TRIBES: A SILENT PLAYER IN MODERN-DAY SAUDI

C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 000368

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KISL SA
SUBJECT: TRIBES: A SILENT PLAYER IN MODERN-DAY SAUDI
FOREIGN POLICY

Classified By: Ambassador Ford Fraker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Traditionally seen as a domestic issue,
tribalism plays a key role in modern-day Saudi foreign
policy. Tribalism affects which conflicts and issues the
Saudi government (SAG) engages in, the extent of the SAG's
involvement, and with which side it chooses to align itself.
Despite the lack of tribalism within the ruling Al Saud
family, the basis of its establishment -- namely the joining
together of tribes under a common nationalist banner --
dictates that the SAG strongly considers the interests of the
Kingdom's main tribes when engaging in any policy issue,
including foreign policy. Tribal interests in foreign policy
range from the support and protection of Saudi foreign
fighters in regional conflicts to citizenship issues and
financial contributions based upon kinship with foreign
countries' tribes or tribal structure. END SUMMARY.

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SAG Struggle: Saudi Foreign Fighters and Tribes
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2. (C) Many foreign fighters in international, jihadist
insurgencies come from Saudi Arabia. Most of these fighters
have tribal backgrounds, which affects loyalty and
recruitment tactics, and therefore, the stability of the SAG.
This issue is currently most prevalent in Iraq, and it is
one of the factors affecting the bilateral relations between
the SAG and Iraqi government. Many of the Saudi foreign
fighters in Iraq hail from tribes in Buraida, Qassim, or
Ha'il-- specifically, the Shammari, Otaibi, Shahri, and
Motairi tribes. Media reports indicate that recruitment of
foreign fighters is largely through familial -- tribal --
relations, which would be only natural given the nature and
cohesion of tribes. Many of the Saudi foreign fighters claim
to be followers of Salafi Jihadism, which includes among its
tenets waging war against the "infidel."


3. (C) This form of Salafism is extremist and became
anti-Saudi establishment due to the SAG's positive relations
with the West. As a result many Al-Qaeda members are
followers of these beliefs, and the SAG's response to these
followers affects foreign and domestic policy. These beliefs
are far more extreme than the conservative, yet puritanical
beliefs of Salafi thought or Wahabism, the official Muslim
sect of the Al Saud family and the only officially recognized
sect in Saudi Arabia.


4. (C) Despite the involvement of some tribal members in
jihad, prominent members of the Shammari and Otaibi tribes
told PolOff that the formal structure of tribal leadership is
not affected by the War on Terror generally, or specifically
by the war in Iraq. According to one of the Shammari tribal
members, tribal leaders only deal with internal tribal
strife. Terrorism is a crime, and therefore the
responsibility of the SAG, not the tribes. However, he added
that the war in Iraq affects the individual tribal members
because they consider "their tribal members in Iraq no
different than the ones residing in Saudi Arabia. Therefore,
destruction to them and their lands, no matter what the
reason, is painful and must be avenged."


5. (C) An Otaibi tribal member, who is also a SAG MFA
official, agreed with this sentiment, adding that, "The
tribes contribute greatly to the cause of foreign fighters,
but although the tribal members' hearts go out to their
brothers in Iraq, there should not be violence." Throughout
the course of 2007 and early 2008, PolOff spoke with dozens
of tribal members, whose over-riding theme was the
unimportance of geographic boundaries to the tribes. This
attitude affects the tribes' outlook on foreign policy
issues, especially on Iraq.


