ITALIANS TELL DAS HALE LEBANON HAS MADE MAJOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001514 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC LE IS SY IT SUBJECT: ITALIANS TELL DAS HALE LEBANON HAS MADE MAJOR PROGRESS ROME 00001514 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Barbara A. Leaf, Political Minister Counselor, for reaso ns 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Begin Summary: In a Dec. 2 meeting in Rome with NEA DAS David Hale, MFA DG for the Middle East Ragaglini said the GOI thought Lebanon had come a long way since the end of August 2006, and that UNIFIL had played a crucial role in bringing stability and calm to the south, given the political and operational constraints it faced. Ragaglini reviewed GOI efforts over the previous summer to encourage the GOI toward direct negotiations with Israel, but said the Lebanese leadership remained reluctant, given its own sense of relative weakness and its fear that Israel would immediately put on the table the politically un-doable - dismantling Hizballah. He underlined Rome,s belief that USG direct engagement in mediating Israeli-Syrian talks remained crucial to prospects for progress there, and therefore for Israeli-Lebanese talks. Asked directly by DAS Hale whether the EU intended, as we had heard, to move to sign an association agreement with Damascus in mid-December, Ragaglini evinced no knowledge of such, while suggesting, somewhat disingenuously, that if that were the case, French pressure might be to blame. He took on board DAS Hale,s message that the US and EU needed to jointly keep pressure on Syria, and that we must collectively avoid giving the Lebanese any sense that we had abandoned our strategy for ensuring a free and sovereign Lebanon. Responding to DAS Hale,s concern about smuggling across the Syrian border and the perception that risk-averse UNIFIL units turned a blind eye to certain Hezballah operations, Ragaglini cited UNIFIL,s limits as well as the fact that a Syrian move to fully control the border would be a political, not technical, decision that would only come about as a result of progress in talks with Israel. End Summary. Not Perfect, But Lebanon Has Come a Long Way Since August 2006 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) MFA DG for the Middle East Caesare Ragaglini told NEA DAS David Hale during December 2 consultations in Rome that all things considered Lebanon had made good progress since the end of August 2006, when virtually no institutions or figures enjoyed wide credibility and a lengthy crisis had ensued over the departure of the President. Credible institutions now functioned, albeit in a Lebanese way, not a U.S. or Italian way. In response to DAS Hale,s comment that one problem with the unity government was that Israeli leaders now held it wholly responsible for the resistance, Ragaglini said disarmament would be a lengthy political process. It was not a job for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),and not a single Lebanese thought in terms of disarming Hezballah. Terming Lebanon a country where no one believed the rules of democracy applied to him, Ragagliani said such a fractured country inevitably required painful, slow compromises; moreover, the regional context profoundly impacted the domestic situation. Ghajar/Lebanese-Israeli Talks - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Commenting that the Israelis believed they "don,t have to give anything away for free," Ragaglini suggested Israel should nonetheless make a gesture. He said there was "nothing new" about Israel evacuating from the Ghajar area, that it was not a disputed zone; if we could get Israel to agree to the UNIFIL plan it would be an important signal; alternatively, not doing so would give Hizballah further ammunition. Moreover, he said, it was the simplest of all the issues in that area to resolve; if it could not be, we could not be hopeful in tackling the larger, more complex ones. DAS Hale responded that Israel appeared ready to make progress on the issue, but needed greater clarity from UNIFIL and Lebanon on security arrangements down the road, following a withdrawal. More importantly, once we got past Ghajar, and in the event Syria moved into direct talks with Israel, we would see an important opportunity for Lebanon to do the same. Italian Efforts to Push Lebanon Toward Direct Talks ROME 00001514 002.2 OF 003 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Ragaglini reviewed GOI efforts the previous July to persuade Lebanese leaders to begin thinking in terms of direct talks with Israel. Ragaglini said he had argued to Sinoria that if Lebanon engaged now, it would do so as a sovereign nation looking out for its own interests. While Siniora had taken refuge in an argument that all Lebanese-Israeli issues could be resolved by simple application of UNSC resolutions, Ragaglini said it was clear that the Lebanese feared that any agreement to engage directly with Israel would see Israel immediately putting on the table disarmament of Hizballah, a non-starter for any Lebanese government. To Hale,s comment that in any case Syrian-Israeli talks would not be able to go much further without tacking that issue, Ragaglini responded that everything ultimately hinged on direct USG engagement - "they (Syria) want you in the game." EU-Syria Association Agreement? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Ragaglini demurred when DAS Hale asked directly whether reports were true that the EU would move to initial an Association Agreement by mid-December. Side-stepping the question by suggesting there was still much work to be done to review the text, Ragaglini nonetheless said that "if true," it was conceivably a result of French pressure to sign. He took on board without comment DAS Hale,s message that it was critical that we jointly continued to pressure Syria, and that all positive moves be conditioned on Syrian progress. We needed to continue to reassure March 14, in particular in this period leading up to parliamentary elections, that any direct engagement with Syria would not come at the expense of Lebanese sovereignty. While we were likely to see a post-election government not much different than the current one, we did not want something worse; a muddled message to March 14 could boomerang, encouraging the wrong kind of political accommodations, lessening Lebanese support for 1701, and jeopardizing our ability to provide enhanced support to the LAF. Who Is Supporting the Salafists? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) DAS Hale commented that we were concerned by reports of funding being channeled to Salafist elements from various Sunni sources, including, according to some accounts, ones in Saudi Arabia. Ragaglini responded that the GOI had seen evidence to suggest possible Hariri support for these fighters. UNIFIL - - - - ¶7. (C) In response to DAS Hale,s question, Ragaglini said that given the political and operational constraints under which it operated, UNIFIL had played a crucial, positive role in ensuring calm and stability, especially in southern Lebanon. While no one could pretend the south was weapon-free, Hizballah did not, he asserted, have the armaments it held prior to July 2006. DAS Hale recognized Italian UNIFIL commander Grazioli,s accomplishments, but noted widespread frustration with continued smuggling from Syria. He also underlined the perception that many UNIFIL units looked the other way when Hizballah conducted certain operations, preferring stability and calm over a risky confrontation. He termed the German mission in the north a failure. While the US would not seek an expanded mission for UNIFIL, we would fine-tune our capacity-building with the Lebanese and work on further motivating the Syrians to do their part. Ragaglini acknowledged Hale,s points on smuggling, but said that smuggling was a way of life on the border, and both geography and limited resources for UNIFIL made real border security a difficult goal. More to the point, any Syrian move to fully secure the border would be a political one, not technical, which would only come as a result of progress with Israel, which ultimately depended on USG engagement. Hale took the point, but said it was ROME 00001514 003.4 OF 003 nonetheless critical that we not collectively act as if that were the case, as any suggestion that we were abandoning our efforts on that front would have undesirable consequences. ¶8. (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS David Hale SPOGLI