UPDATED SAUDI VIEWS ON JCCIP IMPLEMENTATION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 001579 SIPDIS WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP, CENTCOM FOR POLAD, NAVCENT AND J5, DOE FOR KKOLEVAR AND WBRYAN, DEPARTMEMT FOR P, NEA, S/CT AND NEA/ARP E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018 TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET MARR MCAP MOPS OVP PGOV PREL PTER, SA SUBJECT: UPDATED SAUDI VIEWS ON JCCIP IMPLEMENTATION REF: A. RIYADH 1408 ¶B. RIYADH 1298 Classified By: Ambassador Ford M. Fraker for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY. The Ambassador met with Assistant Minister of Interior Prince Mohammed bin Nayif bin 'abd al-'Aziz (MBN) to discuss the next steps in implementation of the Joint Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Border Security (JCCIP). MBN reiterated the urgency posed by the threat of a terrorist attack against Saudi oil facilities. He made the same point earlier in the day to U/S Edelman. The Prince emphasized the Saudi desire to keep a single point of contact and single point of payment as the Saudis develop and fund JCCIP. Previously, the DCM met with MOI officials to discuss the structure of JCCIP and the Saudi request to reduce the initial number of working groups to three. MOI also proposed that JCCIP undertake work on cyber security, based on the Saudi assessment that the Kingdom is vulnerable in this regard. END SUMMARY. -------------- The Urgent Need for Progress -------------- ¶2. (S) On October 18, Ambassador Fraker met with Assistant Minister of Interior Prince Mohammed bin Nayif bin 'abd al-'Aziz (MBN) to discuss the next steps in implementing the Joint Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Border Security (JCCIP). MBN had met earlier in the day with DOD Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman (Septel) where MBN urged the USG to move quickly in assisting MOI stand up the Facilities Security Force (FSF). Both Ambassador Fraker and Ambassador Edelman underscored USG commitment to standing up the JCCIP. ¶3. (S) MBN reiterated to Ambassador Fraker the urgent need to address the real threat of a terrorist attack against Saudi oil facilities. There are 25 Tier 1 critical oil production-related sites in the Kingdom that are vulnerable to terrorist attack. A successful attack on any of these facilities would have an immediate, and devastating, impact on the global economy; e.g., 70% of Saudi oil (7 million barrels) flows through Abqaiq, which Al Qaeda unsuccessfully attacked in Feb, 2006. MBN noted that since then, the MOI has foiled several other plans to attack Saudi ARAMCO facilities. ¶4. (S) MBN noted that his grandfather King Abdulaziz had always placed high value on his strategic relationship with the United Sates and had advised his sons to do likewise. After the Abqaiq attack in 2006, the Saudi government had realized that it must do much more to protect its critical infrastructure which was in fact critical to both the Saudi and global economies. MBN said he had been tasked by his superiors to meet these new security requirements. He had been given a budget and the authority to recruit 35,000 men to carry out this project. As his grandfather had advised, he had turned to the United States for help. ¶5. (S) Now nearly two years after their initial request, little has been achieved. Until recently, the Prince said he and the senior leadership of the MOI had doubted American interest in our commitment to JCCIP. Since his meetings with CENTCOM J5 MG John Allardice on September 11 in Jeddah (Reftel A),he now believes the USG is indeed serious, but stressed the need to show progress to the Kingdom's senior leaders, including his father, the Minister of Interior, and his uncle, the King. RIYADH 00001579 002 OF 003 -------------- The Need for Efficiency -------------- ¶6. (S) The Ambassador again noted to MBN that JCCIP implementation would be most effective if a U.S. company was utilized for the Command and Control portion of the Border Guard Modernization Project since this would facilitate inter-operability and ease working relationships with USG-led JCCIP WGs. Raytheon's bid for the Command/ Control/ Communications/ Computer/ Intelligence (C4I) contract for the Saudi Border Guard Development Program remains pending (Reftel A). MBN responded that the SAG's decision on the company selected will be done "by the book" and based on who offers the best systems for the best price. ¶7. (S) MBN then repeated the Saudi desire for a single point of contact with the USG for JCCIP, as well as a single point of payment for USG services to the MOI. Which he said was the "only way" this could work. ¶8. (S) Earlier this month, DCM had a working-level meeting with Major General Dr. Sa'ad