RIYADH EAC - 20 SEPTEMBER 2008

S E C R E T RIYADH 001436

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, DS/IP/NEA, DS/ITA, INR,
DS/IP/SPC/MSG
RIYADH PASS TO DHAHRAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2018
TAGS: ASEC AMGT CASC PGOV PTER PREL SA
SUBJECT: RIYADH EAC - 20 SEPTEMBER 2008

REF: A. IICT-2008-83A

B. TDX 315/069244-08

C. RIYADH 01423

D. SANAA 10547

Classified By: DCM DAVID RUNDELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(C),AND (D).


1. (S/NF) On September 20, the DCM convened a meeting of
Riyadh's EAC to discuss the Mission's security posture in
response to additional threat information received describing
further attacks planned against U.S. interests in the region
following the September 17 attack on the U.S. Embassy in
Sana'a. Also present in the meeting were MGT, CONS, LEGAT,
POL, ECON, DATT, PAO, GRPO, MED, ISC, AGR, DAO, POL-MIL, MSG,
DHS, IMO, ATO, CIP, GSO, CG Jeddah, CG Dhahran and RSO.


2. (S/NF) RSO opened the meeting by reading to the committee
the "Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Advisory" (ref
A). This advisory, that expires in 45 days (November 2,
2008),warns of continued and credible terrorist threats
against U.S. personnel, facilities and interests over the
next several weeks. As described, Al-Qaida leaders have
publicly indicated a desire to restart operations in the
region, and a body of intelligence reporting on outstanding
plots indicates Al-Qaida is planning attacks in Saudi Arabia,
the UAE, and possibly Kuwait, with additional attack planning
in Yemen in the near term also likely. GRPO also presented,
Ref B, a newly received, specific threat to large gatherings
of Americans in the Kingdom. A sanitized version of this
threat was provided for publication in a Wardens Notice.


3. (S/NF) In response to the described continued threat
stream identifying Americans and American interests as
potential targets in Saudi Arabia, the EAC unanimously agreed
to continue travel and other restrictions implemented by the
EAC on September 17 (ref C). These measures will be reviewed
by the committee on Wednesday, September 24.


4. (S/NF) To further bolster our existing physical security
posture, the RSO informed the committee of the installation
of portable Delta vehicle barrier to better control the
access road leading to the Embassy rear entrance. Also
supplementing existing security personnel around the
perimeter of the Embassy and Consulate facilities, additional
Saudi security personnel and equipment already requested were
reportedly in place or soon to be in place. In fact, in
Riyadh, shortly after the EAC meeting concluded, a Saudi
staffed machine-gun equipped security vehicle arrived to
supplement units already in place outside the Embassy
perimeter. Additional armed vehicles and/or soldiers were
also said to be forthcoming this date to patrol the
Ambassador's and DCM's residences and around the Embassy in
Riyadh and at Consulates in Jeddah and Dhahran.


5. (S/NF) Later this date, a Post-wide Duck and Cover drill
was conducted. After seeking cover in reaction to the Duck
and Cover alarm, all Embassy staff practiced moving to
Embassy safe havens, when instructed to do so by Marine Post
One. Staff participation, by all accounts, was complete and
enthusiastic.


6. (S) RSO continues to re-establish/re-staff Embassy
emergency teams, including First Responder Medical, Internal
Defense, and Emergency Excavation teams, with assistance and
participation offered by DATT, MED and others.


7. (SBU) RSO Riyadh will continue to maintain frequent
communication with RSOs Jeddah and Dhahran to coordinate
Mission responses to this continued threat.


8. (U) POC for this reporting in Riyadh is RSO John C. Taylor.

FRAKER
FRAKER