DHAHRAN EAC - 24 SEPTEMBER 2008

S E C R E T RIYADH 001465 NOFORN SIPDIS DHAHRAN SENDS DEPT FOR NEA/EX, NEA/ARP, DS/IP/NEA, DS/ITA, DS/IP/SPC/MSG, AND INR E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2018 TAGS: AMGT ASEC PGOV PTER SA SUBJECT: DHAHRAN EAC - 24 SEPTEMBER 2008 Classified By: CG Joseph Kenny for reasons 1.4(c),(d) and (g) ¶1. (S/NF) On September 24, the Consul General convened a meeting of the EAC to discuss the consulate's security posture in light of the attack on the US Embassy in Sana'a and the Marriott hotel in Islamabad, along with the continuing stream of threat reporting for the region. Also present were RSO, GRPO, MGMT, CONS, MSG and DHS. ¶2. (S/NF) RSO began the meeting by providing an overview of the method of attack used in the attack on the US Embassy in Sana,a. In particular, RSO noted the paramilitary tactics used, as well as the level of planning and resources needed to successfully initiate such an attack. Additional discussion involved the attack on the Marriott hotel. RSO stated that a similar sized vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED),that if detonated at the CG compound access point (CAC) would cause catastrophic damage the consulate's CAC and would irreparably damage the compound vehicle gate. Due to age, significant to catastrophic structural damage may also result to the chancery and perimeter wall. Due to concrete bollards and delta barriers, however, it is not believed that such a VBIED would be able to successfully access the compound perimeter. The CAC is approximately 175 meters from the chancery. ¶3. (S/NF) Based on recent threat reporting, there remains the possibility that an attack may occur in the region during the upcoming Eid holiday (for Dhahran the period is 29 Sept. to 5 Oct.). Although no specific threat is known to exist for Consulate Dhahran or the Eastern Province of KSA, post continues to remain at a constant state of vigilance. A number of post personnel are expected to be away from post during some point of the Eid holiday. ¶4. (S/NF) Due to the continuing stream of reports indicating a potential attack in the region, RSO has continued to maintain an increased security posture. Armed LGF staff has been reassigned from roving patrol duties to static positions in proximity of the compound access points. Additional local police and Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) resources have been acquired, including the positioning of a second crew-served, vehicle-mounted machine gun and additional police presence at the street entrance and nearby checkpoint. MSGs remain on a modified restriction to bolster post's defensive posture. RSO further noted that a security technician from Riyadh was at post this week to repair and provide maintenance on security equipment. ¶5. (S/NF) RSO has reviewed the current level of motor pool security driver training and noted a serious weakness. Of the 13 drivers currently utilized approximately half have had no training and the remainder have not taken any refresher training more recently than two years ago. RSO will confer with RSOs in Riyadh and Jeddah to determine options for obtaining necessary initial or refresher training, as applicable. Post would appreciate any assistance provided by Washington-based resources. ¶6. (SBU) Post held a compound-wide Duck and Cover drill on 20 September. All staff participated in the drill, which included movement to safe havens, as well as reacting consulate security resources. An after-action discussion was held to obtain comments and suggestions for improvement. ¶6. (S/NF) The EAC determined that post's current security profile was appropriate based on current information. RSO reminded all staff to maintain a low profile during any public activities. Additionally, staff was strongly urged to avoid any public events. No official events are planned for immediate future and inclusive of the Eid holiday. ¶7. (U) RSO remains in frequent contact with RSOs in Riyadh and Jeddah. ¶8. (U) POC for this report is RSO Ed Roth. (Approved: Kenny) FRAKER RUNDELL