DHAHRAN EAC - 26 FEB 2008

S E C R E T RIYADH 000362

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DHAHRAN SENDS
DEPT FOR P, M, CA, DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/DSS/OSAC,
DS/ICI/PII, DS/IP/OPO, S/CT, NEA/EX, NEA/ARP, SES-O, DS
COMMAND CENTER, INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018
TAGS: ASEC PTER CASC AMGT SA
SUBJECT: DHAHRAN EAC - 26 FEB 2008

REF: A. RIYADH 286

B. RIYADH 2

C. IIR 1 656 7280 08

D. DS DAILY FEB 26 (PAGE 7)

Classified By: Consul General John Kincannon, reasons 1.4 (c) and (g)


1. (SBU) On 26 February 2008, Consulate General Dhahran
convened an full Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting to
discuss the ramifications of REFTEL A on ConGen Dhahran
operations and the current threat environment in the Eastern
Province of Saudi Arabia. In attendance were the CG, RSO,
FCS, ITC, POL, RAO, CONS, and PD. The core EAC reconvened on
2 March 2008 to review the threat information in REFTEL C.


2. (S/NF) RSO commenced the meeting by noting that although
the overall threat condition for Saudi Arabia had been
dropped from Charlie Plus to Charlie (REFTEL A),that there
were still regular reporting streams concerning threats in
the Eastern Province. The RSO discussed the current security
posture for the consulate, and the EAC agreed that no changes
were warranted concerning the physical security of the
consulate compound. RSO also noted that a request had been
made for a Surveillance Detection team (REFTEL B),and that
funding appeared imminent. RSO also noted that several
motorpool vehicles had been switched to non-diplomatic white
license plates and that a more rigorous program of enforcing
time and route variation had been implemented.


3. (S/NF) The EAC discussed the possibility of modifying the
vehicle policy for ConGen Dhahran, with a specific emphasis
on adjusting the aspects of the policy regarding use of
armored vehicles. The current policy requires the use of
armored vehicles for all travel within the Eastern Province
with three exceptions. Those exceptions are overland travel
to Riyadh on a case-by-case basis approved by RSOs Dhahran
and Riyadh, overland travel to Bahrain via the King Fahd
causeway, and travel to the Saudi Aramco Main Camp, located
one mile away.


4. (S/NF) The EAC reviewed the current restrictions and
proposed revising them to also allow travel in unarmored
vehicles between secure residential compounds and the
consulate compound. The EAC noted that the use of vehicles
could potentially increase the security posture for
individuals, since they would allow for more varied routes
and times. It would also decrease the amount of shuttle
traffic in Chevy Suburbans, which the EAC felt could also
decrease the consulate's visibility and increase security.
The EAC remarked that the farthest residence occupied by a
consulate direct-hire American was only five miles away (the
other two compounds are three and four miles away
respectively.)


5. (S/NF) The EAC agreed that for a direct-hire American to
drive off-compound that they would need to follow the
strictest personal safety and security rules. The drivers
must have a valid Saudi driver's license, they must have
completed the DSTC-offered OT-610 Foreign Affairs Counter
Threat course (or DS-approved equivalent),they must strictly
vary their routes and times, and they must drive vehicles
with non-diplomatic white plates. The EAC agreed that
vehicles, armored or unarmored, should not be left unattended
at non-secure locations. In addition, the EAC requested that
RSO and MGT provide an informational card for drivers to use
in the event of an accident.


6. (S/NF) The EAC concluded that the current threat condition
for Post of Charlie was appropriate and that the proposed
changes would allow for greater flexibility and increased
security for individuals living off-compound. While these
are currently proposed changes, RSO will continue to evaluate
the feasibility of implementing said changes in the Eastern
Province, work with MGT to ensure that appropriate mechanisms
are in place to support the changes, and brief the full EAC
at the next regularly scheduled EAC meeting, at which time
the full EAC may consider implementing the proposals with
concurrence from Riyadh.


7. (S/NF) The core EAC reconvened on 2 March 2008 to review
the threat information in REFTEL C. The EAC agreed with
DS/IP/ITA's assessment in REFTEL D and determined that Post's
security profile stance was appropriate for the information
available.


8. (SBU) ConGen Dhahran will continue to closely monitor all
threat information available, and Post's security posture
will be modified accordingly as circumstances dictated.

(Approved:KINCANNON)
FRAKER