CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE WORK PROGRESSES IN RIYADH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 001114 SIPDIS P FOR U/S WBURNS NEA FOR DAS GGRAY DEPT OF ENERGY PASS TO A/S KKOLEVAR, MWILLIAMSON, GPERSON, AND JHART S/CT FOR GFEIERSTEIN, SUSAN BURK, GAIL ROBERTSON, AND BAVERILL DS/ATA FOR KMALOY TREASURY PASS TO A/S CLOWERY DHS PASS TO TWARRICK AND DGRANT CIA PASS TO TCOYNE E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2018 TAGS: KCIP EPET ENERG PTER ASEC SA SUBJECT: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE WORK PROGRESSES IN RIYADH REF: SECSTATE 70793 Classified By: DCM Michael Gfoeller for reasons 1.4 (b) (c) and (d). ¶1. (U) This cable has been cleared by DOE A/S Kevin Kolevar. ¶2. (S) During a July 8 visit to Riyadh, DOE A/S Kevin Kolevar met with Ministry of Interior representatives Joint Working Group (JWG) on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Co-Chair Dr. Saud A-Semari and Dr. Khalid Al-Ageel, Manager, High Commission on Industrial Security. The U.S. JWG Co-Chair Economic Counselor Robert Murphy participated, as did a delegation from DOE and the Embassy. Major outcomes of the discussions included: -------------- Abqaiq Assessment to Move Forward -------------- ¶3. (S) Dr. Al-Semari told us the Saudis are now ready to move forward with a complete Vulnerability Assessment (VA) of Saudi Aramco's Abqaiq Plants. We are scheduling a visit by DOE and Sandia Lab personnel for early August to conduct the VA. This is a key win for the Joint Working Group. DOE's Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability is able to finance the VA, as we meanwhile work to finalize procedures for future Saudi financing of bilateral CIP efforts under the May 2008 Technical Cooperation Agreement signed by Secretary Rice. --Background to Abqaiq Plants: Abqaiq is the world's single largest petroleum processing and de-sulphurization facility. About 70% of Saudi crude production passes through Abqaiq for processing. The facility is critical to the world's petroleum markets. It has a through -put capacity of 7 million-plus barrel per day (bpd) capacity, of which 6.3 mbpd are routinely utilized. --The VA is an in-depth, technical review of the facility's operational and security systems. The VA includes a 2-week on-site data collection and discussion period, followed by a month-long data analysis period. A Sandia National Labs team will analyze Abqaiq data utilizing its VA computer models. The Saudi MOI would receive VA results and recommendations within about one month after completion of the on-site data collection. JWG members regard successful completion of the VA as one of our highest priorities, and a template for facility-based work in the future. --We are particularly concerned to identify Abqaiq components which were custom-manufactured several decades ago, in the 1970s, and for which Saudi Aramco may have no replacements or spare parts. Such single-point failures would be of grave concern. Saudi Aramco personnel have not been able to provide a clear picture of these vulnerabilities during past short visits to Abqaiq by JWG personnel. An in-depth analysis of Abqaiq's engineering plans and drawings, along with extended access to and discussion with key technical personnel, are required to better understand the plant's specific vulnerabilities. --The VA also will help us to better advise the MOI and Saudi Aramco on how to design security systems to protect Abqaiq, and for contingency planning to prepare for any possible attack on the facility. Such planning would allow Saudi Aramco and the MOI to better mitigate long-term damage, ensure maximum possible continuity of operations, and respond and recover as swiftly as possible. -------------- - MOI Requests Threat Warning System Assistance -------------- - ¶4. (C) The MOI had expressed an interest in adopting a national threat warning system, and had requested a briefing on systems in use in the U.S. During the July 8 meeting, DOE Infrastructure System Analyst VanderMey therefore presented on U.S. threat warning systems, including DHS's Homeland Security Advisory System and the U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Security System (MARSEC). Our MOI interlocutors were particularly impressed to learn how the USG works with industry in implementing the threat warning system, sharing information on an as-needed basis, and even sponsoring some industry personnel for security clearances so that information could be better shared. The group also discussed the utility of restricting a specific threat warning to a given region, city, or industrial sector. ¶5. (C) Dr. Saud-Al Semari requested the USG make available one employee who is familiar with the U.S. threat warning systems for a 6-12 month period to assist the MOI in implementing a similar system for Saudi Arabia. A/S Kolevar stated that he believed he could work with DHS or DOE to make such a person available, although perhaps for a shorter, more focused period of time. -------------- MOI Proposes Intelligence Liaison Offices with Key Sectoral Ministries -------------- ¶6. (S) Dr. Al Semari then steered the discussion towards how the USG structured its intelligence-sharing and liaison functions for agencies such as DHS and DOE. A/S Kolevar explained that the Department of Energy had its own intelligence division, but that it largely played a liaison role with the larger intelligence services. He, Economic Counselor Murphy, and Energy Analyst Burke also explored the frequent practice of seconding personnel between departments, offices, and functions to allow for better intelligence sharing. ¶7. (S) Dr. Al-Semari stated it would be useful for the MOI to establish a liaison office within MOI to better communicate with key sectoral ministries such as the Ministry of Petroleum (MinPet) and Transportation,or alternately, seek to establish liaison offices within these ministries. He noted that while the High Commission on Industrial Security (which oversees security and safety issues at parastatals such as Saudi Aramco and SABIC) had deepened ties with industry, the MOI still has no clear mechanism for working easily with other ministries. Dr. Al Semari concurred with Econ Off that having liaison personnel imbedded in a ministry would establish a more effective, on-going relationship, which could help ensure key counterpart ministers address security issues with appropriate understanding and seriousness. ¶8. (SBU) Regarding reftel A, Economic Counselor Robert Murphy hand-delivered the letter from U/S Burns to HRH Assistant Minister of Interior for Security Affairs Prince Mohammed bin Nayif on July 7. 2 -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The Mission was pleased -- on two levels -- to hear Dr. Al-Semari initiate the idea of establishing an MOI intelligence liaison to improve communication with other ministries. First, it will help the MOI function and communicate better with other key ministries who require security information to address their sector's challenges. Additionally, this is the first time within the JWG that the MOI has proposed a systemic change to improve its communication with other organizations. We have spent the last two years working closely with the MOI, encouraging them to coordinate and communicate with other parts of the government and industry on security issues. The MOI now appears to be thinking deeply and independently about how to apply these lessons to its own environment in a manner appropriate to Saudi norms. This is a small but we hope significant harbinger of progress to come. FRAKER