6. (C) Saudi foreign fighters are also an issue with
Saudi-Russian relations. Beginning in 2003 with the visit of
then-Crown Prince Abdullah to Moscow, the SAG has
dramatically improved relations with Russia. However,
tensions still arise in the bilateral relationship due to the
conflict in Chechnya and the traditional role of Saudi
foreign fighters there. One of the most notorious Saudi
fighters in Chechnya is Abu Al-Walid Al-Ghamdi, from the
Al-Ghamdi tribe, who has been leading Arab fighters there
since 2002. Many Al-Qaeda members hail from this tribe, one
of Saudi's largest tribes, including several involved in the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks as well as the May and
June 2003 terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia. The SAG has
refused to withdraw his Saudi citizenship, probably fearing
the internal repercussions of this bold move against such a
large tribe. Despite increased Saudi-Russian bilateral
relations over the past five years, the issue of Chechnya is
still one of concern, according to MFA officials. The SAG
continues to keep tribal issues in its sights, since key

Saudi tribes compose a majority of the foreign fighters,
while increasing its counter-terrorism efforts and working on
rebuilding and strengthening its relations with Russia-- an
important ally to Saudi Arabia on many fronts.


7. (C) Even in Lebanon, a country divided along sectarian
and ethnic, but not tribal lines, Saudi tribal policy plays a
role. According to the Damascus-based Al-Watan newspaper,
Saudi Arabia's international image is shaped by its
relationship with its tribes and its traditional tribal and
Salafi thought. This is apparent in its relations with Syria
and Lebanon. In summer 2007, during the fighting with
Al-Qaeda-inspired Fatah Al-Islam in the Nahr Al-Bared refugee
camp in northern Lebanon, many of the foreign fighters in the
camp were suspected of being Saudi citizens. Publicly, Saudi
Arabia repeatedly denied involvement of its government or
citizens in this conflict, however, mounting evidence
demonstrates Saudi citizen involvement.


8. (C) On February 24, 2008, the Saudi Gazette reported that
the Saudi Embassy in Lebanon identified the bodies of two
Saudi citizens who died during the fighting last year.
Another body was identified and repatriated to Riyadh in July

2007. Currently ten Saudis are under interrogation by
Lebanese authorities. Among the names of the deceased
fighters, several were from tribal, not religious-based
families, such as Obaid, a major tribe whose ancestors
settled in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan hundreds of years
ago. Interestingly, some of the fighters with "tribal" names
took on more "Islamic" names when they joined Fatah Al-Islam,
according to media sources.


9. (C) According to sources at the Arab States Department at
the MFA, tribes "officially are not a factor" in the SAG's
Lebanon policy. However, unofficially, tribes affect the
SAG's entire foreign policy. The SAG down-played media
reports of its citizens' involvement in the Nahr Al-Bared
camp and did not provide much public support to the Lebanese
Government during its fight. This contrasts starkly with the
SAG's current support and intense public, international
campaign to end the Lebanese political crisis, provide
financial assistance to its government, and end foreign
interference from Syria in Lebanon.


10. (C) In addition to sometimes turning a blind eye to
Saudi foreign fighters for tribal reasons, the SAG also uses
tribes to reintegrate the returned foreign fighters into
mainstream Saudi society. Under rehabilitation programs
sponsored by the Ministry of Interior (MOI),family members
and tribal leaders must accept responsibility for their
kinsmen in order for them to be released from prison. If the
detainee stops participation in the program, another tribal
member would have to take his place in prison. The SAG is
relying on the tribal structure as the main fabric in society
in terms of maintaining security in the Kingdom. The
importance of keeping the individual in line without
humiliating him is imperative for the SAG because any undue
duress suffered by a tribal member could spark the anger of
his entire tribe, turning them against the SAG.

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Tribal Culture: Kinship in Bilateral Relations
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11. (C) The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) bases much of its
cooperation on tribal ties since many of the tribes in the
Arabian peninsula span several GCC borders. The Head of the
GCC Department at the MFA, Abdullah al-Shamarani, told PolOff
on February 18 that tribes are "not discussed, but
understood" as part of the policy-making process in the GCC.
Further to this point, the Assistant Secretary General for
Political Affairs at the GCC headquarters in Riyadh
Abdulkarim Hamadi told PolOff that tribes play a "silent
role" in the relations among the GCC member states. The GCC
countries use their tribal culture to make common foreign
policy in line with their tribal interests on major issues,
such as citizenship policy. One major element of tribes is
cohesiveness of the tribal unit-- be it for protection,
promotion, or penalty-- and so the GCC countries avoid any
policies that might threaten tribal integrity.


