Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08RIYADH728
2008-05-07 04:51:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:  

DHAHRAN EAC - 4/12/2008

Tags:  ASEC PTER AMGT CASC SA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRH #0728/01 1280451
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 070451Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8339
INFO RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 2387
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 9528
S E C R E T RIYADH 000728 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DHAHRAN SENDS
DEPT FOR P, M, CA, DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/DSS/OSAC,
DS/ICI/PII, DS/IP/OPO, S/CT, NEA/EX, NEA/ARP, SES-O, DS
COMMAND CENTER, INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2018
TAGS: ASEC PTER AMGT CASC SA
SUBJECT: DHAHRAN EAC - 4/12/2008

REF: A. RIYADH 633

B. SANAA 626

C. MANAMA 227

D. RIYADH 362

Classified By: Consul General John Kincannon, reasons 1.4 (d) and (g)

S E C R E T RIYADH 000728

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DHAHRAN SENDS
DEPT FOR P, M, CA, DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/DSS/OSAC,
DS/ICI/PII, DS/IP/OPO, S/CT, NEA/EX, NEA/ARP, SES-O, DS
COMMAND CENTER, INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2018
TAGS: ASEC PTER AMGT CASC SA
SUBJECT: DHAHRAN EAC - 4/12/2008

REF: A. RIYADH 633

B. SANAA 626

C. MANAMA 227

D. RIYADH 362

Classified By: Consul General John Kincannon, reasons 1.4 (d) and (g)


1. (U) NOTE: This cable is a retransmission since the
original cable did not appear to have been transmitted. END
NOTE.


2. (S/NF) On April 9, 2008, Consulate General Dhahran
convened an Emergency Action Committee meeting to discuss
proposals and threats described in REFTELS. In attendance
were the Consul General, RSO, RAO, MGTOFF, POLOFF, PAO, and
ARSO. The information was then reviewed on April 12, 2008
in light of REFTEL A.


3. (S/NF) The EAC initially discussed the recent decision
by EAC Sana'a to request ordered departure in light of
recent attacks in Yemen. The EAC agreed that the security
situation in Yemen was different from the current situation
in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia where ConGen
Dhahran is based, and determined that current security
measures were appropriate.


4. (S/NF) The EAC also discussed the recent reporting
stream concerning telephonic threats made to a number of
Embassies in the region as well as to various agencies in
the United States. RSO noted that updated bomb threat
report sheets had been distributed to all employees along
with instructions on how to use them, and noted that Post
had not received any phone calls or threats in relation to
REFTEL C to date.


5. (S/NF) The EAC then reviewed Riyadh's proposal in REFTEL
A for the return of adult family members and children under
the age of five to ConGen Dhahran. MGTOFF confirmed that
there were currently several Eligible Family Members (EFM)
already at Post working in the Consulate and that the
proposal would not significantly affect motorpool
operations. The EAC also noted that the International
Schools Group Dhahran Campus, which is located directly
adjacent to ConGen Dhahran, has a nursery available for
children under 5, and that the Saudi Aramco Main Camp,
located one mile from ConGen Dhahran, also has nursery and
pre-school options available to consulate employees. The
EAC determined the impact of allowing adult EFMs and
children under five back to Post would have a negligible
impact on security or management resources, but noted that
with a consular region consisting of nearly 14,000 American
Citizens, this change could affect the security procedures
of American businesses that operate in the Eastern
Province.


6. (S/NF) The EAC reviewed the initial proposal in REFTEL D
to allow for self-drive of unarmored and Privately Owned
Vehicles (POV) at Post. The EAC determined that the
proposal concerning POV usage should be reviewed at a later
date, but approved the provision allowing for self-drive of
armored vehicles between secure compounds. The EAC
approved, as proposed in REFTEL D, that employees whose
agency provides an armored vehicle should be allowed to
self-drive between secured compounds provided strict
security guidelines were met.


7. (S/NF) These security guidelines include requiring the
vehicle to have non-diplomatic "white" license plates and a
requirement that the driver have a valid Saudi driver's
license and have completed the DSTC-provided OT-610 Foreign
Affairs Counter Threat course (or DS-approved equivalent).
In addition, drivers would have to follow the strictest
guidelines to vary routes and times, and never leave the
vehicles unattended in non-secure areas. It was also
recommended, though not required, that the vehicles be
equipped with a Global Positioning System pre-loaded with
maps of the region to facilitate navigation. In essence,
drivers would be allowed to self-drive armored vehicles
between secure locations - primarily walled residential
compounds with host government security - within the
greater Dhahran area, in addition to the currently approved
exceptions allowing drivers to self-drive POVs to the
Aramco Main Camp and to Bahrain from the Consulate
Compound.


8. (S/NF) Based on the current threat condition, reporting
streams, availability of management and security resources,
and cooperative security presence of the local government
forces, the EAC agreeQwith Riyadh's proposal in REFTEL A
to allow adult EFMs and children under the age of five back
to Dhahran. The EAC also approves the proposal to allow
self-drive of armored vehicles as described in paragraphs 6
and 7.


9. (SBU) Point of contact for this cable is RSO Chris
Tremann, 966-3-330-3200 x 3028, tremannce@state.sgov.gov,
tremannc@state.gov.

(Approved:KINCANNON)
GFOELLER