Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08RIYADH1423
2008-09-20 04:38:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:
RIYADH EAC - 17 SEPTEMBER 2008
how-toVZCZCXRO7476 PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR DE RUEHRH #1423 2640438 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 200438Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9191 INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 9754
S E C R E T RIYADH 001423
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, DS/IP/NEA, DS/ITA, AND
DS/IP/SPC/MSG
RIYADH PASS TO DHAHRAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
TAGS: AMGT ASEC CASC PGOV PTER PREL SA
SUBJECT: RIYADH EAC - 17 SEPTEMBER 2008
REF: SANAA 1547
Classified By: DCM David Rundell for reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d)
S E C R E T RIYADH 001423
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, DS/IP/NEA, DS/ITA, AND
DS/IP/SPC/MSG
RIYADH PASS TO DHAHRAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
TAGS: AMGT ASEC CASC PGOV PTER PREL SA
SUBJECT: RIYADH EAC - 17 SEPTEMBER 2008
REF: SANAA 1547
Classified By: DCM David Rundell for reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d)
1. (S/NF) On September 17, the DCM convened a meeting of the
EAC to discuss the Missions security posture in light of
today's attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa. Also present in
the meeting were POL, ECON, PA, CONS, BPM, MGT, MED, ISC,
AGR, DAO, POL-MIL, MSG, OPM-SANG, DHS and RSO.
2. (S/NF) RSO opened the meeting with an account of
information on the attack in Sanaa as reported by the press
and television. At the time of the EAC meeting, little
official reporting had been obtained from Embassy Sanaa
itself. Unofficial reports described a vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device (VBIED) 'car bomb' which
detonated near the perimeter wall of the embassy, followed by
sporadic gun fire. These initial reports included a casualty
report ranging from 1 local guard to 10 other persons of
unspecified nationality and occupation.
3. (S/NF) Reftel contained portions of a letter received by
Embassy Sanaa from the "Islamic Jihadist Organization" that
called for "sleeper cells in Yemen, Saudi and the UAE to
prepare according to the proposed plan for VBIED attacks on
foreign interests, especially British and American.
4. (S/NF) The DCM instructed EAC to review with their
respective sections the current security situation at post.
The DCM requested that appropriate Saudi security forces be
requested to provide additional security in the vicinity of
the Embassy and our facilities. RSO noted that the Embassy
was at a heightened security posture and confirmed the
readiness of the guard force and MSG detachment responses.
5. (S) The following actions were taken by the Riyadh EAC:
- No unessential travel off the Diplomatic Quarter (DQ) for
the next 48 hours
- Immediate cancellation of all social events that involve
outside guests for the next week
- Immediate test of the IDNS/SelecTone Drills (duck and cover
& Evacuation)
- Telephone and cell phone test to be conducted this date
- Review external wall project and reinforce any weak points
- Country-Wide Wardens Message
- Request extra Saudi security presence around facilities
- SSF for AMB (in Jeddah),DCM (Riyadh) and CGs (Dhahran and
Jeddah) alerted of threat with extra security for each
official requested
- All reminded to carry cell phone at all times and radio at
all times
- Remind all motor pool drivers of SOP in the event they are
off DQ and a Lock-Down occurs.
- MSG Detachment on call status until further notice
- LGF reviewed frequently and kept alert.
- Noticed reissued on color coded Emergency Evacuation Routes
familiarization
- Immediate closure of Annex compound for social events.
- The establishment of emergency teams, including a first
responder team, an internal defense team, and an excavation
team.
8. (U) Jeddah and Dhahran conducted their own EAC meetings,
reported separately.
9. (U) POC for this reporting in Riyadh is RSO John C. Taylor.
FRAKER
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, DS/IP/NEA, DS/ITA, AND
DS/IP/SPC/MSG
RIYADH PASS TO DHAHRAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
TAGS: AMGT ASEC CASC PGOV PTER PREL SA
SUBJECT: RIYADH EAC - 17 SEPTEMBER 2008
REF: SANAA 1547
Classified By: DCM David Rundell for reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d)
1. (S/NF) On September 17, the DCM convened a meeting of the
EAC to discuss the Missions security posture in light of
today's attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa. Also present in
the meeting were POL, ECON, PA, CONS, BPM, MGT, MED, ISC,
AGR, DAO, POL-MIL, MSG, OPM-SANG, DHS and RSO.
2. (S/NF) RSO opened the meeting with an account of
information on the attack in Sanaa as reported by the press
and television. At the time of the EAC meeting, little
official reporting had been obtained from Embassy Sanaa
itself. Unofficial reports described a vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device (VBIED) 'car bomb' which
detonated near the perimeter wall of the embassy, followed by
sporadic gun fire. These initial reports included a casualty
report ranging from 1 local guard to 10 other persons of
unspecified nationality and occupation.
3. (S/NF) Reftel contained portions of a letter received by
Embassy Sanaa from the "Islamic Jihadist Organization" that
called for "sleeper cells in Yemen, Saudi and the UAE to
prepare according to the proposed plan for VBIED attacks on
foreign interests, especially British and American.
4. (S/NF) The DCM instructed EAC to review with their
respective sections the current security situation at post.
The DCM requested that appropriate Saudi security forces be
requested to provide additional security in the vicinity of
the Embassy and our facilities. RSO noted that the Embassy
was at a heightened security posture and confirmed the
readiness of the guard force and MSG detachment responses.
5. (S) The following actions were taken by the Riyadh EAC:
- No unessential travel off the Diplomatic Quarter (DQ) for
the next 48 hours
- Immediate cancellation of all social events that involve
outside guests for the next week
- Immediate test of the IDNS/SelecTone Drills (duck and cover
& Evacuation)
- Telephone and cell phone test to be conducted this date
- Review external wall project and reinforce any weak points
- Country-Wide Wardens Message
- Request extra Saudi security presence around facilities
- SSF for AMB (in Jeddah),DCM (Riyadh) and CGs (Dhahran and
Jeddah) alerted of threat with extra security for each
official requested
- All reminded to carry cell phone at all times and radio at
all times
- Remind all motor pool drivers of SOP in the event they are
off DQ and a Lock-Down occurs.
- MSG Detachment on call status until further notice
- LGF reviewed frequently and kept alert.
- Noticed reissued on color coded Emergency Evacuation Routes
familiarization
- Immediate closure of Annex compound for social events.
- The establishment of emergency teams, including a first
responder team, an internal defense team, and an excavation
team.
8. (U) Jeddah and Dhahran conducted their own EAC meetings,
reported separately.
9. (U) POC for this reporting in Riyadh is RSO John C. Taylor.
FRAKER