MOVING FORWARD ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RIYADH 001408 SIPDIS WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP CENTCOM FOR POLAD, NAVCENT, J5 DOE FOR WBRYAN DEPARTMENT FOR P, S/CT, AND NEA/ARP E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2028 TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET LE MARR MCAP MOPS OVP PGOV PREL, PTER, SA, YM SUBJECT: MOVING FORWARD ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION REF: A. RIYADH 1252 B. RIYADH 1230 Classified By: Ambassador Ford M. Fraker for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (S) Summary: The Ambassador accompanied by CENTCOM J5 met Assistant Minister for Security Affairs Prince Mohammed bin Naif (MBN) to discuss the next steps in implementing the Critical Infrastructure and Border Protection (CIP) program designed to safeguard Saudi Arabia's oil production and water desalination facilities. MBN welcomed a visit in October by the Secretary for the Strategic Dialogue and for P to follow-up with a Joint CIP Commission meeting. The Saudis are ready to begin funding the CIP program and they are eager to establish an Facilities Security Forces (FSF) under CENTCOM's guidance. The next step is to assist the Saudis in drafting a Letter of Request (LOR) for the establishment of an Office of the Program Manager-Facilities Security Forces (OPM-FSF). It was presented to the Saudis that it would be best for the effectiveness of CIP to only contract with U.S. companies. Atmospherics were extremely positive with the Prince, where he welcomed the proposed next steps, offered full Saudi cooperation, and named working-level MOI POCs. He also offered his views on regional and local threats. End summary. -------------- CIP Formation and Concept -------------- ¶2. (S) The Ambassador accompanied by CENTCOM J5 MG John Allardice, DCM, GRPO, with associated staff, met Assistant Minister for Security Affairs Prince Mohammed bin Naif (MBN) on Sept. 11 in Jeddah to discuss the next steps in implementing the CIP program. MBN emphasized the importance and urgency of CIP. He mentioned how despite Al Qaeda in the Kingdom being beaten down, there are continuing threats to target Saudi oil facilities with the goal of destabilizing the region and damaging the global economy. ¶3. (S) The Ambassador informed MBN of the Secretary's expected visit to the Kingdom on Oct 19-20 to continue the U.S.-Saudi Strategic Dialogue, noting CIP would be a major topic. He suggested that Under Secretary for Political Affairs William Burns arrive later in October to chair with MBN the first Joint CIP Commission meeting. The Ambassador described how the Embassy established an inter-agency CIP Cell with the DCM as the CIP Coordinator. The cell will serve as MOI's working-level partner for this project. The Ambassador said the Joint CIP Commission will follow the JECOR (U.S.-Saudi Arabia Joint Economic Commission, Riyadh) model of undertaking several, simultaneous projects under a single USG management and funding structure. For CIP, the in-country management and funding authority would rest with the Ambassador, who will be supported by the Coordinator and the CIP cell. Overall responsibility for CIP within DOS rests with P, as outlined in the agreement signed by Secretary Rice and Minister of the Interior Naif bin 'abd al-'Aziz in May; P and MBN would act as Co-Chairmen of the Commission. ¶4. (S) The Ambassador provided MBN an outline of the seven Working Groups (WG) to be established under the Joint Commission framework. The WGs would be based in Riyadh and they would include U.S. and Saudi participants designated to conduct the daily work of coordination, training, equipping, assessment, and guidance pertaining to their particular tasks: - Infrastructure WG - Ports/Terminal WG - Facilities Security Forces WG RIYADH 00001408 002 OF 004 - Border Guard WG - Nuclear Security WG - Maritime WG - Internal Security WG ¶5. (S) MBN was extremely receptive to both the Secretary's and P's proposed visits, and he assured us of MOI's full cooperation with the Embassy Riyadh CIP Cell, CENTCOM, and all other USG agencies. He named MG Dr. Sa'ad al-Jabri as the MOI's lead working level contact. -------------- OPM-FSF -------------- ¶6. (S) MG Allardice presented CENTCOM's draft proposal for the establishment of a CIP training organization to support and guide MOI's planned 35,000 man force. This organization -- Office of the Program Manager, Facilities Security Force (OPM-FSF) -- would be modeled along the lines of OPM-Saudi Arabia National Guard, by which DOD has successfully partnered with the Saudi government in developing the Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG) since 1973. OPM-FSF essentially could also provide the U.S. participation for the WGs on FSF, Ports and Terminals, and other groups that would benefit from CENTCOM's assistance and expertise. He added that the final report of the DOE-led vulnerability assessment of the Abqaiq oil facility conducted in August, with MOI and CENTCOM participation, would be ready by mid-October and that this could serve as a stepping stone for future vulnerability assessments. MG Allardice advised the next step for OPM-FSF would be an LOR from the SAG to the USG requesting the establishment of OPM-FSF, and he offered CENTCOM's assistance to MOI