al-Jabri, Special Advisor to MBN to discuss an improved structure for the JCCIP Working Groups. Al-Jabri proposed that JCCIP should initially consist of only three working groups: JWG for Industrial Security, JWG for Facilities Security Force and JWG for Internal Security. -------------- JWG for Industrial Security -------------- ¶9. (S) Al-Jabri explained that the Joint Working Group on Industrial Security (JWG/IS) would continue with the assistance of the Department of Energy provided under the Joint Working Group Memorandum of Understanding signed in December 2006. Al-Jabri believed JWG/IS should be a permanent group of U.S. and Saudi personnel working jointly in Riyadh. This vision would require both the U.S. and Saudi sides to increase their substantive staffs assigned to JCCIP. MOI is identifying counterparts for U.S. personnel. MOI also is trying to locate housing and office space on the Diplomatic Quarter for all JWGs. Al-Jabri noted that some MOI offices connected with JCCIP might relocate to the Diplomatic Quarter to facilitate closer cooperation. ¶10. (S) Programmatically, the JWG/IS would cover all security matters "inside the fence" of critical facilities. The work of this group would include assessments of facilities, developing and implementing security standards and regulations, monitoring the MOI's industrial security system, and assistance with MOI's national contingency planning. This group would work tacitly with the owners like ARAMCO and SABIC. This JWG would essentially mirror those of various MOI's departments which are responsible for all policy, procedures, and standards at critical facilities. ¶11. (S) Regarding future site assessments, MOI wants to review the results of the Abqaiq assessment, scheduled to be presented by DOE on Oct. 27 in Riyadh, before it commits to further assessments. Additionally, MOI requests U.S. assistance in developing a Threat Advisory System (similar to system used by the Department of Homeland Security). -------------- JWG for Facilities Security Force -------------- RIYADH 00001579 003 OF 003 ¶12. (S) The FSF is responsible for protecting everything "outside the perimeter fence." It will not be involved in what goes on inside the facility. Al-Jabri wants to move quickly on the JWG for Facilities Security Force (JWG/FSF). He said this is MOI's top priority. He characterized the work of this JWG as "building an army from scratch". Al-Jabri agreed that this could best be done through CENTCOM's proposal for an OPM-FSF similar to OPM-SANG which has successfully advised the Saudi Arabian National Guard for many years. Like its namesake, OPM-FSF will advise on organization, recruitment, training, and operations. This week, MOI will receive CENTCOM's draft Letter of Request (LOR) to review, which is the initial step in the FMS process to establish OPM-FSF. ¶13. (S) Al-Jabri said that the MOI wants the Facilities Security Force working group to assume responsibility for Maritime Security and help the FSF assume coastal/maritime duties currently performed by MOI's Coast Guard. These duties include the protection of on-shore oil facilities such as the Ras Tannurah and Safaniyah sites, desalination plants and power plants, as well as off-shore oil platforms and loading sites. 5,000 of FSF's authorized strength is to be dedicated to maritime protection. -------------- JWG for Internal Security -------------- ¶14. (S) The third JWG, JWG-Internal Security, would encompass assessments, training, and performance testing for elements of the MOI not covered by the other two working groups. Al-Jabri specifically wants to add cyber security to the list of areas for U.S.- Saudi cooperation. Al-Jabri stressed his strong interest in this topic because he believed Saudi Arabia was vulnerable to the threat of a cyber attack. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶15. (S) COMMENT. The Saudis began discussing critical infrastructure protection with us just after the Feb. 2006 failed attack against Abqaiq. Two years later, they are just about to receive their first detailed threat assessment. They believe the threat is very real and are pressing us to move more quickly in implementing JCCIP. Prince Mohammed bin Naif was unusually blunt with both the Ambassador and Undersecretary Edelman. Accurate or not, he believes that should a successful attack disrupt global energy supplies occur, a lack of urgency on the part of the USG will be partially to blame. ¶16. (S) The consolidation into three working groups is due to MOI's lack of capacity to staff more working groups. The creation of the Internal Security Working Group is the first indication we have received of MOI interest to expand JCCIP beyond the relatively limited scope of infrastructure protection. END COMMENT. FRAKER