12. (C) All of the GCC countries boast large expatriate
populations-- many of whom are Muslim and have lived in the
respective countries for decades and even generations.
Nevertheless, individual GCC countries have very restrictive
citizenship laws, usually only extending citizenship to other
GCC member states and spouses of GCC nationals. This policy
has come under much criticism, especially from the Arab
world, as many Arabs argue that the Gulf countries should
grant citizenship to the stateless Palestinian people.
Despite the GCC commitment to provide financial, social, and
political assistance to the Palestinian cause, their charity

stops at citizenship as, according to Hamadi, unofficially,
they want to protect the tribal cohesiveness and traditional
ways of rule that non-tribal Arabs could challenge.


13. (C) Leadership and cultural aspects also play a part in
GCC tribal politics, particularly as it concerns the SAG.
There are countless examples in the Saudi media-- the amount
of them increasing exponentially under the reign of King
Abdullah-- to demonstrate GCC-wide interaction with
individual cases of blood money, tribal poetry, and
negotiations amongst tribal leaders. One example involved a
2007 execution of a Shammari tribal member for murder of a
member of another, "lesser" tribe. Although the Islamic
court ultimately carried out his sentence, Shammari tribal
leaders from Qatar and Kuwait joined in the extensive public
and private domestic efforts-- which included negotiations,
poetry publications asking for forgiveness, and offers of
financial support-- to intervene on his behalf and stay the
execution. Royal family members also joined in on this
campaign, ignoring the crime of murder, with the aim of
supporting the existing tribal structure; however, all were
ultimately defeated by the Islamic legal system in the
Kingdom. One Shammari Saudi tribal interlocutor commented to
PolOff that the tribes "know no geographical boundaries," and
this trans-national nature is proving more evident in modern
times with websites linking the tribal communities
internationally, which enable broad support for individual
cases such as this.


14. (U) SAG involvement in bilateral relations outside of
the GCC are also affected by the Kingdom's tribal culture.
Pakistan has a deeply-rooted tribal culture, and even though
its tribes are not related to the Saudi tribes, the common
traits of tribal cultures-- cohesion, loyalty, protection,
etc-- are shared by both governments and societies.
Influenced by this commonality, there seems to be a "soft
spot" for Pakistan in SAG foreign policy. Although their
close historical ties date back decades and span a range of
issues, an example of tribal influence in the SAG's policy is
its support for former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.



15. (C) In 2000 the SAG agreed to take Sharif into exile
despite his conviction for corruption and other crimes by the
Pakistani Supreme Court. Many media commentaries have cited
"personal linkages" and "tribal mindsets and relations" as
the reasons for such action being taken by both governments.
Political Counselor Zahid Raza at the Pakistan Embassy in
Riyadh told PolOff on January 21 that tribal mindsets
"certainly influence" the bilateral relationship. According
to the Raza, the broad relationship shows "understanding of
the tribal culture and sensitivities" in both countries.
Specifically as it relates to Sharif, the SAG returned Sharif
to Pakistan less than two months prior to the scheduled
presidential elections. According to the Pakistan Embassy
and working level contacts at the MFA, Sharif's return was
timed to exert his moderate influence in the uncontrolled
tribal areas that were "exercising too much extremism and
violence" on the border with Afghanistan prior to the
elections. The SAG, understanding how the tribal structure
works, wanted to assist the Pakistani government and help
resolve the problem before it got out of control. On the eve
of Sharif's return to Pakistan, King Abdullah stated in a
farewell dinner that, "His heart beats with the people of
Pakistan and he has great love for the brotherly country" --
a clear testament to the "soft spot" that the SAG holds for
Pakistan.


