SAUDI MFA OFFICIAL ON IRAQ

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 001205 NOFORN SIPDIS CENTCOM FOR GEN PETRAEUS; DEPARTMENT FOR S/I, NEA/ARP AND NEA/I; BAGHDAD FOR AMB CROCKER, MNF-I CG GEN ODIERNO AND RFORD E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2018 TAGS: ASEC IR IZ MCAP MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SA SUBJECT: SAUDI MFA OFFICIAL ON IRAQ REF: A. BAGHDAD 2306 ¶B. WALKER-GFOELLER AUG 4 E-MAIL ¶C. RIYADH 1150 ¶D. RIYADH 1034 ¶E. RIYADH 767 ¶F. RIYADH 708 ¶G. RIYADH 649 Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires Michael Gfoeller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. The Saudis support USG policy and strategy in establishing a stable Iraq. However, the Saudis remain extremely distrustful of PM Maliki and highly concerned over Iranian influence there. Therefore, they are still hesitant, at least for the interim, to commit any political capital or monetary funds for Iraqi reconstruction, including I-CERP. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S/NF) In a routine meeting on Aug. 5 to discuss overall bilateral issues, A/Pol Counselor and Saudi MFA Western Affairs Department Dr. Ra'ed Krimley engaged in a frank discussion of Iraq and related security issues. Krimley emphasized repeatedly he was expressing Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud's views. ¶3. (S/NF) Krimley admitted that the Iraqi security situation was continually improving, offering that the MFA is in the selection process for a Saudi Ambassador to Iraq, although he gave no information on when one would be appointed. However, he repeated the SAG's, including King Abdullah's personal, distrust of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki. Krimley noted that after Maliki's return from his most recent visit to Tehran, Maliki began publicly calling for a reduction in U.S. troops in Iraq and for a harder line regarding the proposed Status of Forces Agreement. A/Pol Counselor, referencing previous discussions with the SAG, strongly urged the Saudis to contribute to I-CERP as soon as possible. In his response, Krimley was non-committal about when funds would be made available. Krimley did acknowledge that Saudi Chief of General Intelligence Prince Muqrin Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and Iraqi National Security Advisor Mowaffaq Rubaie had been in regular contact. But this had been solely for intelligence sharing, not for Saudi-funded aid/reconstruction-related projects in Iraq. ¶4. (S/NF) Discussion turned to the upcoming Iraqi provincial elections. Krimley agreed that these elections are a necessary next step for national Iraqi reconciliation. He acknowledged that the SAG has links to various Sunni and Shia groups in Iraq. That said, he claimed the SAG has minimal political influence with them. Krimley opined that the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI) leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim was "more clever" than Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) leader Muqtada al-Sadr. He offered that Hakim was "biding his time" until U.S. forces eventually draw down in Iraq, when ISCI would begin to exert its "own influence on the Iraqi political structure." Krimley, while criticizing the U.S. decision to effect regime change in Iraq, stressed that the U.S. must maintain a strong military presence in Iraq to "ensure security for everyone." ¶5. (S/NF) COMMENT. Krimley is currently the highest-ranking MFA policy official still in the Kingdom. He is a protg and close advisor of Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, who works directly for the minister and is frequently seen in Saud al-Faisal's office. Although we cannot be sure that Krimley's comments accurately reflect the views of the King and the Foreign Minister, it is quite probable that they do. ¶6. (S/NF) Krimley's comments match what we have been long RIYADH 00001205 002 OF 002 hearing from the SAG. King Abdullah's vehement distrust of Maliki colors the SAG's relationship with the GOI. The Saudis remain extremely concerned over Iran's intentions in the region, and particularly fearful of Iran achieving de facto control of Iraq. They recognize the importance of a stable Iraq being able to counter Iranian expansionism. Therefore, they strongly favor a continued U.S. military commitment in Iraq and are worried about the effect of a precipitous U.S. withdrawal. They want Iraq to develop into a stable, secular, Arab-ruled neighbor free of Iranian influence or overt Shia extremism. They will likely, at least for the interim, maintain a wait and see attitude towards Iraq until they develop more trust in the GOI and are assured of a lasting U.S. presence in Iraq. Despite Krimley's non-committal approach, we believe there is value to continue to address the Saudis to contribute to I-CERP. END COMMENT. GFOELLER