in drafting this LOR. He recommended the LOR be made ready before the Joint Commission meeting in October. ¶7. (S) MBN was enthused by the OPM-FSF concept. He agreed to draft the LOR with CENTCOM's assistance, and he eagerly awaited the DOE vulnerability assessment and its recommendations. He mentioned there was some SAG concern about the pace of CIP developments since the May signing of the Technical Cooperation Agreement, yet he felt reassured by the USG's current actions. MBN agreed to make an initial deposit of USD 500,000 into the CIP account established by the Department of the Treasury, and he gladly accepted Post's offer to assist in the technical process of making the first deposit. He expressed appreciation for having only one point of contact (i.e. the CIP account) for funding, as it made it much simpler for MOI. It was made clear by MBN that he was ready to sign any additional MOUs with us, but wanted to avoid bureaucracy as much as possible and to move forward as quickly as possible with a CIP structure based on a single point of contact between the USG and SAG for oversight and funding. ¶8. (S) MBN mentioned his desire for high-technology sensors to supplement border and installation security operations, indicating he wanted more than just trained border troops. He stated the Saudi border force along the Kingdom's northern frontier with Iraq could be manned by 2000 troops instead of 6000, because high-technology sensors provided the same level, and often superior, coverage than ground forces alone. MBN pointed out that over the long-run automated sensors are more cost effective than having to continually recruit and train new personnel. Also, mechanical sensors are less likely than a non-local FSF trooper to inflame tribal sensitivities among the border population. -------------- RIYADH 00001408 003 OF 004 U.S.- Only Contractors -------------- ¶9. (S) In a follow-on private meeting between MBN, the Ambassador, and DCM, the Ambassador explained that CIP would be most effective if only U.S. companies were utilized because it would facilitate inter-operability and it would ease working relationships with the USG-led CIP WGs. The Ambassador specifically mentioned Raytheon's bid for the Command/Control/Communications/Computer/Intel ligence (C4I) contract for the Saudi Border Guard Development Program. (Note: Thales, Raytheon and EADS, whose respective bids are USD 3.6 bn, USD 3.2 bn, and USD 1.8 bn, are all in competition for this contract with their bid proposals currently awaiting the SAG's final decision). The Ambassador asserted that the issue was more than simply commercial advocacy, and that the utilization of only U.S. companies for CIP was in the national security interest of both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. -------------- Views on Threats -------------- ¶10. (S) Throughout the discussions MBN commented on various threats. He informed us that MOI had just concluded a successful operation resulting in several arrests of terrorists in the Kingdom, mentioning that MOI remained active in countering cyber sites that promote terrorism and incite religious extremism. He expressed concern with Lebanon's volatile political situation, asking for MG Allardice's opinion, as he made several recent trips there. MBN was worried about external threats to the Kingdom's oil facilities, as well as internal threats. He said he knew terrorists, naming both Al Qaeda and Hizbollah, wanted to infiltrate Saudi Aramco. He expanded that terrorists also likely use the Hajj and Umrah as opportunities to enter the Kingdom and to then conduct terrorist operations. ¶11. (S) Additionally, MBN opined that Yemen was similar to lawless Afghanistan, with Al-Qaeda having relocated to Yemen, although terrorists were still targeting Saudi Arabia from their new locations. He informed us that the Saudi-Yemen Commission, headed by Crown Prince Sultan bin 'abd al-'Aziz and Yemeni Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Mujawwar, was active in promoting construction projects along the mountainous Saudi-Yemeni border to counter Al-Qaeda. He continued that to avoid corruption the SAG will use "projects instead of cash" as assistance to Yemen. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶12. (S) Comment: MBN made clear the SAG's great interest in CIP and its willingness to capitalize the CIP bank account, while expecting the USG to act quickly and responsively. We recommend the first payment of these moneys be used to pay DOE for the USD 355,000 cost of the Abqaiq assessment, so that further vulnerability assessments can be made. The upcoming Strategic Dialogue followed by the Joint Commission are excellent venues to move forward on this project. MBN is looking for the rapid establishment of OPM-FSF. We believe the LOR for OPM-FSF should be drafted and prepared for signatures as quickly as possible. Likewise, any MOUs that must be established should be prepared parallel to the drafting of the LOR. The Saudis appear fully ready to cooperate with us on CIP, which provides us significant opportunities on a broad range of issues in our bilateral relationship, while addressing the significant vulnerability RIYADH 00001408 004 OF 004 of the Kingdom's oil facilities, whose damage would jeopardize the U.S. and global economies. End Comment. FRAKER