MEDVEDEV SECURITY PLAN GETS AN ITALIAN ROLLOUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001358 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO RS IT SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV SECURITY PLAN GETS AN ITALIAN ROLLOUT REF: ROME 1345 ROME 00001358 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Barbara A. Leaf, Acting DCM, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) A November 5 op-ed in the Italian journal Il Riformista by FM Frattini commenting on Medvedev's proposal for a new security architecture in Europe culminates a several-month-long initiative by high profile Italian officials on both sides of the political divide to support the Russian initiative. Since July, President Napolitano, Member of Parliament and Shadow Foreign Minister Fassino and MFA Policy Planning Director Massari have either expressed open support for the Medvedev plan or have presented identical ideas as having been produced internally. Despite Italian denials, this appears to be an orchestrated campaign to lay the groundwork for eventual Italian endorsement of Medvedev's plan once the latter becomes Official. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On November 5, the day before departing to Moscow for the annual Italian-Russian Summit, FM Frattini penned an op-ed in left-leaning Il Riformista calling for the adoption of a new European security architecture in Europe and noting that the Medvedev security proposal merited close attention. (A copy of the unofficial translation of the op-ed emailed to EUR/WE.) In the article, Frattini rejected calls by "those who rigidly maintain a policy of 'no business as usual'" and added that Italy was among the group that advocated dialogue as an indispensable tool in achieving positive results. Frattini endorsed Russian proposals for consultation on NATO expansion, Russian involvement in security discussions with Central Asian and Caucasus countries, Russian WTO membership, and an immediate resumption negotiations on the EU-Russia partnership agreement. Frattini added that this proposal should be raised at the G8 summit next year. ¶3. (C) Frattini's op-ed culminates a three month long procession of statements of support or identical proposals put forth by Italian officials, echoed by politicians from both ends of the political spectrum. During a July visit to Moscow, President Napolitano stated that he would be personally interested in studying Medvedev's security proposal. His office told us later that Napolitano had added the word "personally" to avoid the impression that the Berlusconi government was "endorsing" the idea (Napolitano hails from a different party than Berlusconi). When questioned about Napolitano's comments at the time, Frattini told the Ambassador that no specific proposal had been discussed and that the GOI would not consider any idea that would weaken NATO's prominence in Italy's security policy. ¶4. (C) On August 7, Director of the MFA's Policy Planning Department Maurizio Massari wrote an op-ed in the Financial Times entitled "Russia Can Play a Vital Role in the West's Security." In the article Massari wrote that the EU, U.S., OSCE, NATO and Russia needed to form a new compact to jointly manage security threats in Central Asia, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region through the formation of a new Eurasian security charter. At the time, Massari insisted that the idea was his own and was not based on any similar Russian proposals. (Massari was the principal drafter of the MFA's long-term strategic planning document "Raporto 2020" in which he argued that Italy's energy dependence on Russia called for not simply a good relationship, but a privileged relationship with Russia.) ¶5. (C) On September 3, Piero Fassino, a member of Parliament from the opposition PD party and "shadow foreign minister", submitted an article to the Italian version of Foreign Affairs entitled, "A New 'Helsinki' to Keep Europe United". In the article Fassino noted that a policy of NATO expansion and containment had brought out Moscow's negative qualities and only a renewed effort to unite Russia and Europe under a single security umbrella would allow for a more stable Eurasian region. He added that it should be raised at the G8 next year. Fassino recently visited the Ambassador personally invite him to a November 12 presentation of his proposal and enlist his support for the initiative. When the Ambassador noted that the plan was identical to the Medvedev plan, Fassino demurred and noted that dialogue had long been a tenet of Italian foreign policy (reftel). (Post has coordinated with friendly embassies to pose tough questions during the question and answer period of ROME 00001358 002.2 OF 002 Fassino,s presentation on November 12.) ¶6. (C) Comment. Fassino and Massari's claims that their articles were independently produced ring hollow. Massari's thinly staffed office of 2 (even with the Russia Department's staff of 2) is not given to producing strategic pieces, particularly for publication. Fassino's foreign policy experts in his party told us that they were not consulted in the drafting process prior to circulation of his article. Additionally, it seems suspect that a virulently anti-Berlusconi opposition figure would arrive independently at the same conclusions that the Foreign Minister did, including the same recommendation that a new security architecture be raised for discussion at the G8. Likewise, the somewhat flustered assurances of Frattini,s chief of staff to us aside that the GOI was not endorsing a specific Russian proposal per se, the Frattini piece clearly led the reader to that conclusion. These incidents, as well as periodic parroting of the concept by lower-level right- and left-leaning politicians, has all the appearance of a Russian-inspired campaign to enlist Italy's support in laying the groundwork for an eventual rollout of the Medvedev plan. We would be particularly interested in other posts, impressions as to whether a similar PD campaign is underway in official or other circles, or whether, in this sense, too, Italy is "privileged" in the attention Russia is lavishing upon it. SPOGLI