrian talks remained crucial
to prospects for progress there, and therefore for
Israeli-Lebanese talks. Asked directly by DAS Hale whether
the EU intended, as we had heard, to move to sign an
association agreement with Damascus in mid-December,
Ragaglini evinced no knowledge of such, while suggesting,
somewhat disingenuously, that if that were the case, French
pressure might be to blame. He took on board DAS Hale,s
message that the US and EU needed to jointly keep pressure on
Syria, and that we must collectively avoid giving the
Lebanese any sense that we had abandoned our strategy for
ensuring a free and sovereign Lebanon. Responding to DAS
Hale,s concern about smuggling across the Syrian border and
the perception that risk-averse UNIFIL units turned a blind
eye to certain Hezballah operations, Ragaglini cited
UNIFIL,s limits as well as the fact that a Syrian move to
fully control the border would be a political, not technical,
decision that would only come about as a result of progress
in talks with Israel. End Summary.

Not Perfect, But Lebanon Has Come a Long Way Since August 2006
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2. (C) MFA DG for the Middle East Caesare Ragaglini told NEA
DAS David Hale during December 2 consultations in Rome that
all things considered Lebanon had made good progress since
the end of August 2006, when virtually no institutions or
figures enjoyed wide credibility and a lengthy crisis had
ensued over the departure of the President. Credible
institutions now functioned, albeit in a Lebanese way, not a
U.S. or Italian way. In response to DAS Hale,s comment that
one problem with the unity government was that Israeli
leaders now held it wholly responsible for the resistance,
Ragaglini said disarmament would be a lengthy political
process. It was not a job for the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF),and not a single Lebanese thought in terms of
disarming Hezballah. Terming Lebanon a country where no one
believed the rules of democracy applied to him, Ragagliani
said such a fractured country inevitably required painful,
slow compromises; moreover, the regional context profoundly
impacted the domestic situation.

Ghajar/Lebanese-Israeli Talks
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3. (C) Commenting that the Israelis believed they "don,t
have to give anything away for free," Ragaglini suggested
Israel should nonetheless make a gesture. He said there was
"nothing new" about Israel evacuating from the Ghajar area,
that it was not a disputed zone; if we could get Israel to
agree to the UNIFIL plan it would be an important signal;
alternatively, not doing so would give Hizballah further
ammunition. Moreover, he said, it was the simplest of all
the issues in that area to resolve; if it could not be, we
could not be hopeful in tackling the larger, more complex
ones. DAS Hale responded that Israel appeared ready to make
progress on the issue, but needed greater clarity from UNIFIL
and Lebanon on security arrangements down the road, following
a withdrawal. More importantly, once we got past Ghajar, and
in the event Syria moved into direct talks with Israel, we
would see an important opportunity for Lebanon to do the
same.

Italian Efforts to Push Lebanon Toward Direct Talks

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4. (C) Ragaglini reviewed GOI efforts the previous July to
persuade Lebanese leaders to begin thinking in terms of
direct talks with Israel. Ragaglini said he had argued to
Sinoria that if Lebanon engaged now, it would do so as a
sovereign nation looking out for its own interests. While
Siniora had taken refuge in an argument that all
Lebanese-Israeli issues could be resolved by simple
application of UNSC resolutions, Ragaglini said it was clear
that the Lebanese feared that any agreement to engage
directly with Israel would see Israel immediately putting on
the table disarmament of Hizballah, a non-starter for any
Lebanese government. To Hale,s comment that in any case
Syrian-Israeli talks would not be able to go much further
without tacking that issue, Ragaglini responded that
everything ultimately hinged on direct USG engagement - "they
(Syria) want you in the game."

EU-Syria Association Agreement?
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5. (C) Ragaglini demurred when DAS Hale asked directly
whether reports were true that the EU would move to initial
an Association Agreement by mid-December. Side-stepping the
question by suggesting there was still much work to be done
to review the text, Ragaglini nonetheless said that "if
true," it was conceivably a result of French pressure to
sign. He took on board without comment DAS Hale,s message
that it was critical that we jointly continued to pressure
Syria, and that all positive moves be conditioned on Syrian
progress. We needed to continue to reassure March 14, in
particular in this period leading up to parliamentary
elections, that any direct engagement with Syria would not
come at the expense of Lebanese sovereignty. While we were
likely to see a post-election government not much different
than the current one, we did not want something worse; a
muddled message to March 14 could boomerang, encouraging the
wrong kind of political accommodations, lessening Lebanese
support for 1701, and jeopardizing our ability to provide
enhanced support to the LAF.

Who Is Supporting the Salafists?
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6. (C) DAS Hale commented that we were concerned by reports
of funding being channeled to Salafist elements from various
Sunni sources, including, according to some accounts, ones in
Saudi Arabia. Ragaglini responded that the GOI had seen
evidence to suggest possible Hariri support for these
fighters.


UNIFIL
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7. (C) In response to DAS Hale,s question, Ragaglini said
that given the political and operational constraints under
which it operated, UNIFIL had played a crucial, positive role
in ensuring calm and stability, especially in southern
Lebanon. While no one could pretend the south was
weapon-free, Hizballah did not, he asserted, have the
armaments it held prior to July 2006. DAS Hale recognized
Italian UNIFIL commander Grazioli,s accomplishments, but
noted widespread frustration with continued smuggling from
Syria. He also underlined the perception that many UNIFIL
units looked the other way when Hizballah conducted certain
operations, preferring stability and calm over a risky
confrontation. He termed the German mission in the north a
failure. While the US would not seek an expanded mission for
UNIFIL, we would fine-tune our capacity-building with the
Lebanese and work on further motivating the Syrians to do
their part. Ragaglini acknowledged Hale,s points on
smuggling, but said that smuggling was a way of life on the
border, and both geography and limited resources for UNIFIL
made real border security a difficult goal. More to the
point, any Syrian move to fully secure the border would be a
political one, not technical, which would only come as a
result of progress with Israel, which ultimately depended on
USG engagement. Hale took the point, but said it was

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nonetheless critical that we not collectively act as if that
were the case, as any suggestion that we were abandoning our
efforts on that front would have undesirable consequences.


8. (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS David Hale
SPOGLI