16. (U) In the past year, the SAG has played an increasing
leadership role in the region, working to resolve conflicts
throughout the Arab world. In mid-September 2007, the SAG
attempted to mediate the Somalia crisis-- a war-torn Arab
League country, which has been without a government for over
seventeen years. The SAG brought several key Somali leaders
to Jeddah to finalize peace negotiations and sign a
"landmark" agreement. However, this negotiation -- the
approximately fifteenth attempt for Somalis, depending on how
it is counted -- only involved the historical tribal rivals
(also referred to as clan leaders) who compose the current
Transitional National Government. It did not involve the
Islamist-led opposition leaders who held their own conference
in Asmara the week earlier. Without the opposition's
presence or acquiescence, the SAG proclaimed victory at the
signing of this peace agreement. The Saudi media noted the
presence of the tribal members, both as participants and the
over four-hundred male and female observers, throughout the
conference, as well as the absence of the Islamist
opposition. The SAG's decision to support the tribal forces
of Somalia over the Islamist-led opposition is a clear
example of the importance of tribes in Saudi foreign policy.


17. (U) One of the biggest foreign policy issues for the SAG

is its bilateral relationship with Yemen. For decades, the
SAG and Government of Yemen (GOY) have had boundary disputes
that caused tension between tribes residing on both sides of
the border. In 2003, Saudi Arabia attempted to build a fence
along the border with Yemen, claiming the need to prevent
smuggling of weapons and drugs. However, the Yemeni tribes
located near the Saudi border are generally in opposition to
the Yemeni government. As a result, they often cross into
Saudi Arabia to seek support for their insurrection.
Moreover, the GOY is ineffective at protecting the border
with Saudi Arabia, which makes negotiations between the two
countries on this issue largely unhelpful. The border fence
project was eventually abandoned due to intense disagreements
with the Yemeni tribes on the border resulting in the death
of dozens of Saudi border guards and tribesmen, and smuggling
still remains a problem today.


18. (U) According to Yemeni media sources, the SAG still
financially supports Yemeni tribal chieftains in order to
ensure their loyalty and tractability as much as possible.
An August 2007 article from the Yemen Times stated, "If the
rulers of Sana'a do not succeed in improving law, order, and
their responsibility on the border, Saudi Arabia can open the
door for naturalization of Yemeni families and tribes." This
possibility has been explored by the SAG, usually to the
dismay of the local Saudi population. In late December 2007,
an Arabic-language website dedicated to Saudi news and issues
of concern to Ismailis in Najran, published an article titled
"Despite Promises to End Resettlement, 'Secret' Document
Reveals Steps to Resettle New Yemeni Tribes in Najran."
According to the article, a letter signed by Najran's deputy
governor calls for "allowing members of the Yemeni tribe of
Yafi, who originally resided deep inside Yemeni territory, to
benefit from educational services, send their children to
Saudi schools, and be treated in Saudi hospitals pending
their acquisition of Saudi citizenship." The letter further
showed that Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayif bin Abdul
Aziz relied on the support of the Najran government to grant
this tribe the same status as other Yemeni tribes already
afforded these services and rights in Saudi Arabia.


19. (U) On February 18, 2008, a local NGO-type organization,
Human Rights First Society, distributed an article titled
"Saudi Shi,ites Oppose Plans to Settle Sunnis," referring to
the resettlement plans mentioned in the earlier article.
According to the 2008 report, the Ismaili Shi,ites of Najran
sent a letter to the governor of Najran province protesting
these plans. Also according to the article, "large
billboards signed in the name of Yemeni tribal leaders had
been erected to thank the local governor and senior Saudi
royals for funding some of the housing projects."


20. (C) COMMENT: Tribal politics plays a silent, but
critical role in Saudi foreign policy. The breadth of its
influences on bilateral relations extends from nations
outside the Arab world to the Kingdom's neighbors. The depth
of its importance in foreign policy reaches into heart of
Saudi Arabia, challenging domestic security and the stability
of the House of Saud leadership. Recognizing the role tribes
play in SAG bilateral relations will enhance understanding of
the Kingdom's foreign policy, now and in the future. END
COMMENT.
FRAKER